Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 1 (of 2)

by Jaime Luciano Balmes

EXTENSION ABSTRACTED FROM PHENOMENA.

133. That which is extended is not one being only; it is a collection of beings. Extension necessarily contains parts, some outside of, and consequently distinct from, others. Their union is not identity; for, the very fact that they are united, supposes them distinct, since any thing is not united with itself.

It would seem from this that extension in itself and distinguished from the things extended, is nothing; to imagine extension as a being whose real nature can be investigated is to resign one's self to be the sport of one's fancy.

Extension is not identified in particular with any one of the beings which compose it, but it is the result of their union. This is equally true whether we consider extension composed of unextended points, or of points that are extended but infinitely divisible. If we suppose the points unextended, it is evident that they are not extension, because extended and unextended are contradictory. Neither are these points identified with extension, if we suppose them extended; for extension implies a whole, and a whole cannot be identified with any of its parts. If a line be four feet long, there cannot be identity between the whole line and one of its parts a foot long. We may suppose these parts, instead of a foot, to be only an inch in length, and we may divide them ad infinitum, but we shall never find any of these parts equal to any of its subdivisions. Therefore, extension is not identical with any of the particular beings which compose it.

134. The idea of multiplicity being involved in the idea of extension, it would seem that extension ought to be considered, not as a being in itself, but as the result of a union of many beings. This result is what we call continuity. We have already seen[51] that multiplicity is not sufficient to constitute extension. It enters into the idea of number, and yet number does not represent any thing extended. We also conceive a union of acts, faculties, activities, substances, and beings of various classes, without conceiving extension, and yet multiplicity is a part of all these conceptions.

135. Therefore continuity is necessary, in order to complete the idea of extension. What, then, is continuity? It is the position of parts outside of, but joined to other parts. But what is the meaning of the terms, outside of, and joined to? Inside and outside, joined and separated, imply extension, they presuppose that which is to be explained; the thing to be defined enters into the definition in the same sense in which it is to be defined. Exactly; for, to explain the continuity of extension is the same as to show the meaning of the terms inside and outside, joined and separated.

136. We must not forget this observation, unless we wish to accept the explanations which are found in almost all the books on the subject. To define extension by the words inside and outside, is not to add any thing, under a philosophic aspect; it is merely to express the same thing in different words. Without doubt this language would be the simplest, if all we wanted was to establish the phenomenon only, but philosophy will not be satisfied with it. It is a practical, not a speculative, explanation. The same may be said of the definition of extension by space or places. What is extension?—the occupation of place:—but, what is a place?—a portion of space terminated by certain surfaces:—what is space?—the extension in which bodies are placed, or the capacity to receive them. But even admitting the existence of space as something absolute, what is the capacity of bodies to fill space? Who does not see that this is to define a thing by itself, a vicious circle? The extension of space is explained by the capacity of receiving; the extension of bodies by the capacity of filling. The idea of extension remains untouched; it is not defined, it is merely expressed in different words, but which mean the same thing.

To suppose the existence of space as something absolute, does not help the question, and is, besides, an entirely gratuitous supposition. To take the extension of space as a term by relation to which we may explain the extension of bodies, is to suppose that to be found which we are looking for.

We run into the same error if we try to explain the words inside and outside, by referring them to distinct points in space, we should define a thing by itself; for, we have the same difficulty with respect to space to determine the meaning of inside and outside, joined and separated, and contiguous and distant. If we presuppose the extension of space as something absolute, and try to explain other extensions by relation to this, we only make the illusion more complete. We have to explain extension in itself, the extension of space must be explained as well as the rest; to presuppose it is to assume the question already solved, not to solve it.

137. Extension in relation to its dimensions seems to be independent of the thing extended in the same place. An extension may remain absolutely fixed with the same dimensions, notwithstanding the change of place of the thing extended. If we suppose a series of objects to pass over a fixed visual field, the things extended vary incessantly, but the extension remains the same. If we suppose a very large object to pass before a window, it changes continually; for the part which we see at the instant A is not the part which we see at the instant B, but the extension has not varied in its dimensions. This regards surfaces only, but the same doctrine may be applied to solids. A space may be successively filled with a variety of objects, but its capacity remains the same. There is no identity between the object and the extension which contains it; for any number of objects of the same size may occupy the same place; neither is the air, or any surrounding object, identified with the extension; for these, too, may change without affecting the extension in which the object is contained.