About a week after this, the aid-de-camp of General McClellan, who had so often before called upon General Montgomery, called again, and told him that it was General McClellan's special wish that the provost-court should have nothing more to do with civil cases, or cases touching the subject of slavery in any way. That while General McClellan greatly preferred not to issue a formal order on the subject, yet he would certainly do so if his wishes could not be carried out in any other way. He was not willing, the aid said, to have Judge Freese interfere with the old citizens of Alexandria in any way, though if he chose to continue the court merely for the punishment of soldiers who got drunk within the city limits, or otherwise disturbed the peace, he had no objection. At the same visit, the aid delivered to General Montgomery an order from General McClellan requiring the court to refund to the Alexandria hardware merchant the five hundred dollars which he had been required to pay as a fine, because of the assault, with threat to kill, upon the Union man—all of which has heretofore been related.
When the aid had gone, General Montgomery sent for Judge Freese, and they had a long conference as to what had best be done under the circumstances. The Judge had before told the General all that had passed between the President, the Attorney-General, the Secretary of War, and himself; and the General now told the Judge all that had passed between General McClellan's aid-de-camp and himself. The Judge said that under no circumstances could he consent to continue the court, if thenceforth it was only to punish soldiers for drunkenness and other misdemeanors; that it had been exceedingly distasteful to him from the first to have to punish a soldier at all, and now to punish him alone, and let citizens, who committed offences far worse, go free from punishment, would be, in his opinion, a mockery of justice, and he would not be the presiding officer of such a court; that, it having gone abroad that the court was willing and ready to assist Northern creditors in their efforts to collect claims against disloyal debtors, it would now be exceedingly unpleasant to have to deny such claimants as might thereafter call, and, rather than have to do this, he would much prefer to see the court closed; for then the public would place the responsibility just where it belonged. The Judge added, that he knew the court was placing the President in a very embarrassing position, so far as related to his Cabinet; that, while Cameron and Seward were anxious to have the court continue, Bates and Blair were just as anxious to have it suppressed; and from the order just received from General McClellan to return the five hundred dollars fine, it was entirely clear that the secessionists of Alexandria, and the sympathizers with secession at the North, had gained complete control over him; from all of which the Judge thought it would be best to close the court.
General Montgomery fully concurred with the Judge in all these views, and added that, as the court had been organized upon his order, without first consulting with General McClellan or the President, he would much prefer to have it close voluntarily, than to be compelled to close it upon the order of General McClellan or of the President. The Judge replied, that while he believed that President Lincoln would never issue such an order, no matter what the consequences to himself might be, still he should be glad to relieve the President from what to him was evidently a great embarrassment; and if he, General Montgomery, would issue an order directing the court to close its operations on the next or any day following, he, the Judge, would gladly announce the order from the bench and adjourn the court sine die.
Such was the conclusion finally agreed upon. General Montgomery wrote out the necessary order and handed it to the Judge. Next day, after all the business before the court had been disposed of as usual, the Judge read General Montgomery's order from the bench, and explained to those present why it had been issued. Had a cannon burst then and there and killed a hundred men, the surprise could not have been greater. Some raved at Attorney-General Bates, and pro-slavery men generally; others cursed General McClellan and Northern sympathizers with rebellion, generally; deep and somewhat loud were the mutterings among all present; but the order was irrevocable, and thus closed at once and forever the provost-court of Alexandria.
Had that court been continued, and others like it established in every city of the South, so soon as they came into the possession of Union troops, at least one hundred millions of dollars would have been collected from the property of Southern debtors and gone into the pockets of Northern creditors; the war would have ended two years sooner; over five hundred millions of dollars would have been saved to the United States treasury; and over one hundred thousand lives been saved to the homes and families of both the North and the South. Only at the last judgment-day will it be known how great was the mistake—a mistake which, in its ultimate consequences, was not less ruinous to the South than to the North—of those who insisted upon, and who finally compelled, the closing of the provost-court at Alexandria.
We say this after a full consideration of the whole subject as drawn from the facts heretofore detailed in this volume, and do not think we shall have to take a single word of it back. True, very true, as eloquently stated in a letter from our old friend, J. E. Brush, Esq., of New York—"Floyd, Thompson, and Cobb, of Buchanan's Cabinet, had so disarmed and depleted the government of means, that Lincoln had very slender resources; and the gullibility of Northern business men in filling the orders of Southern men for war material, for months previous to the opening of the war, proves that they meant business, while the North did not take in the situation at all;" still we think, but for the secret machinations of Northern sympathizers—of men on whom, for a time, the government relied and entirely trusted, including generals in the field, officers in the navy, and even officers in the Cabinet—the war would have been ended at least two years sooner, and hundreds of millions saved to the taxpayers of the country.
We are aware that such a statement at first sight seems extravagant, if not wild; but if the reader will carefully weigh each factor of the problem, and follow out the relation which each bears to the other; and then if he will suspend judgment until he shall have read the last chapter and last line of this book—so that he shall have all the facts before him, all the secret springs which were so adroitly worked, but of which nobody even suspected the existence, all the villanies of men singly and of men united in political and religious associations—we have no doubt at all but what he will reach the same conclusion that we have reached in the above paragraph. Facts and figures never lie when properly placed; but men are so disposed to shut their eyes against unpleasant facts, and so inclined to place figures in such a way as will bring the result they wish for, that the most palpable truths are often hid, and kept hid, from the public, until by some accident or incident the secrets are revealed, as in this volume.
