96. The existence of another sense is, then, possible; at least, we see no impossibility of it. If the deaf man who has no idea of sound, and the blind man who knows not what color is, would be foolish to deny the possibility of those sensations of which they are deprived, can we, with any more show of reason, assert the impossibility of an order of sensations different from what we possess? If we examine the system of sensations by the light of reason, we can discover no essential dependence between the sensations and their respective organs, nor between the organs and the objects and circumstances by which they are affected. Why does the impression of the light upon my eyes cause in me a particular sensation, which cannot result from the same impression on a different part of my body? Why may not the brain receive the same impression in various forms? Why must this fluid which we call light, and no other, produce the impression? Why may not this same sensation of seeing proceed equally from other affections of the brain? A violent blow on the head produces the sensation of many luminous points, whence the common expression of "seeing stars by daylight." We must confess that philosophy knows nothing of these secrets, that as yet it has not been able to penetrate them, and it can give no answer to these questions. It sees an order of facts, but no necessary connection between them, or rather, judging from its ideas of mind and body, every thing induces it to believe that these phenomena in our life depend solely on the will of our Creator.
97. If an entirely new order of sensations is possible, there may be beings with six or seven senses. The imagination cannot conceive their nature; but reason sees in them no impossibility.
[CHAPTER XVII.]
EXISTENCE OF NEW SENSES.
98. Is it certain that we have only five ways of sensation? I have some doubts on this point. In order to present them with the greatest clearness, and solve the questions which they raise, it is well to settle the meaning of the terms.
What is sensation? In the ordinary acceptation of the word, it is the perception of the impression transmitted to us by one of the organs of the five senses. Thus understood it is clearly limited to the action of the organs, but if considered as expressing a certain class of animal phenomena, it is the experiencing of any affection produced by an impression of the organism. Even in common use the word sensation in its broadest signification is not restricted to the impressions of the five senses, and although we make a great difference between sentiment and sensation; still we are often forced to confound them, and to use the word sensation to express things which have nothing whatever to do with the five senses. Thus we say: "The news made a great sensation;" "I cannot resist the force of such strong sensations," etc., in which cases it is evident that there is no reference to seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, or touching, but to a different order of affections of the soul.
99. I said we were forced to use the word in the broader meaning; it is the truth which forces us. For, to the eyes of philosophy, the phenomenon of sensation consists in the production in the soul of a particular affection determined by an impression on an organ; and of whatever order this affection may be, and whatever organ may be affected, the animal phenomenon is substantially the same. The difference is in the class of affections and of the organ which is their medium, the essence of the phenomenon does not change. And if by sensations we understand such distinct orders of affections as those of sight and of touch, why may we not include other impressions caused by any other organ, whatever that organ may be?
100. Whatever use we may make of the word sensation, it is certain that we experience many affections caused by organic impressions, besides those of the five senses. What are passions but affections of the soul, springing from organic impressions? Does not the mere presence of an object often excite love, anger, pity, joy, grief, and many other sentiments of the soul?
You may say there is an essential difference between the impressions of the senses and those of the passions, that the former are independent of all previous idea and reflection, which the latter more or less presuppose. Thus, when an object is present to our open eyes, we cannot but see it and always in the same manner; and yet this object will excite in us at one time one passion, at another time another, and sometimes none; and almost always with great difference in the degree of its intensity. Moreover it is not only the mere presence of the object which causes an affection, but certain conditions are necessary, for example; the remembrance of a benefit or of an injury, etc., from which it is easy to see that there is an essential difference between the two classes of impressions.