NEW YORK:
BILLIN & BROTHER, PRINTERS, XX NORTH WILLIAM ST.
CONTENTS OF VOL. I.
| BOOK FIRST. | ||
| ON CERTAINTY. | ||
| CHAPTER | PAGE | |
| [I]. | Importance and Utility of the Question of Certainty | 3 |
| [II]. | True State of the Question | 7 |
| [III]. | Certainty of the Human Race and Philosophical Certainty | 14 |
| [IV]. | Existence of Transcendental Science in the Absolute Intellectual Order | 24 |
| [V]. | Transcendental Science in the Human Intellectual Order cannot emanate from the Senses | 32 |
| [VI]. | Transcendental Science.—Insufficiency of Real Truths | 37 |
| [VII]. | The Philosophy of the Me cannot produce Transcendental Science | 41 |
| [VIII]. | Universal Identity | 56 |
| [IX]. | Universal Identity,—Continued | 64 |
| [X]. | Problem of Representation: Monads of Leibnitz | 67 |
| [XI]. | Problem of Representation examined | 71 |
| [XII]. | Immediate Intelligibility | 76 |
| [XIII]. | Representation of Causality and Ideality | 83 |
| [XIV]. | Impossibility of Finding the first Principle in the Ideal Order | 89 |
| [XV]. | The Indispensable Condition of all Human Knowledge.—Meansof perceiving Truth | 92 |
| [XVI]. | Confusion of Ideas in Disputes on the Fundamental Principle 102 | |
| [XVII]. | Thought and Existence.—Descartes' Principle | 105 |
| [XVIII]. | The Principle of Descartes, continued.—His Method | 111 |
| [XIX]. | Value of the Principle, I Think:—Its Analysis | 118 |
| [XX]. | True Sense of the Principle of Contradiction.—Kant's Opinion | 126 |
| [XXI]. | Does the Principle of Contradiction merit the Title of Fundamental; and if so, in what Sense | 140 |
| [XXII]. | The Principle of Evidence | 146 |
| [XXIII]. | The Criterion of Consciousness | 151 |
| [XXIV]. | The Criterion of Evidence | 157 |
| [XXV]. | The Objective Value of Ideas | 163 |
| [XXVI]. | Can all Cognitions be reduced to the Perception of Identity? | 171 |
| [XXVII]. | Continuation of the same subject | 176 |
| [XXVIII]. | Continuation of the same subject | 183 |
| [XXIX]. | Are there true Synthetic Judgments a priori in the Sense of Kant | 188 |
| [XXX]. | Vico's Criterion | 200 |
| [XXXI]. | Continuation of the same subject | 212 |
| [XXXII]. | The Criterion on Common Sense | 219 |
| [XXXIII]. | Error of Lamennais on Common Consent | 230 |
| [XXXIV]. | Summary and Conclusion | 253 |
| BOOK SECOND. | ||
| ON SENSATION. | ||
| [I]. | Sensation in Itself | 249 |
| [II]. | Matter is incapable of Sensation | 255 |
| [III]. | Sleep and Waking | 263 |
| [IV]. | Relation of Sensations to an External World | 267 |
| [V]. | An Idealist Hypothesis | 273 |
| [VI]. | Is the External and Immediate Cause of Sensations a Free Cause? | 276 |
| [VII]. | Analysis of the Objectiveness of Sensations | 279 |
| [VIII]. | Sensation of Extension | 283 |
| [IX]. | Objectiveness of the Sensation of Extension | 287 |
| [X]. | Force of Touch to make Sensations Objective | 293 |
| [XI]. | Inferiority of Touch compared with other Senses | 296 |
| [XII]. | Can Sight alone give us the Idea of a Surface? | 302 |
| [XIII]. | Cheselden's Blind Man | 310 |
| [XIV]. | Can Sight give us the Idea of a Solid? | 315 |
| [XV]. | Sight and Motion | 319 |
| [XVI]. | Possibility of other Senses | 324 |
| [XVII]. | Existence of New Senses | 328 |
| [XVIII]. | Solution of Lamennais' Objection | 333 |
| BOOK THIRD. | ||
| EXTENSION AND SPACE. | ||
| [I]. | Extension Inseparable from the Idea of Body | 339 |
| [II]. | Extension not Perceptible as the Direct and Immediate Object of Sensations | 345 |
| [III]. | Scientific Fruitfulness of the Idea of Extension | 348 |
| [IV]. | Reality of Extension | 357 |
| [V]. | Geometrical Exactness Realized in Nature | 360 |
| [VI]. | Remarks on Extension | 365 |
| [VII]. | Space.—Nothing | 369 |
| [VIII]. | Descartes and Leibnitz on Space | 375 |
| [IX]. | Opinion of those who attribute to Space a Nature distinct from Bodies | 380 |
| [X]. | Opinion of those who hold Space to be the Immensity of God | 382 |
| [XI]. | Fenelon's Opinion | 386 |
| [XII]. | What Space consists in | 391 |
| [XIII]. | New Difficulties | 396 |
| [XIV]. | Another Important Consequence | 400 |
| [XV]. | Illusion of Fixed Points in Space | 403 |
| [XVI]. | Observations on Kant's Opinion | 407 |
| [XVII]. | Inability of Kant's Doctrine to solve the Problem of thePossibility of Experience | 415 |
| [XVIII]. | The Problem of Sensible Experience | 418 |
| [XIX]. | Extension abstracted from Phenomena | 421 |
| [XX]. | Are there Absolute Magnitudes? | 427 |
| [XXI]. | Pure Intelligibility of the Extended World | 432 |
| [XXII]. | Infinite Divisibility | 436 |
| [XXIII]. | Unextended Points | 439 |
| [XXIV]. | A Conjecture on the Transcendental Notion of Extension | 442 |
| [XXV]. | Harmony of the Real, Phenomenal, and Ideal Orders | 446 |
| [XXVI]. | Character of the Relations of the Real Order to the Phenomenal | 450 |
| [XXVII]. | Whether every Thing must be in some Place | 452 |
| [XXVIII]. | Contingency of Corporeal Relations | 459 |
| [XXIX]. | Solution of two Difficulties | 462 |
| [XXX]. | Passive Sensibility | 466 |
| [XXXI]. | Possibility of a greater Sphere in active Sensibility | 469 |
| [XXXII]. | Possibility of the Penetration of Bodies | 480 |
| [XXXIII]. | A Triumph of Religion in the Field of Philosophy | 483 |
| [XXXIV]. | Conclusion and Summing up | 489 |
| [Notes to Book First] | 495 | |
| [Note to Book Second] | 514 | |
| [Notes to Book Third] | 517 | |
[INTRODUCTION.]
The following translation of the great work of the lamented James Balmes on Philosophy, was undertaken at my suggestion and recommendation, and thus far I hold myself responsible for it. I have compared a considerable portion of it with the original, and as far as I have compared it, I have found it faithfully executed. The translator appears to me to have rendered the author's thought with exactness and precision, in a style not inferior to his own.
I have not added, as was originally contemplated, any Notes to those of the author. To have done so, would have swelled the volumes to an unreasonable size, and upon further consideration, they did not seem to me to be necessary. They would, in fact, have been an impertinence on my part, and the reader will rather thank me for not having done it. The work goes forth, therefore, as it came from the hands of its illustrious author, with no addition or abbreviation, or change, except what was demanded by the difference between the Spanish and English idioms.