The Causes of the Successes of the Ottoman Turks

by J. Surtees Phillpotts

The feudal system of the Ottomans was essentially military. It was the device of an aggressive power and was made to answer a double purpose; to secure the permanency of its conquests, and to supply soldiers for war. Ottoman feudalism was wholly different from that which prevailed in Western Europe. The great distinction lay in the fact, that among the Ottomans all the feudal vassals held their fiefs directly of the Sultan, or his officers; whereas in Western Europe, between the sovereigns and the lower tenants was interposed a powerful class, which always more or less counterbalanced the supreme power. The one was the division of a kingdom into petty fiefs, the other the fusion of conquered territories under the sway of one victorious monarch. It was through the feudal system of the Ottomans, in combination with their institution of slavery, that war was made to feed war; that every conquest supplied the means for future conquest.

The use of the Ottoman system for the supply of soldiers in time of war may be estimated from the fact, that an armed horseman was required for every fief of the value of twelve pounds a year, and another for every additional twenty pounds. In the time of Solyman these fiefs were able to furnish 150,000 cavalry[6]. The feudal troops were always kept in readiness, nor was anything required to summon them to the field but an order of the Sultan to the two Beglerbegs of the Empire from whom it was communicated to a regular gradation of officers entrusted with the task of mustering these Spahi, or Cavaliers, in their separate divisions[7]. This force served without pay. If they fell in battle, they were honoured as martyrs: if they distinguished themselves, or if the expedition was successful, they were rewarded with larger gifts of property. All their hopes of advancement depended upon the Sultan, and his success in war. They were ready to do his bidding in any part of the world, for the greater part of every country which they subdued was divided among the members of their own body.

It is to this institution of feudalism that we must look for an explanation of the fact, that the Turkish conquests, unlike those of other great conquerors, seldom returned to their original possessors. Immediately an additional piece of territory was gained, it became an integral part of the Empire. Thus it was that the Sultans were able to consolidate and unite their dominions, step by step, with every fresh acquisition of land. In most cases, the conquest of distant territories has been any thing rather than lucrative to the victorious nation. But the Turkish conquests reimbursed the Sultan, and enriched the nation; some portions of land were regularly assigned to the sovereign, and others became public property.

Thus the community of the Timarli, or fief-holders, carried out, on a large scale, the intention of the Roman system of colonise, both as guarding the dangerous frontiers and ensuring the preservation of conquered lands.

But there is one aspect of the Ottoman feudalism which we have not yet regarded, and which redounds more than any other to their honor. Toleration of creed, with one remarkable exception, was given to the conquered Christians, and even in the days of Othman, equal protection was dealt out alike to Greek and Turk, Christian and Mahometan. This tolerant and enlightened system induced numbers of the Christians who dwelt on the borders of the Ottoman Empire to exchange their hard position, as Hungarian serfs, for that of Rayas under the Turks.

We have said that there was one most signal exception to the general toleration of their rule, and this was the institution of the corps of Janissaries, the Yengi Cheri, or “New Soldiers” of Alaeddin. The importance of a well-disciplined standing army struck the far-seeing mind of Orchan’s coadjutor, and to the organization of the army he gave his chief attention during the twenty years of peace of which we have spoken. He first formed, of the native Osmanli, a corps of paid infantry. But it soon appeared that these Turks were too proud and turbulent to endure the necessary discipline. In this perplexity we are told that Alaeddin sought the advice of his relative Black Khalil Tschendereli. Black Khalil’s counsel dictated a device of the most subtle and effective kind—that the Ottoman army must be formed out of the children of the conquered Christians, who should be forced to become Mahometans. By this means, he argued, you will gain troops which can be schooled to any discipline. To the Mussulman religion you will gain many converts, while you will prevent any rebellion of your Christian subjects by the incorporation of the whole strength of their race with your own forces. The plan was adopted by Alaeddin and carried out in the next reign by the First Amurath. Amurath’s warlike spirit, and the lust of conquest that was predominant in his race, led him to make repeated expeditions against the Sclavonic tribes of Servia and Bosnia. Among this hardy race he found no treasures of gold and silver—no spoil for his conquering army—but he found an inexhaustible supply of brave soldiers[8]. The children who were taken captive in his wars were immediately disciplined in the schools of the Janissaries, and in due time drafted into their ranks. Those who were not available for this purpose, or for the service of the Sultan, were sold as slaves, and thus brought in a considerable revenue to the Turkish Emperor.

As long as the flower of the Christian youth were converted not merely into Mahometans, but into devoted supporters of the Ottoman power, any revolt of the Rayas was impossible. In their strict discipline and continued occupation the proselytes lost all remembrance of their kindred and their country. With the highest positions in the Empire open to their ambition, they might well glory in a station that raised them over the heads of the native Osmanli. The rigorous pride with which they kept their own body aloof from any foreign admixture may offer a parallel to that remarkable system by which the proudest chivalry of Egypt was formed out of Circassian slaves.

Thus at the court of the Sultan were gathered an abundance of men, from various nations, devoted only to the common weal of the race into which they were adopted. Not only were there the prisoners taken in war, as well as the tithe, so to speak, of Christian children taken every five years, but from every pacha of the Empire came presents of slaves to the Sultan[9]. These slaves were divided into different classes, according to their abilities. Those who were destined for Janissaries were trained to every exercise that could increase their physical strength, and inure them to toil and hardship. Others were educated for the more immediate service of the Sultan, either as his state-officers or his body-guard. Thus the Turkish armies, though they were those of an Asiatic nation, were composed of the hardiest of Europeans. Nor were these Europeans ever suffered to fall into the enervating habits of Asiatics. They had no homes in which they could be pampered with Oriental luxury. Their barracks were like monasteries; their dress the dark robes of monks; their meals the frugal fare of mountaineers. They were not allowed to take wives; they might ply no trades; engage in no commerce; nor were any admitted into their body who had not gone through the regular course of this discipline. At home they lived as if they were in the camp; in the camp they preserved the same order, the same discipline as at home. War was the occupation of their life. They had given no “hostages to fortune;” they had no domestic ties that could bind them to a peaceful life. Their hopes of advancement rested on their valour in battle. They were justly proud of the achievements of their corps, and were stimulated by every motive of ambition, self-interest, and the love of glory, above all, emulation to surpass the successes of their predecessors. They knew that the watchful eyes of the Sultan were on them in the fight, and that every deed of heroism would meet with its appropriate reward. If he fell, what recked a Janissary of death, save as the glorious consummation of his prowess, as the opening of Paradise to the martyr who had won it[10]?

The testimony of contemporary writers to the wonderful efficacy of this remarkable institution is unanimous. Schwendi, a general of their opponents, owns that the Janissaries had never turned their backs in battle. Busbequius, the German ambassador, struck with admiration at their discipline and endurance, warns his countrymen of the nature of the foe whom they must be prepared to encounter, if they enter a war with the Turks. Barbaro, an ambassador of the Venetian government, comments with wonder on the fact that the power of the Ottomans mainly rested on a corps of compulsory converts from Christianity. The Venetian Relationi, quoted by Von Ranke, are full of the remarks of ambassadors expressing their admiration of the whole system of the Ottoman arms[11].

One of the most conspicuous features of their discipline was the order, temperance, and cleanliness of an Ottoman camp, as constrasted with the drunken, dissolute, and filthy habits of the armies of Christendom[12]. Frequently encamped as they were in the pestilential districts which proved disastrous to the French and English armies at the commencement of the late Russian war, we can easily understand how great an advantage over their opponents these wise regulations secured them in their campaigns.