133. It is impossible to find a primitive measure of motion; we must, at last, take some measure or another, and although arbitrarily chosen, we must refer motion to it. It should be the most uniform measure possible.
134. The resemblance between the ideas of time and space creates a suspicion that they ought to be explained in a similar manner.
135. There is no duration without something which endures; therefore there is no duration separate from things. If nothing existed, there could be no duration.
136. There is no succession without things which succeed: therefore succession cannot be realized as a form independent of things, although it may be conceived in the abstract by itself.
137. Time implies before and after, and, consequently, succession. It is succession itself, because in conceiving succession, we conceive time.
138. Succession involves the exclusion of some things by others. This exclusion may either be founded on the essence of things, or be derived from an external cause.
139. Time, therefore, involves exclusion: it is the general idea of the order of changes, or of the mutual relation of being and not-being.
140. If there were no change there would be no time.
141. No time had passed before the existence of the world. There was no other duration than eternity.