237. There is a person in great want, but who, nevertheless, has every probability of soon improving his fortunes, Lentulus and Julius each give him an alms. Lentulus gives his, because he hopes that when the poor man is better off he will remember his benefactor, and assist him if necessary. The action of Lentulus can have no moral value; in judging of it we see a calculation, not a virtuous act. Julius gives the alms solely in order to succor the unfortunate man, who excites his pity, without thinking of the return which may be made; the action of Julius is morally beautiful, it is virtuous. Whence this difference? Lentulus does good, assisting the needy; but not from love of the internal order of the act; he bends this order towards himself. God, willing that men should stand in need of each other, also willed that they should mutually help one another; to help one, therefore, simply in order to alleviate his wants is to realize simply the order willed by God; to help one for a particular end, is to realize this order not as it is established by God, but as combined by man. There is a complication of view, the simplicity of intention is wanting,—this simplicity so recommended by Christianity, and even in philosophy containing a profound meaning.
238. Regarding the purely natural order, we find that all moral obligations have in the last result a useful object; as all prohibitions are directed to prevent an injury; but it does not suffice for morality, that we will its utility, we must will the order itself from which the utility results; for the greater the reflection, and the love with which this order is willed, without any mixture of heterogeneous views, the more moral is the act.
To help the poor with the simple view of assisting them, out of love for them, is a virtuous act; to help them, out of this love, and with the explicit reflection that it is complying with a duty of humanity, is still more virtuous; to help them, for the thought of God, because you see in the poor man the image of God, who commands you to love him, is a still more virtuous act than either of the other two; to help them, even against the inclination of your own heart, excited by resentment against them, or moved by other passions, to subdue yourself with a firm will for the love of God, is an act of heroic virtue. Observe that the moral perfection of the act increases in proportion as the thing in itself is willed with greater reflection and love; and arrives at the highest point when, in the thing loved, it is God himself that is loved. If the views are selfish the order is perverted, and morality is banished; when there are no selfish views, but the act is prompted principally by sentiment, the action is beautiful, but belongs rather to sensibility than to morality; when the sacrifice tears the heart, but the will preceded by reflection commands the sacrifice, and the duty is performed because it is a duty; or perhaps an act not obligatory is done for the love of its moral goodness, and because it is agreeable to God, we see in the action something so fair, so lovely, so deserving of praise, that we should be confounded if asked the reason of the sentiment of respect which we feel for the person who for such noble motives sacrifices himself for his fellow-men.
Conformably to these principles we may clearly and exactly determine the ideas of morality.
239. Absolute morality, and consequently the origin and type of the moral order, is the act by which the infinite Being loves his infinite perfection. This is an absolute fact of which we can give no reason a priori.
In God there is, strictly speaking, no duty; there is the absolute necessity of being holy.
240. The act essentially moral in creatures is the love of God. It is impossible to found the morality of this act on the morality of any other act.
241. The acts of creatures are moral in so far as they participate of this love, explicitly or implicitly.
242. Creatures which see God intuitively, love him necessarily; and thus all their acts, stamped with this august mark, are necessarily moral.
243. Creatures which do not see God intuitively necessarily love good in general, or under an indeterminate idea; but they do not love necessarily any object in particular.