The Life, Public Services and Select Speeches of Rutherford B. Hayes

by J. Q. Howard

This table shows that in ten years the State taxes have increased thirty-three per cent, and that local taxes have increased almost one hundred and seventy per cent; in other words, that less than one-tenth of the increase has been in State taxes, and more than nine-tenths in local taxes.

The increase of local taxation has been far greater than the growth of the State in business, population or wealth. It is not to be doubted that this burden has grown to dimensions which seriously threaten the prosperity of the State.

No full and exact statement can be made from the official reports as to the amount annually collected from the property-holders of the State in the form of special assessments for what are termed local improvements, but it is certain that this burden is also great and rapidly growing.

The auditor of State reports cases in which such assessments have been made, amounting to half of the cash value of the property on which they were levied, and, in one case which he refers to, the assessment was double the value of the property.

In respect to these evils it is undoubtedly easier to find fault than to provide a remedy. No single measure will remove them. Probably no system of measures which the General Assembly can adopt will of themselves accomplish what is desired. A complete reform is impossible, unless the city, county, and other officers are disposed and thoroughly competent to do the work of cutting off every unnecessary expenditure.

Much, however, can be accomplished by wise legislation. Let the General Assembly firmly adhere to the policy of the constitution, and refuse to enact special laws granting powers to tax or make assessments. Let such powers be exercised only in pursuance of general laws. Local authorities should be empowered to levy no higher rate of taxation than is absolutely required for practical efficiency under ordinary circumstances. In extraordinary cases general laws should provide for the submission of the proposed tax or assessment to the people to be affected by it, under such regulations that it can not be levied unless at least two-thirds of the tax-payers approve the measure.

One of the most valuable articles of the present State constitution is that which prohibits the State, save in a few exceptional cases, from creating any debt, and which provides for the payment at an early day of the debt already contracted. I am convinced that it would be wise to extend the same policy to the creation of public debts by county, city, and other local authorities. The rule "pay as you go" leads to economy in public as well as in private affairs; while the power to contract debts opens the door to wastefulness, extravagance, and corruption.

In the early history of the State, when capital was scarce and expensive public works were required for transporting the products of the State to market, public debts were probably unavoidable; but the time, I believe, has come when not only the State, but all of its subordinate divisions, ought to be forbidden to incur debt. The same rule on this subject ought to be applied to local authorities which the constitution applies to the State legislature. Experience has proved that the power to contract debt is as liable to abuse by local boards as it is by the General Assembly. If it is important to the people that the State should be free from debt, it is also important that its municipal divisions should not have power to oppress them with the burden of local indebtedness.

It would promote an economical administration of the laws if all officers, State, county, and municipal, including the members of the legislature, were paid fixed salaries.

Under existing laws a part of the public officers are paid by fees and a part by fixed annual salaries or by a per diem allowance. The result is great inequality and injustice. Many of those who are paid by fees receive a compensation out of all proportion to the services rendered. Others are paid salaries wholly inadequate. For example, many county officers and some city officers receive greater compensation than the judges of the Supreme Court of the State. The salaries paid to the judges ought to be increased; the amount paid to many other public officers ought to be reduced. To do justice, a system of fixed salaries, without fees or perquisites, should be adopted. The people of Ohio will, without question, sustain an increase of the salaries of judges and of other officers who are now inadequately paid; but it can probably best be done as a part of a system which would prevent the payment to public officers of enormous sums by means of fees and perquisites. To remove all ground of complaint, on account of injustice to present incumbents, the new system should apply only to those elected after its adoption.