Campaign of the Fourteenth Regiment New Jersey Volunteers

by J. Newton Terrill

On the morning of the 22d of September, eight days' rations were issued the men at two o'clock, and orders given to move at daylight. Tents were packed and everything in readiness, when the order was countermanded, the tents again placed on a line. The pickets were doubled, as it was supposed the enemy was advancing, and were about to attack; but this was soon forgotten, and vigilance again relaxed.

Winter quarters were now talked of by the men, as cold weather was approaching; they could scarcely keep warm in small shelter tents. Wood was very scarce and had to be carried some distance. The cold winds of October had come; extra blankets and overcoats were issued to protect the men from the cold. Forty-two dollars per year were allowed the men for clothing, and if they over-ran the amount, the difference was paid by them; if not drawn, the government paid the balance due the men.

On the 10th of October everything was quiet in camp. The various regiments were out on drill, when suddenly the long roll was beaten, and the troops, in double quick time, proceeded to camp. Orderlies were now running in every direction, everything in confusion, as the enemy were advancing in force. A line of battle was soon formed, extending some 15 miles. Our pickets were driven in, and the rebels were slowly advancing. Remained in line one hour, with arms stacked, the men lying on the grass awaiting orders. Returned to camp and packed up, ready to move, as the enemy had crossed the Rapidan and were advancing in force. At noon the troops moved, maneuvering in various directions. As yet no decisive order had been given, as it was not known what Lee's intentions were. The regiment marched three miles, halting in the camp the 6th N. J. had occupied, their camp showing signs of having been left in haste. The majority of the men being on picket, wagons were sent for their knapsacks. At ten o'clock the men pitched their shelters to get, if possible, a little sleep. Tents were up but a short time when orders came to pack up and move. The men formed in line but did not move, and lay on the ground until morning by camp fires, when the men again fell in, the day being Sunday, and marched in retreat, a forced march, the enemy following firing on our rear guard. Several times during the retreat a line of battle was formed by our men to protect the rear. Lee had been heavily re-enforced by troops sent from Bragg's army in the southwest, and was following closely, as the men remarked, "tight to our heels," destroying the railroad, burning bridges, etc. At Brandy station, the cavalry under Buford made a gallant charge, driving their advance guard back to Culpepper. The 106th N. Y. of third division, being on picket, were nearly surrounded, fighting their way out with small loss. Both armies were now using every exertion, part of the time Lee's army on a line with ours, moving for Centreville Heights. Arriving at the Hazel river, the troops were obliged to wait until pontoons were built, halting in line of battle, the rear guard skirmishing with the enemy during the entire march. The troops soon filed over on two bridges, which were taken up as soon as the army passed, the rebels laying theirs shortly after. Darkness now came on, and still the march was continued; the men, tired and weary often halting, forming line of battle, moving back and then advancing. At ten o'clock the Rappahannock was reached, the night very dark and cold; the men were compelled to wade the river waist deep, the water running rapidly. The troops halted on the banks of the river, having marched twenty-one miles since morning. A line of battle was now formed and a heavy picket force thrown out. The 14th Regiment was detailed, and orders given the men to light no fires nor to sleep. Chilled through, the men stood all night in their wet clothes. Several refused to cross the river and were taken prisoners the next day. At first it was supposed the enemy would not follow any farther than the river, but we were mistaken. All day Monday the men remained on picket, watching the movements of the enemy. At Fox's Ford, the 1st New Jersey cavalry were engaged for several hours, keeping the enemy at bay. The fords were all heavily guarded by the cavalry, and skirmishing was continually kept up. All was quiet in our immediate front, while the deep booming of the cannon was heard at intervals during the day on the extreme right or left. Our base of supplies was at Alexandria. The retreat had thus far been admirably conducted by Gen. Meade. Being afraid to hazard a battle against such odds, it was deemed expedient to retreat within the defenses of Washington, and with the troops there encamped to fight if necessary. It was now evident that it was Lee's intention to make a grand raid in the rear of the Army of the Potomac; cutting off railroad communication with Washington by destroying the bridges; securing supplies for his half famished troops and horses by seizing scattering wagon trains; and then by rapid marches throw his main force upon different points, and, if possible, destroy Gen. Meade's army by detail. When this flank movement was discovered Gen. Meade ordered a rear movement east of Culpepper, by Kilpatrick's and Buford's divisions of cavalry, with infantry supports. A. P. Hill's rebel corps had advanced on our north flank, towards Warrenton, threatening our right. Finding that Ewell's corps had not pursued us to the river, Gen. Meade sent three corps and Buford's cavalry towards Culpepper, but found no heavy force of the enemy there, Lee having by this time pushed his main column towards Warrenton, threatening our right and rear, while we were on the Rappahannock watching a portion of one of his corps. Lee hoped to execute his well-planned movement upon our rear, but our reconnoisance towards Culpepper led him to believe that it was Gen. Meade's intention to get in his rear. Instead of moving farther as he should have done, he halted his army, and took a position to give a decisive fight.

Up to this time Lee had the advantage, having surprised us while lying in camp. He was as near Washington as Gen. Meade, and unencumbered with trains, with every prospect of gaining Manassas or Centreville Heights, and cutting off our retreat and all our heavy trains. He evidently expected to be attacked on Tuesday, as we lay all day Monday on the Rappahannock, watching, as we supposed, his whole army, when it was only one of his corps, and he, as ignorant as we were, expecting us to attack him, maintaining his position in line of battle until noon Tuesday, awaiting our advance. Gregg's cavalry division had retarded the movements of the rebel leader Stuart's advance over the Rappahannock during Monday, although compelled to fall back from the river at night. Quietly, during the reconnoisance on Monday, Gen. Meade had prepared his trains, and got them en route rearward, and during Monday had withdrawn his corps from the Rappahannock, destroyed the railroad bridges, abutments and all, and sent the pontoons eastward before daylight on Tuesday morning; sunrise saw the whole army well on the way towards Washington. Our regiment was yet on picket, having been on over twenty-four hours. At three o'clock in the morning we were ordered to fall in, marching one mile, halting in the woods, stacking arms and cooking breakfast. At four o'clock we formed in line of battle; Co.'s E and G were sent out as skirmishers. Colonel Truex rode to the front of the regiment telling them he wished every man in his place; he wanted no shirking, as the enemy had crossed the river, their skirmishers were slowly advancing, and would soon be in sight. Again we were destined not to engage in battle, remaining in line one hour and then marched back, passing the place we stood picket with our backs to the Rappahannock; the army had crossed so often, only to return beaten by the foe. The brigade was now several miles ahead, and the men were compelled to march fast to keep up, passing the 1st and 2nd divisions, taking the fields and by-roads; at three o'clock halting near the railroad, supposing we were to remain until morning, as we had marched twenty miles. The enemy were pressing and again we were ordered to move. From elevated points of view the advance of our army over the plains of Manassas by four different roads, with flanking columns of infantry stretching for miles and moving steadily forward, was grand beyond description. Cannonading and musketry were frequently heard on our left flank, as bodies of rebel cavalry came down at different points, under the fixed belief that they would reach the railroad and cut our line unopposed. They were very much surprised at finding a force at every point, miles from the line of travel, to meet and repel them there. Nor was Lee less surprised when he learned that he was successfully out-generaled by Meade. He pushed off Stuart's cavalry from Sulphur Springs upon our rear on Tuesday evening, and rushed forward Hill's corps at a double quick to support them. Ewell advanced more leisurely, capturing our stragglers, a great many falling out, some forty from the 14th regiment were taken and sent to Belle Isle, there to linger, starved and nearly frozen, during the long, dreary days of Winter.

The firing in the rear now became heavier, the men hastened their steps. The 2nd corps was passed, halting in a woods for supper, and to protect the rear, relieving the 3d corps that had guarded the rear during the day. Our weary columns now pressed on without any rest until twelve o'clock at night, when the camp fires of the advanced guard were discerned in the distance. After marching through a dense woods, 3 miles in length, the regiment halted in an open field with the rest of the brigade near Greenwich, having been furnished with eight days' rations, muskets, equipments and sixty rounds of ammunition, marched thirty-three miles since morning. During the march Gen. French and staff were fired into by guerillas, but fortunately none of them were injured.

After resting about four hours, the troops were again routed out long before daylight, resuming our march; being the rear guard the day before, the 3d corps was now in advance in four columns. Our army pressed on, knowing that if Centreville Heights were not reached by us before Lee, all would be lost, and like Pope, Meade would have been left to get out of the scrape the best way he could. At daylight Hill's corps rushed upon Warren with the 2d corps; in vain he endeavored to cut them off; forming the 2d corps in two lines of battle at Bristoe Station, the brave Warren awaited their advance until within a few yards, and then opened with his artillery and musketry, driving them back with severe loss; in turn charging them, capturing 450 prisoners and 6 guns, leaving 500 of them killed and wounded on the field. When first attacked at Bristoe Station, Warren threw his infantry from a hill south of the road down through a swamp near the railroad, under a storm of shot and shell. The raw recruits that were sent to the army at Rout Hill, were nearly all of them placed in the 2d corps and in this, their first battle, gave themselves up for lost. Pale and trembling they involuntarily went forward, took position with their comrades and performed their portion of the fight. Every whistling rifle ball, every shrieking shell, they apprehended was to destroy them individually. It was beyond their comprehension when told they had met, charged and beaten a brave enemy in a fierce fight, and captured several hundred of Hill's veterans, six guns and three battle flags, besides wounding hundreds of rebels, and come out of the fight unhurt. Their immediate commanders say they fought equally as well as the old boys, showing no signs of fear when the first impulse had passed. At three o'clock the corps was ordered to halt, the guns of Warren could be plainly heard. The regiment halted on Manassas plains near a brick house used for a signal station, where Beauregard had his headquarters at the battle of Bull Run. The day was rather sultry; occasionally a shower came up, which was very refreshing to the tired men. The troops had a splendid view of the old Bull Run battle ground. The brigade countermarched one mile, and forming line of battle proceeded to the help of Warren; but he needed no assistance, as he had driven Hill back. During the march the enemy pressed us so hard that we were compelled to leave the sick and wounded in their hands. Crossed Broad Run, wading it knee deep; also crossed Bull Run at night, the army forming a line front to the enemy, from Chantilly on the north to Wolf Run shoals on the south. Not a farthing's worth of property had been abandoned to, or destroyed by the enemy, out of millions of dollars transported from Culpepper. Nearly seventy-five miles were marched in three days, our advance on Centreville Heights being only a few hours ahead of Lee.

Thus Lee was again out-generaled by Maj. Gen. Meade; by ceaseless and untiring vigilance he kept himself possessed of all their movements and designs, and by marches of unparalleled rapidity, in which the troops suffered without murmuring the loss of rest for successive nights, marching on through daylight and darkness, in storm and cold, he overcame the first day's march the enemy had gained, our advance being already in possession of the Heights when the rear guard was engaged at Bristoe, full ten miles distant. In consequence of hard marching the men were very tired, and with blistered feet and weary limbs were glad to rest on the old Bull Run battle ground, amid the bones of men and horses that were now resting there. Forty from the regiment were captured on the march, being unable to keep up. At 11 o'clock the troops encamped, resting on their arms till morning. Maneuvering on the Heights, forming line of battle, moving forward, passing the 1st, 2d and 5th corps on the Heights; marching seven miles to Union Mills; raining hard. The next day the regiment was detailed for picket, remaining on one day; was then relieved by the 122d Ohio regiment of 3d division; remained at Union Mills five days; every morning routed out at three o'clock in line of battle until daylight.

Our line of defence was now taken up as follows: From the vicinity of Chantilly on the right to Union Mills on the left, with cavalry on either flank; Birney's division of the 3d corps was stationed at Fairfax Court House, the depot of supplies; the 3d division on the extreme left at Union Mills; the 6th corps under Sedgwick, on the extreme right at Chantilly, with Kilpatrick's cavalry to protect the flank; the 2d corps in the rear, was held in readiness to be sent where most needed. The troops were now inspected, and articles most needed given out, and new clothing given to those who did not draw at Culpepper. Gen. Sickels, our old commander, visited the corps at Union Mills. He was received by the men with cheers, and welcomed back. His stay was brief, as he had not recovered from his wound, his leg having been amputated near the hip. Lee, foiled in his attempt to take Washington, retraced his steps, falling back rapidly towards his entrenched position on the Rapidan. It was feared that he would again cross the Potomac in the direction of Harper's Ferry, for another extensive raid into Maryland and Pennsylvania, as there were frequent reports coming from sources usually reliable, but all of them proved groundless; if he had again attempted it he would have found the Potomac army ready, and well prepared for any engagement. With re-enforcements from Washington, the army was again ready to move with a view to overtake Lee if he should be retreating, or to intercept his return if he should have gone towards the Potomac.

On the morning of Oct. 19, the order to advance was again given; marching during the morning seven miles, halting at noon on Manassas Plains, near Clarksville, marching over a railroad bridge at Pope's Run, the rain pouring in torrents. Construction trains had now run as far as Bristoe Station, the trussle bridge having been burnt by the rebels and the tracks between Manassas and Catlet's Station almost wholly destroyed by them. For the first time in two months we saw the cars, having marched on by roads from Maryland to Culpepper, or on main roads far from any railroad. The pursuit now commenced in earnest, and Lee, who but a short time before was confident of victory, was now in turn retreating. Again the tables were turned; by strategic skill Gen. Meade had baffled all the designs of the skillful rebel chieftain. After a weary march of three days in cold and storm, he succeeded in placing the Union army in such a position that it would be madness for any foe to attack it, and now the discomfited rebel army beats a hasty retreat, attempting by rapid movements and shrewd devises, to get back to their fortified position on the Rapidan before the Union Army could overtake them in their haste. As we retired from the Rappahannock to the fortified Heights of Centreville, the enemy followed, shouting victory; every step they advanced seemed to them an assurance that Washington was in their grasp. Proudly and defiantly they pressed on after our retreating columns, thinking that the army of the Potomac had been weakened by drafts upon it for the army in the southwest, and that we would be wholly unable to protect the Union capitol; every mile we retired strengthened them in their feeble delusion. Succeeding in getting possession of the shortest line from the Rappahannock to Centreville, they thought to possess those heights in advance of our army, then wheeling destroy us, leaving Washington a sure fruit of their success. It was a scheme well planned, and if successful, would have given the Confederates their independence; but the commander of the Union army was not idle, he understood their plans. By ceaseless and untiring energy and by rapid marching, he came out victorious, and we were again to traverse the same road, not in retreat, but as a victorious army. Ten days from the time of our starting from Culpepper, found us again on the advance. On the 20th the troops crossed Broad Run and Kettle Run near Bristoe Station, wading them knee deep; found the railroad destroyed, bridges and ties burned, marched over the hill where Warren, with the 2d corps, engaged the enemy, the result being well known to our readers, the remains of dead horses and men lying around; marched 16 miles, taking the wrong road. The 1st and 2d divisions had waded a stream very deep when the mistake was discovered, and they were compelled to re-cross again, halting for the night near Greenwich; no signs of the enemy, the weather very cold.

The next day the column again started, marching seven miles, the 2d corps halting at Buckley's Mills, and the 3d corps encamping at Catlet's Station. The railroad was totally destroyed, the rebels having placed the ties on heaps, and then setting them on fire; with the rails on top becoming red hot, they were bent nearly double, rendering them entirely useless. At Catlet's Station the troops were ordered in camp until the railroad was rebuilt. The regiment was detailed for picket at Weaverville, near a mill on Cedar Run; remained one day until relieved by the 87th Pennsylvania; marched when relieved three miles, near corps headquarters. The corps remained at Catlet's Station ten days, during which time we were constantly on the move, changing camp five times. The men were detailed to rebuild the railroad; trees were cut and ties made, the men working with a will. Soon the road was re-built, rails having been sent on construction trains from Washington; about forty miles of road had been destroyed, part by our troops and part by the rebels. During our encampment at Catlet's Station, the first military execution that had ever occurred in the 3d corps took place on Friday afternoon in the 1st division. The culprit was private Henry C. Beardsly, who originally enlisted in the 5th Michigan infantry. He was always a worthless, quarrelsome soldier and a shirk. He deserted before fighting a battle, and afterwards enlisted in a cavalry regiment, from which he also deserted; being caught with such a record there was no hope for him. He was shot in the presence of the entire division at two o'clock in the afternoon. The arrangements were most perfectly made by the Provost Marshal of the division, the ceremonies being exceedingly solemn. The poor fellow met his death more boldly than he lived. Twelve-muskets were fired at him, eleven balls entered his breast, one musket being blank; he died without a struggle.