Campaign of the Fourteenth Regiment New Jersey Volunteers

by J. Newton Terrill

On Wednesday, the 25th, the 3d division was ordered to move, marching five miles to Noles' Station, for the purpose of destroying a portion of the Virginia Central Railroad, forty miles from Gordonsville and thirty from Richmond; the men stacking arms went to work with a will, and the road was soon destroyed for a distance of eight miles; at night the division moved back to their old position with the corps. During the afternoon Gen. Sheridan rejoined the army of the Potomac from the raid which he had started upon at Spottsylvania, having destroyed the depot at Beaver Dam and Ashland Station, four trains of cars, large supplies of rations, and many miles of track, besides re-capturing 400 of our prisoners who were on their way to Richmond under guard; met and defeated the enemy's cavalry at Yellow Tavern; captured the first line of works around Richmond, but finding the second line too strong to be carried by assault, he re-crossed to the north bank of the Chickahominy at Meadow's Bridge under heavy fire, and communicated with General Butler. This raid had the effect of drawing off the whole of the enemy's cavalry, making it comparatively easy to guard our trains.

According to orders, Gen. Butler moved his main force up the James River, and succeeded in taking Petersburg and destroying the railroad, but, failing to fortify his position, he was attacked in a fog by Beauregard and driven back; his army, therefore, though in a position of great security, was as completely shut off from further operations against Richmond as if it had been in a bottle strongly corked, and it required but a small force of the enemy to hold it there. The army having been sent to operate against Richmond was now lying at Bermuda Hundred, without power to do anything. Butler had thus far proved himself a military governor, but when it came to taking an army in the field he was not competent; but had General Sheridan been placed in command, Richmond would have fallen and the war ended sooner, thereby saving thousands of lives; but those scenes are past, and errors that are now seen if known at the time could have been avoided. The enemy were now enabled to bring the most, if not all, of the re-enforcements brought from the South by Beauregard, against the army of the Potomac, and in addition to this a very considerable force was brought in, not less than 15,000 men, by calling in the scattered troops under Breckinridge from the western part of Virginia. The position at Bermuda Hundred was as easy to defend as it was difficult to operate against the enemy. Grant therefore determined to bring from it all available forces, leaving only enough to secure what had been gained, and accordingly on the 22d, the 18th army corps, under command of Major General W. F. Smith, joined the army of the Potomac. On the 24th of May the 9th corps, which had been a temporary command, was assigned to the army of the Potomac, and from that time forward constituted a portion of General Meade's command. Finding the enemy's position on the North Anna stronger than any of his previous ones, Grant ordered another flank movement on the night of the 26th to the north bank of the North Anna river, and moved via Hanovertown, to turn the enemy's position by his right, starting at dark and re-crossing at Jerico's Ford, marching seven miles and then halting in the morning at Chesterfield's Station to issue rations. Thus far our regiment had taken an active part in the campaign, losing a great many men. Leaving Chesterfield at seven o'clock, we marched during the day twenty miles, passing Concord Church and Bowersville. Generals Torbert and Merritts' divisions of the cavalry, and the 6th corps were in advance, crossing the Pamunkey river at Hanovertown after considerable fighting, and on the 28th the two divisions of cavalry had a severe but successful engagement with the enemy near the river. On the 29th and 30th the troops advanced with heavy skirmishing to the Hanover Court House and Cold Harbor Road, and developed the enemy's position north of the Chickahominy. Late on the evening of the 31st the enemy came out and attacked our left, but were repulsed with considerable loss. An attack was immediately ordered by General Meade along the entire line, which resulted in driving the enemy from a part of his entrenched skirmish line. The 14th was on the skirmish line during the afternoon, and lost several in killed and wounded. Orderly Black of Co. I was shot in the heart and instantly killed; Col. Truex was slightly wounded in the hand, but remained on duty during the time; he was a brave officer and a fighting man, always at the head of his men when they were in action.

On the 31st General Wilson's division of cavalry destroyed the railroad bridges over the North Anna river, and defeated the enemy's cavalry. General Sheridan on the same day reached Cold Harbor Road, and held it until relieved by the 6th corps and General Smith's command, which had just arrived via White House, from General Butler's army.

Grant had thus far failed to exterminate Lee, but, confident of success, he determined, using his own expression, to fight it out on this line if it took all summer. The 6th corps had thus far suffered severely in those terrible battles of the Wilderness and Spottsylvania, losing over 10,000 men; but there was yet more to be done, as Lee was merely acting on the defensive, choosing his own position. On the morning of June 1st, 1864, the army was again ordered to move, the 6th corps in advance, starting at two o'clock a. m., and marching fifteen miles, relieving the cavalry at Cold Harbor; the roads were very dusty and the sun very warm; a heavy line of battle was formed during the afternoon; again the enemy were ahead of us and were strongly entrenched awaiting our approach; the cavalry had discovered their position and awaited our arrival. An attack was made at five o'clock, forming in four lines of battle, the 3d division being ahead, and the 14th New Jersey in the front line. A terrible battle was fought which lasted long after dark; the losses were very heavy on both sides; the 14th suffered severely, losing in the fight, in the short space of two hours, two hundred and forty in killed and wounded; Lieutenant Stults, of Co. H, and Lieutenant Tingley, of Co. E, were killed. Our men were compelled to fall back a short distance, entrenching during the night and building three lines of works. Firing continued during the night; a great many wounded had fallen between the lines unable to move, and lay all night under fire from both sides. Robert Perrine, of Co. K, being wounded in the hip fell in a ravine, being unable to move; he was struck eight times while lying there and mortally wounded; he was brought in next morning, and died at the White House. The Colonel of the 106th New York was also killed, his body lay but a short distance off from our lines, but the firing being so heavy it was impossible to get to him. The other corps having been held in readiness now came up and formed under a heavy fire, the 9th corps on the extreme left, the 5th on the right, and the 2d, 6th and 18th in the centre. We were now but twelve miles from Richmond, and had, at an immense loss of life, succeeded in driving Lee steadily back from Mine Run. The dust and heat were almost intolerable and flies and lice were in abundance. The men were compelled to lie close, as skirmishing was continued day and night. During the attack the enemy made repeated assaults on each of the corps not engaged in the main attack, but were repulsed with heavy losses in every instance. The 2d of June was spent in getting troops into position for an attack on the 3d, when the enemy's works were again assaulted in hopes of driving them from their position; in the attempt our loss was heavy, the 14th again suffering severely. Both armies were very much weakened by repeated losses, the enemy acting only on the defensive. Over 350 men had been lost from the 14th since crossing the Rapidan, but one short month before, and more were yet to be lost ere the rebellion would be crushed. The troops remained in line at Cold Harbor twelve days, and forts were built, heavy lines of works erected, and a regular siege commenced. Firing was kept up by the pickets and sharpshooters day and night, the men lying close when not on duty; many were shot while going after water and cooking. There was no place to wash and the weather was intensely hot; officers and men were covered with lice, huddled together as they were behind the works. Those twelve days were days that never will be forgotten; the sufferings of the men can never be told; it was death to stand up, as the bullets were continually flying through the air.

On the night of the 9th the enemy made an attack along the line, hoping to surprise our men, but they were handsomely repulsed by the 2d corps, driving them back from their first line of works. On the afternoon of the 6th a flag of truce was sent in by Lee requesting a suspension of hostilities for two hours, for the purpose of burying the dead between the lines; it was granted by General Meade, the pioneers were sent out and the wounded brought in, the dead being buried where they lay. But a few moments before both armies were engaged in hostile combat, now all was as still as death, the men talking with each other and exchanging papers, the Yankees trading sugar and coffee for tobacco; the works were lined with unarmed men, all gazing upon the solemn scene. The two hours soon passed, the signal was given, the men rushed back to their arms, and the rattle of musketry was again commenced along the line, Lieut. Tingly's body was recovered, but the body of Lieut Stults could not be found. The brigade was still commanded by Colonel Truex, the regiment by Lieut. Colonel Hall. The men were weary of the campaign, but there was no rest, it being Grant's determination to take Richmond. From the proximity of the enemy to their defences around Richmond it was impossible, by any flank movement, to interpose between them and the city. The army was still in a condition to either move by Lee's left flank and invest Richmond from the north side, or continue the move by his right flank to the south side of the James. Grant's plan from the start was to defeat Lee north of Richmond, if possible; then after destroying his lines of communication north of the James River, transport the army to the south side and besiege Lee in Richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat. After the battle of the Wilderness, it was evident that Lee deemed it of the first importance to run no risks with the army he then had, and acted fully on the defensive behind his works, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and in case of repulse could easily retire behind them. Without a greater sacrifice of life than Grant was willing to make, all could not be accomplished that he had desired north of Richmond; he therefore determined to hold the ground we then occupied, taking advantage of any favorable circumstances that might present themselves, until the cavalry could be sent to Charlottesville or Gordonsville to break the enemy's communications between Richmond and the southwest, and to cut off their supplies, compelling them in time to evacuate Richmond; when the cavalry got well off so that the enemy's cavalry would follow, to move the whole army south of the James by the enemy's right flank, and, if possible, cut off all supplies from all sources except by the canal.

On the 7th, two divisions of cavalry were sent under General Sheridan against the Virginia Central Railroad, to join with Hunter, who was then moving up the Shenandoah Valley. Seigel had met the enemy and was defeated by them with heavy loss, and was superseded by General Hunter. Thus far the work of the three armies had been but one-half accomplished. From the start, Butler was to take Richmond and Petersburg; Siegel to move on Lynchburg, and the Potomac army to whip Lee. Butler and Siegel had both failed, and the Potomac Army, that had never yet failed, had thus far accomplished all that was desired of it, and was left to finish what the other armies could not do. When Sheridan started for Lynchburg he was instructed to again join the Potomac army, choosing his own route in returning, after fulfilling his instructions.

Attaching great importance to the possession of Petersburg, General Smith's command, the 18th army corps was sent back to Bermuda Hundred via White House, to reach there in advance of the army of the Potomac. This was for the express purpose of capturing Petersburg, if possible, before the enemy became aware of our intentions and re-enforce the place. The 1st New Jersey regiment, whose term of office had now expired, were relieved from the front and sent home; they bade their comrades good-bye with happy hearts, soon to meet their loved ones at home. For three long years they had battled for their country, and their thinned ranks showed that they had suffered severely. The 14th had still fifteen months to serve, the hardest yet to come.

Finding that nothing more could be accomplished at Cold Harbor, the movement to the south side of the James commenced. After dark, on the night of the 12th, one division of cavalry under General Wilson, and the 5th corps, crossed the Chickahominy at Long Bridge, and moved out to White Oak Swamp, to cover the crossing of the other corps. The advance Corps reached James River at Charles City Court House on the night of June 13th; the 6th corps was left to guard the rear and the trains; marching on the night of the 12th twenty miles, halting thirty-two miles from Richmond; on the morning of the 14th marched eight miles to Charles City Court House, halting at noon near the river and pitching tents; guarding the rear until the trains passed; a pontoon bridge was laid, the troops crossing at Wyandott's Landing. The 3d division, the rear of the entire army, remaining on the banks of the James three days, until the trains had all passed. The army had now joined with Butler and moved on Richmond. After the army had crossed, the pontoons were taken up, and the 3d division placed on transports, and after sailing 25 miles—a splendid moonlight night—we landed at Bermuda Hundred at three o'clock the next morning. The James is a splendid River. One year ago the 14th was on the cars riding to Harper's Ferry; now in the vicinity of Petersburg. After landing the division marched eight miles, halting at five o'clock near Butler's headquarters for breakfast; cannonading and musketry at the front; the army was now in position, having failed to capture Petersburg, were investing the place.

During three years the armies of the Potomac and Northern Virginia had been confronting each other. In that time they had fought more desperate battles than it had ever fell to the lot of two armies to fight, without materially changing the vantage ground of either. The southern press and people, with more shrewdness than was displayed in the north, finding that they had failed to capture Washington and march on to New York, as they had boasted they would do, assured that they only defended their capital and southern territory; hence Antietam, Gettysburg, and all the other battles that had been fought, were by them set down as failures on our part and victories for them. Their armies believed this, and it produced a morale which could only be overcome by desperate and continuous hard fighting. The battles of the Wilderness, Spottsylvania, North Anna and Cold Harbor, bloody and terrible as they were on our side, were even more damaging to the enemy, and so crippled them as to make them wary ever after of taking the offensive. Their losses in men were probably not so great, owing to the fact that we were, save in the Wilderness, almost invariably the attacking party, and when they did attack it was in the open field. The details of those battles, which for endurance and bravery on the part of the soldiery, have rarely been surpassed, are too fresh in the minds of every one to be repeated again. During the campaign of forty-three days from the Rapidan to James River, the army had to be supplied from an ever-shifting base by wagons, over narrow roads and through a densely wooded country, with a lack of wharves at each new base at which to conveniently discharge vessels. Too much credit cannot therefore be given to our chief quartermaster, as the trains were made to occupy all the available roads between the army and our water course, and but little difficulty was experienced in protecting them.

Before proceeding farther, it will be necessary to explain as briefly as possible why Petersburg was not taken. As soon as the crossing of the army commenced, Grant proceeded by steamer immediately to Bermuda Hundred to give the necessary orders for the capture of the place. The instructions to Butler were to send to General Smith immediately that night all the troops he could give him, without sacrificing the position he held. After remaining with Butler a few hours, he returned immediately to the Potomac Army to hasten the crossing, and throw it forward to Petersburg by divisions as rapidly as possible. We could thus re-enforce our army more rapidly there than the enemy could bring troops against us. General Smith got off as directed, and confronted the enemy's pickets near Petersburg before daylight the next morning, but for some reason did not get ready to assault their lines until near sundown; then, with a part of his command only, he made the assault, and carried the first line for a distance of two and a half miles, capturing fifteen pieces of artillery and three hundred prisoners. This was about seven P. M. Between the line thus captured and Petersburg there was another line, and there was yet no evidence that the enemy had re-enforced Petersburg with a single brigade from any source. The night was clear, the moon shining brightly, and favorable to further operations. General Hancock, with two divisions of the 2d corps, reached General Smith soon after dark, but instead of taking those troops, and pushing at once into Petersburg, he lay quiet until morning, when the enemy under Beauregard came down from Richmond in force, and by the next morning the inner line of the works was fully manned by rebel troops. An attack was ordered the next morning, but failed, as the enemy were too strongly posted. The troops commenced entrenching, and a strong line of works was built around Petersburg.