If the soul of brutes be not composed of parts, it cannot perish by disorganization; what has no organizable parts is not organized, and what is not organized cannot be disorganized. Hence we infer that the soul of brutes cannot perish by corruption, properly so called; for no being not composed of matter can. We see not what difficulty can arise from this view; but the question is only resolved in its negative part, for thus far we know only that the soul of brutes cannot die, or be corrupted by decomposition; we must know what is done with it. Is it annihilated? Does it continue to exist? And if so, in what way? These are different questions.
First of all we must observe, that we have here only conjectures, and these rather as to the possibility than as to the reality. Philosophy may indeed enable us to see what may be, but not what is, for we can know the reality only by experience, which in the present case we cannot have. When sound philosophy, examining this point, is asked what is, its best reply is, that it knows not; if it is asked what may be, it enters into an argumentation founded on general principles, and more especially upon analogy.
18. It is usually said that nothing is annihilated; but this needs some explanation. What is the meaning of annihilation? To cease to be, so that nothing, which before was, remains. If a body be disorganized, it ceases to be as an organized body; but the matter remains, and there is no annihilation. Is it true that nothing is annihilated? Some say we must distinguish between substances and accidents; for, as these latter are a kind of incomplete beings, there is no reason why they should not cease to exist, and nothing of them remain; but in this disappearance there is no annihilation, strictly so called; thus we see things continually transformed, and undergoing a succession of accidents which cease to exist whenever the thing ceases to be modified by them. As to substances, there would indeed be true annihilation should they cease to exist, but this they do not, because no substance is annihilated. Thus some think; we know not how true this system may be, for we know not upon what solid foundation it rests. If a substance be destined to an end, why may it not be annihilated when this end no longer exists? A created being incessantly needs the conservatory action of the Creator, for which reason conservation is said to be a continued creation; when, then, the end to which the created substance was destined ceases, why may it not be annihilated? We see nothing in its being annihilated repugnant to the wisdom or goodness of God. The artificer abandons a tool no longer serviceable; this, in God, would be equivalent to the withdrawal of his conservatory act, and in the creature, to the reduction to non-existence. If it be not repugnant to the wisdom and goodness of God for an organized being to be disorganized, or cease to exist as an organized being, why may he not allow a substance which has accomplished the object for which it was created to cease to exist? From this we infer that it would not be against sound philosophy to maintain that the souls of brutes are reduced to non-existence.
19. But supposing there is no question of annihilation, is there any reason against their continuing to exist? If there be, we know not what it is.
We know not of what use they would be; but we may conjecture that absorbed anew into the bosom of nature they would not be useless. Neither do we know the use of many other beings, and yet we cannot therefore deny their existence, or doubt their utility. Who says that the vital principle residing in brutes can have no object if the organization which it animates be destroyed? Does the destruction of a plant involve, perchance, the extinction of all the vital principles residing in it? Do these principles, by not operating upon the organized being just destroyed, therefore cease to be of any use in the wonderful laboratory of nature? Who will say that a vital principle cannot be useful if it does not act upon an object within our observation? Who will assert that vital principles do not in the recesses of nature act in many and different ways, and that the effects of their activity are not presented very differently according to circumstances, yet always in conformity to laws established by infinite wisdom? Do not the magnificent profusion of radical materials, the gems without number which we everywhere discover, the immense amount of matter susceptible of transformation and assimilation by the living being, the mysteries of generation in the animal and vegetable kingdoms, all indicate to us that there are scattered over the universe an infinite number of vital principles, which exercise their activity in very different ways, and over a scale of astonishing extent? Who shall assure us that the same vital principle may not present very diverse phenomena, according to the conditions which determine its action? Does not the same principle reside in the acorn, as in the gnarled old oak that for ages has defied the fury of the tempest? Did experience not show it to be so, who would ever have suspected the vital principle of a shapeless and filthy caterpillar to be the same as that of a beautiful butterfly? It is not then contrary either to reason or to experience to suppose the soul of brutes, the vital principle residing in them, to continue after the organization of the body is destroyed, and, absorbed anew in the treasures of nature, to be there preserved, not as a useless thing, but in the exercise of its faculties in different ways, according to the conditions to which it is subjected.[(29)]
[CHAPTER III.]
SLEEP AND WAKING.
20. The fact of sensation is connected with many others, and from this connection results a great part of our knowledge. It has been said in a tone of great confidence, that it was not possible to demonstrate by sensations the existence of bodies; for as sensations are something purely internal, they cannot enable us to infer the existence of any thing external, and there is no reason for not regarding all our sensations as a collection of individual phenomena, inclosed in our soul. At first view it seems impossible to solve the difficulty; nevertheless, if we examine it thoroughly, we shall see that too great importance has been attached to it.