Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 1 (of 2)

by Jaime Luciano Balmes

60. The limitation of touch to what is immediate to it involves a scarcity of the ideas originating in it alone, and of necessity places it in a lower grade than the other three senses, particularly sight. Let us in order to form clear ideas upon this point compare the range of sight with that of touch relatively to some object, for example, a building. By means of sight we in a few instants obtain an idea of its front, and other external parts; and in a short time become acquainted with its internal divisions, with the arrangement even of its ornaments and furniture. Can we accomplish all this by touch? Even if we suppose the most delicate sense of touch, and the most tenacious memory of the impressions communicated, long hours would be necessary to pass the hand over the front of the building, and form some idea of it. How will it be when we come to the whole exterior of the building? the whole interior? We see that it would be necessary to renounce such a task, that the elaborate workmanship of a cornice, a pedestal, a peristyle, the magnificence of a tower, a cupola, the boldness of an arch, a vault, which the eye seizes in an instant, would require the poor being possessed of touch alone to go often on all fours, climb over dangerous scaffoldings, and expose himself to the danger of falling from fearful heights; and yet he would never be able to acquire the millionth part of what the eyes so easily and so quickly perceive.

Apply these observations to a city, to vast countries, to the universe, and see what immense superiority sight has over touch.

61. We do not indeed find so vast a superiority when we compare touch with the other senses; nevertheless, it does exist in a very high degree.

The first difference is the ability to act from a distance. Certainly, touch also may in some manner perceive the presence or absence of the sun, by means of the impressions of heat and cold; and in like manner the presence or absence, and the more or less close proximity of some bodies, etc.; but not only are these impressions far from having the same variety and rapidity as those of hearing, but they would not even give us any idea of distance, if we had not already perceived it otherwise than by touch.

Heat and cold, dryness and moistness, are what the impressions which some bodies, though distant, may make upon touch are reduced to; and these impressions are clearly of a nature to be exposed to many serious errors.

62. If we suppose a man, having only the sense of touch, to know the presence or absence of the sun above the horizon, his only rule being the temperature of the atmosphere, which depends upon a thousand causes having no connection with the orb of day, it will happen that the natural or artificial change of it will lead him into error. The dampness which we perceive around a lake is a sign of the nearness of the water; but do we not a thousand times experience the feeling of dampness from causes operating on the atmosphere, altogether independent of the waters of a lake?

It is certain that the concentration of all sensitive forces upon one sense, the absence of all distraction, and continual attention to only one kind of sensations, might raise the delicacy of touch to a degree of perfection which we probably do not know; just as the habit of connecting ideas with respect to only one order of sensations, and of forming judgments concerning them, produces a precision, exactness, and variety, far superior to all that we can imagine. But however far we might extend our conjectures upon this head, it is certain that there is a limit in the nature of the organ and of its relations to bodies. This organ must be limited to contiguous objects, in order to receive well determined impressions; and with respect to those that are distant, and can act upon it, they can do this by causing on it an impression such as the nature of both permits, heat or cold, dryness or dampness, and if you will, a certain pressure either greater or less. So far as a great many other objects are concerned, we cannot imagine any action. However much the circle of this class of sensations be enlarged, it must ever be very limited. Moreover, we must observe, that the perfectibility of touch by means of its isolation does not belong to it exclusively, but extends likewise to the other senses; for it is founded on the laws of organization, and the generation of our ideas.

63. To comprehend the superiority of hearing to touch in this matter, we have only to consider the relation of distances, the variety of objects, the rapidity of the succession of sensations, the simultaneousness so much greater in hearing than in touch, and their relations to speech.

I. Relation of distances. On this point, hearing is clearly superior to touch, for the latter generally requires contact, the former does not, but for the due appreciation of its object even requires a distance suited to the class of the sound. Of how many distant objects does hearing inform us of which touch can tell us nothing? The gallop of the horse threatening to trample us under foot, the roaring of the torrent which may carry us away in its course, the thunder rumbling from afar, and announcing the tempest, the roar of cannon, telling that a battle has begun, the rattle of carriages in the streets, drums and bells, and clamor of voices which indicate the explosion of popular fury, the noisy music that proclaims the joy caused by happy news, the concert dedicated to the pleasures of the saloon, the song that brings back melancholy recollections, sentiments also of hope and love, the groan that warns us of suffering, the plaint that afflicts us with the idea of misery; all this hearing tells us, but touch can tell us nothing of any of these.