"I pray you," he continues, "to remember that with respect to matters of the will, I have always made a broad distinction between the contemplation of truth and the uses of life; as regards the latter, I am so far from thinking that we must follow only things very clearly known, that I believe we must not always consider even what is most probable, but that we must, among things wholly unknown or uncertain, sometimes choose one, and hold firmly to it, so long as we see no reason for not doing so, just as if we had chosen it from evident and certain motives, as I have already explained in the Discours sur la Méthode; but when we treat only of the contemplation of truth, who ever doubted that it was necessary to suspend the judgment upon things that are obscure or not distinctly known?"
In what, then, consists Descartes' merit? In having applied a rule known to all, and employed by few, and in so doing at the very time that prejudices in favor of the Aristotelian doctrine were the strongest. Descartes plainly says so; his method of doubting is not new, only the application of it was wanting; for, as regards its fundamental principle, "who ever doubted that it was necessary to suspend the judgment upon things that are obscure or not distinctly known?"
Understanding Descartes' method in this sense, that is, taking the doubt as a supposition, a mere fiction, it is not opposed to sound religious and moral principles. The profound philosopher does not seem to disdain to set his readers at rest upon this point; he ingenuously shows, in commencing his investigations, that his religious belief was safe. "Finally, as before undertaking to rebuild the house wherein one lives, it is not enough to demolish the old one, and provide materials and workmen, or to exercise one's self in architecture, and to carefully trace the design of the new house; but it is also necessary to have another house in which to live, while the new one is building; so that my actions might not be unresolved, like my judgments, and that I might, in the meantime, live as happily as possible, I made a provision for myself; it consists of three or four maxims. The first is, to observe the laws and customs of my country, and constantly to preserve the religion in which, by the grace of God, I have been instructed from my infancy. * * * * * * After having assured myself of these maxims, and laid them aside with the truths of faith which have always been first in my belief, I judged that I might freely reject the rest of my opinions."—Discours sur la Méthode, P. 3ieme.
ON CHAPTER XIX.
(19) With respect to the distinction between the testimony of consciousness and that of evidence, as in the analysis of the proposition: I think, therefore I am; there can be no doubt that Descartes did not express himself with sufficient precision and exactness. See, for example, this extract: "After this, I considered in general what is necessary for a proposition to be true and certain; for, although I had not yet met such a one, I nevertheless thought I ought to know in what this certainty consisted; and observing that in the proposition, I think, therefore I am, there is nothing to assure me of its truth, except the clear perception that in order to think I must be, I judged that I could take it to be a general rule that things clearly and distinctly conceived are all true; only there is some difficulty in ascertaining what things we do distinctly conceive."—Discours sur la Méthode. Partie 4me.
ON CHAPTER XX.
(20) The apodictical certainty of which Kant speaks in the passage cited, is the result of the intrinsic evidence of ideas, or, in other words, it is what the schoolmen called metaphysical certainty.
ON CHAPTER XXI.
(21) Besides the questions on the principle of contradiction as the only foundation of certainty, there are others as to its scientific utility and importance. We shall, when we come to treat of the idea of being in general, examine these points at length; wherefore we will now pass them by.
ON CHAPTER XXII.