"Book viii. chap. 3, law 2, of the new Recopilacion, enjoining persons condemned by the Inquisition, and absent from these kingdoms, not to return there under pain of death and losing their goods.
"D. Ferdinand and D. Isabella, at Saragossa, 2d August, 1498. Pragmatic Sanction.
"Some persons condemned as heretics by the Inquisition have absented themselves from our kingdoms, and have gone to other countries, where, by means of false reports and undue formalities, they have surreptitiously obtained exemptions, absolutions, mandates, securities, and other privileges, in order to be exempt from the condemnations and punishments which they had incurred, and to remain in their errors, which, nevertheless, does not prevent their attempting to return to these kingdoms, wherefore, wishing to extirpate so great an evil, we command these condemned persons not to be so bold as to return. Let them not return into our kingdoms and lordships, by any way, in any manner, for any cause or reason whatsoever, under pain of death and the loss of their goods; which punishment we will and ordain to be incurred by the act itself. One-third of the property shall be for the persons who shall have denounced, another for the courts, and the third for our exchequer. Whenever the said justices, in their own places and jurisdiction, shall know that any of the said persons are in any part of their jurisdiction, we order all and each of them, without exception, to go to the place where such persons are, without being otherwise called upon, to apprehend them forcibly and immediately, and without delay to execute, and cause to be executed, on them and their properties the punishments which we have appointed; and this notwithstanding all exemption, reconciliation, securities, and other privileges which they may have, these privileges, in the present case, and with respect to the said penalties, not availing them. We order them to do and accomplish this under pain of the loss and confiscation of all their property. The same penalty shall be incurred by all other persons who shall have hidden or received the said condemned persons, and who knowing that they were so, shall not have given information to our courts. We order all great men and councillors, and other persons of our kingdoms, to give favor and assistance to our courts, whenever it shall be demanded and required from them, to accomplish and execute what has been said above, under the penalties which the courts themselves shall appoint on this subject."
We see from this document, that, after the year 1498, things had reached such a point, that the kings attempted to maintain against every one all the rigor of the Inquisition, and that they were offended that the Popes interfered to soften it. It will be understood thereby whence proceeded the harshness with which the guilty were treated; and this shows us one of the causes which made the Inquisition sometimes use its power with excessive severity. Although it was not a mere instrument of the policy of kings, as some have said, the Inquisition felt more or less the influence of that policy; and we know that policy, when about to defeat an adversary, does not commonly display an excess of compassion. If the Spanish Inquisition had been at that time under the exclusive authority and direction of the Popes, it would have been infinitely milder and more moderate in its method of acting.
At that time the object ardently desired by the kings of Spain was, to obtain that the judgments of the Inquisition should be definitive in Spain, without appeal to Rome; Queen Isabella had expressly demanded this of the Pope. The Sovereign Pontiffs would not accede to these solicitations, no doubt fearing the abuse which might be made of so fearful an arm when the restraint of the moderating power should become wanting.
It will be understood from the facts which I have just quoted, how much reason I had to say that, if you excuse the conduct of Ferdinand and Isabella with respect to the Inquisition, you must not condemn that of Philip II., since the Catholic sovereigns showed themselves still more harsh and severe than the latter monarch. I have already pointed out the reason why the conduct of Philip II. has been so rigorously condemned; but it is also necessary to show why there has been a sort of obstinacy in excusing that of Ferdinand and Isabella.
When it is wished to falsify an historical fact by calumniating a person or an institution, it is necessary to begin with an affectation of impartiality and good faith; great success is obtained in this by manifesting indulgence for the same thing which it is desired to condemn, but taking care that this indulgence has strongly the appearance of being a concession gratuitously made to our adversaries, or of a sacrifice of our opinions, of our feelings, on the altars of reason and justice, which are our guide and our idol. We thus predispose our hearers or readers to regard the condemnation which we are about to pronounce as a judgment dictated by the strictest justice; a judgment in which neither passion, nor partiality, nor perverse views, have any part. How can we doubt the good faith, the love of truth, the impartiality of the man who begins by excusing what, according to all appearances, and considering his opinions, ought to be the object of his anathemas? Such is the situation of the men of whom we speak. They intended to attack the Inquisition; now it happened that the protectress, and, in some sort, the foundress of that tribunal was Queen Isabella,—that distinguished name which Spaniards have always pronounced with respect, that immortal queen, one of the noblest ornaments of our history. What was to be done in this difficulty? The means were simple. Although the Jews and heretics had been treated with the greatest severity in the time of the Catholic sovereigns, and although they had carried severity further than all those who have succeeded them, it was necessary to close the eye to these facts, to excuse the conduct of these sovereigns, and to point out the important matters which urged them to employ the rigors of justice. They thus avoided the difficulty,—for it was one to cast a stigma on the memory of a great queen cherished and respected by all Spaniards,—and they thus prepared the way for merciless accusations against Philip II. That monarch had the unanimous cry of all Protestants against him, for the simple reason that he had been their most powerful adversary; it would therefore cost nothing to make all the weight of execration fall upon him. The enigma is thus explained. Such is the cause of a partiality so unjust,—such is the hypocrisy of that opinion which, while excusing the Catholic sovereigns, condemns Philip II. without appeal.
I have not attempted to justify the policy of this monarch in all respects; but I have presented a few considerations which may serve to mitigate the violent attacks made upon him by his adversaries: it only remains for me to transcribe here the documents to which I alluded when I said that the Inquisition was not a mere instrument of the policy of Philip II., and that this prince did not intend to establish a system of obscurantisme in Spain.
Don Antonio Perez, in his Relations, gives a letter of the confessor of the king, Fray Diego de Chaves, in which letter the latter affirms that the secular prince has power over the lives of his subjects and vassals, and adds in a note: "I shall not undertake to relate all that I have heard said on the subject of the condemnation of some of these propositions; this is not within my province. Those who are concerned in this will at once understand the import of my words. I shall content myself with saying that, at the time when I was at Madrid, the Inquisition condemned the following proposition: a preacher—it matters not that I should mention his name—maintained in a sermon, at St. Jerome's, in Madrid, in presence of the Catholic king, that kings have an absolute power over the persons of their subjects, as well as over their properties. Besides some other separate matters, the preacher was condemned to retract this publicly, in the same place, with all the ceremonies of a juridical act, which he did in the same pulpit, saying that he had advanced such a proposition on such a day, and that he retracted it as erroneous. 'For, messieurs,' said he, reading literally from a paper, 'kings have no other power over their subjects than what is given them by the divine and human law; they have none proceeding from their own free and absolute will.' I even know who condemned the proposition, and appointed the words which the accused, to the great gratification of the former, was obliged to pronounce; indeed, he rejoiced to see torn up so poisonous a weed, which he felt was increasing, as the event proved. Master Fray Hernando del Castillo (I will mention his name) was the one who prescribed what the accused was to say; he was consultee of the holy office, and preacher to the king; he was a man of singular learning and eloquence, very well known and esteemed by his own nation, and especially by the Italians. Dr. Velasco, an important personage of that time, said of him, that the guitar in the hands of Fabricio Dentici was not so sweet as the tongue of Master Fray Hernandez del Castillo to the ears of those who heard him." And at page 47 in the text: "I know," says Don Antonio Perez, "that they were denominated very scandalous by persons very important by their rank, their learning, and their Christian purity of heart; there was one among them who had held supreme rank in the spiritual order in Spain, and had previously filled an office in the tribunal of the Inquisition." Perez afterwards says, that this person was the nuncio of his Holiness. (Relaciones de Anton. Perez. Paris, 1624.)
The letter of Philip II. to Doctor D. Benito Arias Montano contains the following, in addition to the remarkable passage which we have quoted.