VI. Intuitive ideas of the intellectual order are not innate, because they are nothing else than the acts of the understanding or will, presented to our perception in reflex consciousness.
VII. General determinate ideas are not innate, since they are the representation of intuitions, upon which some act has of necessity been performed.
VIII. There is no ground of affirming that general indeterminate ideas, which seem to be acts of the faculty perceptive of objects under a general reason, are innate.
IX. All that there is of innate in our mind is sensitive and intellectual activity; but both to be put into motion, require objects to affect them.
X. The development of this activity begins with organic affections; and although it goes far beyond the sphere of sensibility, it always remains more or less subject to the conditions imposed by the union of the soul and body.
XI. The intellectual activity has a priori conditions totally independent of sensibility, and applicable to all objects, no matter what impressions may have been their cause. The principle of contradiction figures as the first among these conditions.
XII. There is then in our mind something a priori and absolute, which cannot be altered, even although all the impressions we receive from objects be totally varied, nor if all the relations we have with them were to undergo a radical change.