[CHAPTER XVIII.]
FICHTE'S PANTHEISTIC SYSTEM.
129. I am going to fulfil a promise made in the beginning of this work,[51] to explain and refute the system of Fichte. We have seen the cabalistic forms employed by the German philosopher to obtain a simple result, which amounted to neither more nor less than Descartes' principle, "I think, therefore, I am." The reader could never imagine that any one should attempt to found pantheism on this fact of consciousness, and that the human mind, because it finds itself, should have the arrogance to maintain that nothing exists beside itself, that whatever there is, proceeds from itself, and what is still more extraordinary, that it is itself produced by itself. In order to believe that such things have been written we have to see them, and therefore in explaining Fichte's system, I shall copy his own words.
Thus, although he may suffer a little from the foreign garb, and the reader may be fatigued with deciphering enigmas, he will have an idea of the matter and of the form of the system, which he could not have, if we should take from the philosopher his extravagant originality, which, however, relates to the form, rather than to the substance.
130. "This act, namely X = I am, is founded on no higher principle."[52]
This is true to a certain extent, inasmuch as it affirms that in the series of the facts of consciousness, we come to our own existence as the last limit, and can go no farther. The reflex act, by which we perceive our existence, is expressed by the proposition, I am, or, I exist; but this proposition by itself alone, tells us nothing as to the nature of the me, and is very far from proving our absolute independence. On the contrary, from the moment that we begin to reflect, internal facts are presented to us which incline us to believe that our being is dependent on another; and in proportion as we continue to reflect, we acquire a deep conviction of this truth, arising from a rigorous demonstration.
In no way can we affirm that the act, I am, does not depend on any higher principle, if we mean by that, that the act does not spring from any principle of action, and that by itself alone, it produces existence. Besides plainly contradicting common sense, this assertion is without any proof, and is also opposed to the most fundamental notions of sound philosophy.
131. Fichte thinks differently, and without knowing why, he deduces from the above propositions these consequences: "Therefore it (the act, X = I am) is supposed absolutely, and founded on itself, as the principle of a certain (and, as will be seen by the whole Doctrine of Science, of every) act of the human mind, consequently, also of its pure character,—the pure character of activity in itself, abstracted from its particular empirical conditions." It is no great discovery that the character of act is activity; but this character is not pure, since in us no act is pure activity, but it is always a particular exercise of activity.
"Consequently," he continues, "the supposition of the me by itself is its pure activity. The me supposes itself, and it is, in virtue of this mere supposition by itself; and on the other hand, the me is and it supposes its being, by virtue of its mere being. It is at the same time the acting, and the product of the act; the active, and that which is brought about by the activity; act and fact are one and precisely the same thing; and, therefore, I am is the expression of an act, and also of the only one possible, as must be seen from the whole Doctrine of Science."