256. Whoever should attempt to prove these three propositions, not only would fail, but the attempt would prove his ignorance of the phenomena of sensibility, and that his philosophy on this point is the notions of the vulgar. It is not necessary to be a philosopher, it is sufficient to have acquired a very slight knowledge of philosophy to see that such an attempt would suppose a complete ignorance of the history of philosophy. At any rate, I need not insist on this point; for I have treated these questions at length in the last two books of this volume.
257. The solution there given ought to suffice to answer satisfactorily the objection founded on the particular state of a body without the conditions of extension which we find in others. From the moment that we suppose the correspondence of a body with our senses to be suspended, as these are the only means by which we are informed of what passes in the external world, it is impossible for us to affirm that there is any absurdity in that of which we have no experience. We perceive extension only by sensation, therefore we can say nothing in relation to the extension of an object of which we have no sensation. But although this answer should cut short all objections, I shall not confine myself to this alone.
258. What is extension? In reality it is the sum of the relations of the beings which compose the extended object. These relations, as I have proved, are not intrinsically necessary: therefore God can alter them. Thus this question comes to the same point as the preceding: can the power of God suspend, alter, or entirely take away relations which are not intrinsically necessary? Evidently it can. The difficulty then is not as to what could have been, but as to what is. Again we find ourselves out of the field of philosophy in that of facts, or the examination of the motives of credibility.
259. The other objection founded on the impossibility of body being in several places at the same time, though in appearance more difficult, amounts to the same as the former. To be in a place, as we now understand it, is to have a particular extension, with the ordinary form and relations with respect to the extension of other bodies. If we suppose a body with extension subject to other conditions, without the ordinary relation to the extension of other bodies, we destroy the supposition on which we base the impossibility of a body being at the same time in several places. Therefore, as we have proved that the omnipotence of God can alter and even take away these relations, there is no contradiction in admitting the destruction of the results which proceed from these relations.
260. This is why the distinction of the scholastics between two classes of extension: in ordine ad se, et in ordine ad locum, or quantitative and sacramental extension, though to the eyes of a superficial philosophy it might appear to be an empty subtlety, invented for the purpose of avoiding the difficulty, is nevertheless a profound observation, confirmed by the analysis of the reality and the phenomenon in the sensible order. I do not mean by this to say that when this distinction was made in the schools, they understood perfectly all the truth and philosophical nicety which it involves; nor that the distinction was always accompanied by the critical analysis which belongs to it. At present I abstract the merit of the men and regard only the thing. The less philosophical intelligence we suppose in those who used the distinction, the more admirable appears that religion which inspires its defenders with fruitful thoughts which the ages to come might unfold. The philosophical schools disputed warmly on extension, on accidents, and on the sensitive faculties: the Catholic dogma taught a truth which was contrary to all appearances, it stimulated them to examine more profoundly the distance of the phenomenon from the reality, the difference between the contingent and the necessary; the mystery which the Church taught introduced into philosophy questions which without it would probably never have occurred to man's understanding.
261. Bacon expressed a profound truth when he said that a little philosophy carried its possessor from religion, and a great deal of philosophy leads him to it. A careful study of the objections brought against Christianity, lays bare a truth confirmed by the history of eighteen centuries; the most weighty objections against Catholicity, instead of proving any thing against it, involve a proof which confirms it. The secret for discovering this proof, is to go to the bottom of the objection, and examine it under all its aspects. Original sin is a mystery, but it explains the whole world; the Incarnation is a mystery, but it explains the traditions of the human race; faith is full of mysteries, but it satisfies one of the greatest necessities of reason; the history of the creation is a mystery, but this mystery clears up chaos, throws light on the world, and is the key to the history of mankind; all Christianity is a collection of mysteries, but these mysteries are connected by a secret union with all that is profound, grand, sublime, or beautiful in heaven or earth; they are connected with the individual, with the family, with society, with God, with the understanding, with the heart, with languages, sciences, and art. The investigator who rejects religion and even seeks means to oppose it, finds it at the entrance as at the outlet of the mysterious ways of life; at the cradle of the infant as in the shadow of the tomb; in time as in eternity; explaining every thing by a word; listening unmoved to the wanderings of ignorance and the sarcasms of unbelief, patiently awaiting till the course of ages shall acknowledge its truth, which existed before all ages.
[CHAPTER XXXIV.]
CONCLUSION AND SUMMING UP.