The Prince, or Christian Magistrate.
(Liv. ii. ch. xxxix. § 2.)
"Princes, it is said, may compel their subjects to sell at half-price, or to give gratuitously, a part of their property. This opinion is generally founded on the law which ordains that, when a ship in a tempest has been saved by throwing overboard a part of the cargo, the proprietors of the remaining part are obliged to make a proportionate contribution to indemnify the sufferers for the loss they have sustained. Bartholus and other authors have inferred from this, that in a time of necessity and famine the monarch may require his subjects to give gratuitously, and a fortiori to sell at a lower price, a portion of their property to those in need. The monarch, say they, might, without any doubt, render property common, as it was before the establishment of social rights; he may consequently take it from one of his subjects and give it to another.
"It is certainly said in the laws of the kings of Israel, that he who should be chosen by God might seize upon the vineyards and property of his subjects, to confer them on his own servants; but the doctors do not support their arguments on this text. In fact, as we have said in chapter 16th, book i., the question does not concern the rights of a good prince, but the tyrannical acts of a bad one. Now, a careful study of the Scriptures will shew, that this passage must be favourable to one or other of the two opinions; for, if it were intended to establish that kings would possess in conscience the authority set forth in this passage, they would certainly have the right of seizing the property of one of their subjects to give it to another. If this passage is merely meant as a declaration of the injustices, of the extortions, and the tyrannies of wicked monarchs, it is no less certain that in Scripture the deed is considered unjust; for this deed is alleged as an example of what tyrants would do; now if it had been permitted to a good king, it would not have been quoted as an example of tyranny, as the Scriptures suppose it.
"Thus, this text alone, even were there no other in support of this doctrine, would satisfy me, that kings cannot lawfully compel their subjects to relinquish their property for less than its value, not even under pretext of the public good. In fact, were this pretext valid, it would not have been difficult for the kings of Israel to find an excuse for their tyranny; they might have alleged, that it was important to the public good to reward servants whose fidelity was so advantageous to the interests of the kingdom. Further, King Achab might have urged, that the amusements of the prince formed a part of the public good, since the people are so much interested in the health of the prince; and under this pretext might have deprived Naboth of his vineyard in order to enlarge his gardens. We find, however, that this pretext did not justify him in compelling Naboth even to sell his vineyard; the king, although grieved, was not offended by this man's refusal, neither was it his intention to seize the vineyard, had not the impious Jezabel furnished him with the means of doing so.
"Reason is evidently in favour of this opinion. Kings are the ministers of justice, and have been appointed to administer and uphold justice among the people. As St. Thomas teaches, the contract in buying and selling is only just in proportion as the price is equivalent to the thing purchased. Public, it is true, should be preferred to individual interest; in case, therefore, that a State is in danger of dissolution, the monarch might demand property at a less price, or even for nothing, just as he might compel the citizen to expose his life, which is of still greater value, in defending the common cause in a just war. This case, however, as P. Molina observes, is impossible, since the monarch would always be able to indemnify the individual for the loss he sustained, by levying for this purpose a general tax, a just tribute, and one that the State would be bound to pay. To prove this still more clearly, let us imagine the most urgent case possible; let us suppose that the king is besieged in his capital by a tyrant; the tyrant is about to enter sword and torch in hand; he offers to raise the siege on condition of receiving a statue of gold of great value, formerly the property of his ancestors, which a subject of the besieged king, the commander-in-chief of his armies, had taken in the plunder of a town, and made the inalienable property of the eldest son of his family. To render the case still more pressing, let us suppose that the tyrant has a dearly-cherished relation in the service of the besieged king, and that he will be satisfied if a rich lord of the kingdom, possessing a great number of estates, be despoiled, and his property conferred on his relation. It cannot be doubted that, in order to purchase the lives of all, this arrangement might be entered into; and that the king would be justified in acceding to the demand, in taking the statue, or even the whole of this property, to confer it on the tyrant's relation. But no one will assert that the lord should suffer the whole loss. The State would be under the obligation of indemnifying him for the loss, by taking upon itself the indemnification, the lord merely contributing his quota; for this reason, that it would be opposed to natural justice for the burdens of the whole body to fall upon a single member, which would be the case according to the law proposed by the opponents. If, in a case of shipwreck, all the cargo were thrown overboard to save the ship and the lives and fortunes of all, the obligation being common to all, it would not be just that it should fall exclusively upon the owners; because the cargo could best be thrown overboard and most endangered the ship's safety: the loss should be borne by all, even by those who had with them things only of little weight, as jewels or diamonds, for instance; since neither these latter proprietors nor the vessel herself could be saved without lightening her by throwing overboard the heavier portion of the cargo.
"The law decrees also that the owner of the vessel shall pay his quota. Not that he is obliged to indemnify the owners of the merchandise lost, because he sees them in need; it may be supposed, indeed, that these parties are rich, and, although their present loss is extreme, they will nevertheless be under the obligation of returning what would then have been lent to them; for, as the doctors decide, there is no obligation of giving to the rich man when he suffers a heavy loss, when a loan will answer the same end. But it is said that the obligation of the master of a ship is founded on the fact, that all the passengers and the proprietors being interested in saving their lives and their property, the risk and the loss of what was thrown overboard ought to fall on all, and not exclusively on the owners of what was lost. As a proof that this is the correct interpretation, it will be sufficient to notice the summary of the title, and the very words of the law, which are: Eo quod id tributum servatæ mercedes deberent.
"But, except in this case, or in others equally pressing, if the ruin of the State would not result from the mere fact of an individual refusing to yield up his house to the prince, the latter could not compel the proprietor to give it up for a less price than its just value, and still less for nothing; for so long as the persons and the property of the State are safe, it is of no importance to the body corporate whether such or such persons are rich or poor; no one, in fact, in the general community possesses a fixed degree from which he can neither descend nor rise. This instability observable among the members of the same State, some losing what others gain, and vice versâ, is inseparable from the state of society, such is the instability of temporal affairs; and the public good, generally speaking, neither loses nor gains by it."