Protestantism and Catholicity compared in their effects on the civilization of Europe

by Jaime Luciano Balmes

There are two ways in which this question may be decided; by doctrines and by facts.

Those who have said that the human race had lost its rights, and that they were revived by Rousseau, certainly have not given themselves much trouble in examining what are the real rights of the human race, and what are the apocryphal rights advanced by the philosopher of Geneva in his Contrat Social. Indeed, it may be said with more truth, that the human race had very valuable rights, acknowledged as such, and which Rousseau lost sight of. He undertook to examine thoroughly the origin of the civil power, and his wild notions, instead of explaining the matter, have only served to confuse it. I believe that on this important point men have never had ideas less clear and distinct than now. Revolutions have upset every thing in theory and in fact; governments have been sometimes revolutionary, sometimes reactionary; and sometimes revolution, and sometimes reaction, has been predominant. It is extremely difficult to obtain from modern books a clear, accurate, and exact knowledge of the nature of the civil power, of its origin, and of its relations with subjects; in some of these you will find the doctrines of Rousseau, in others those of Bonald: Rousseau is a miner who saps in order to overturn; Bonald is the hero who saves in his arms the tutelary deities of the city delivered to the flames; but in his fear of profanation, he carries them covered with a veil. However, it would not be just to attribute to Rousseau the melancholy honor of having begun the confusion of ideas on this point; at various times there have been found misguided men, who have labored to disturb society by anarchical doctrines; but the embodiment of these doctrines, and the forming of them into seductive theories, dates chiefly from the birth of Protestantism. Luther, in his book De Libertate Christiana, sowed the seeds of endless troubles by the extravagant doctrine, that a Christian is subject to no one. In vain did he have recourse to the evasive declaration, that he did not speak of magistrates or civil laws; the peasants of Germany drew their own consequences; they rose up against their lords, and enkindled a dreadful war. The divine right held by Catholics has been accused of favoring despotism; and it has been considered as so much opposed to the rights of the people, that the two expressions are often antithetically employed. Divine right, well understood, is not opposed to the rights, but to the excesses of the people; so far from giving unlimited extent to power, it confines it within the limits of reason, justice, and public advantage. In his lectures on the general history of civilization in Europe, M. Guizot, speaking of this right as proclaimed by the Church, says: "The rights of liberty and political guarantees are combined with difficulty with the principle of religious royalty; but that principle in itself is elevated, moral, and salutary." (Lecture ix.) When men like M. Guizot, who have made these questions their special study, are so lamentably deceived on this point, who can be astonished that the same thing occurs to the generality of writers!

Before I go further, I will make one observation, which we ought always to have present to our minds. On these questions we continually hear mention made of the schools of Bossuet and of Bonald; private names are put forward, sometimes in one way and sometimes in another. Much as I respect the merits of these men, and of others not less illustrious produced by the Catholic Church, yet I must observe that she is not responsible for any doctrines but those which she herself teaches; that she is not personified in any doctor in particular; and that being herself appointed by God himself to be the oracle of infallible truth in faith and morality, she does not permit the faithful to defer blindly to the mere word of any private man, however great may be his merit in science and in sanctity. If you wish to know what the Catholic Church teaches, consult the decisions of her Councils and her Pontiffs; consult also her doctors of distinguished and unsullied reputation; but beware of confounding the opinions of an author, however respectable he may be, with the doctrines of the Church and the voice of the Vicar of Jesus Christ. By this warning I do not mean to prematurely condemn the opinions of any one, but simply to put those on their guard who, little versed in ecclesiastical studies, might, in certain cases, confound revealed dogmas with what is mere human thought. Having premised this much, let us enter freely into the question.

Wherein does this divine right, of which we hear so much, consist? In order to explain this matter completely, we must state the objects over which this right extends; for these objects being widely different, there will also be a great difference in the application made to them of the principle. A great number of questions present themselves in this very important matter; but it appears to me that they may all be reduced to these, which embrace the rest, viz. What is the origin of the civil power? How far does it extend? Is it lawful to resist it in any case?

The first question is, What is the origin of the civil power? How do we know that this power is from God? There is much confusion prevailing on these points; and certainly it is to be lamented, that at a time so disturbed as the present they should be misunderstood; for whatever may be said to the contrary, doctrines are never wholly laid aside, either in revolutions or in restorations; men's interests, no doubt, have great weight therein, but they are not left alone in the arena. The best way of forming clear ideas on these points is to have recourse to ancient authors, especially those whose doctrines have been respected for a long period of time, who continue to be respected down to this day, and who are looked upon as safe guides in the right interpretation of ecclesiastical doctrines. This way of studying the question which now occupies us ought to be acceptable to those even who entertain contempt for the writers of whom we speak; for we are now engaged more in seeking in what the doctrine consists, than in examining into its truth. Now for this purpose we cannot find witnesses better informed, or interpreters more competent, than men who have devoted their whole lives to the study of the doctrine.

This last reflection is in no way contradictory to what we have said above, on the care which we ought to take not to confound the mere opinions of men with the doctrines of the Church; it only tends to remind us of the necessity which exists of perusing a certain class of authors, who are certainly not worthy of the ungrateful neglect with which they are treated; indeed, it is impossible that their important labors, conscientiously pursued for so long a time, should produce no fruit. In order to understand the better the opinion of these writers on the matter which now occupies us, we ought to observe the difference which they make in the application of the general principle of divine right to the origin of the civil or to that of the ecclesiastical power. From this comparison there arises a bright light, which resolves and clears up all difficulties. Open the works of the most distinguished theologians, consult their treatises on the origin of the power of the Pope, and you will see that in establishing this power on divine right, they mean that it emanates from God, not only in a general sense, that is, inasmuch as all being comes from God; not only in a social sense, that is, inasmuch as the Church being a society, God has willed the existence of a power to govern it; but in a most special manner that God has Himself instituted this power, that He has Himself established its form, that He has Himself pointed out the person, and that consequently the successor to the chair of St. Peter is of divine right the supreme pastor of the universal Church, having over the whole of this Church supreme honor and jurisdiction.

With respect to the civil power, these authors speak thus. In the first place, all power comes from God; for power exists, and all existence comes from God; power is sovereignty, and God is the lord, the supreme master of all things; power is a right, and in God is found the source of all right; power is a moral movement, and God is the universal cause of all sorts of movements; power tends towards an exalted end, and God is the end of all creatures; His Providence ordains and directs all things with mercy and efficacy. Thus we see that St. Thomas, in his work De Regimine Principum, affirms that all power comes from God as supreme master, as may be shown in three ways: as it is a being, as it is a mover, and as it is an end. (Lib. 3, cap. 1.)

As I am treating of this method of explaining the origin of power, I must pause for a moment to refute Rousseau, who, in the allusion which he made to this doctrine, showed that he did not understand it. He says, "All power comes from God, I allow; but all diseases also come from Him. Are we, therefore, to say that it is forbidden to call in a physician?" (Contrat Social, liv. i. c. 3.) It is true that one of the senses in which the divine origin of power is affirmed is, that all finite beings emanate from an infinite being; but this sense is not the only one. Indeed, theologians knew very well that this idea, by itself, did not imply its legitimacy, and that it extended as well to physical force; for as the author of the Contrat Social adds: "the pistol held by a robber in a wood is also a power." Rousseau, in this passage, has sacrificed the sense to show his ingenuity; the love of making a brilliant sally has seduced him into removing the question from its proper ground. It was easy, indeed, to see that, with respect to the civil power, men do not speak of a physical, but of a moral, a legitimate power; in any other way it would be in vain to seek for its origin: as well might they seek the source of riches, health, strength, courage, subtilty, or the other qualities which contribute to form the material force of all power. The question is with regard to the moral being which is called power; and in the moral order, illegitimate power is not power, it is not a being, it is nothing. Consequently, there is no need of seeking its origin in God, or in any thing else. Therefore, power emanates from God as the source of all right, justice, and legitimacy; and in considering power, not as a mere physical, but as a moral being, it is affirmed that it can come from God alone, who is the plenitude of all being. Not only is this doctrine, taken generally, above all difficulty, but it must be admitted by all who do not profess themselves atheists; they alone can call it in question. Let us now descend to particulars, and see whether Catholic doctors teach any thing which is not perfectly reasonable even in the eyes of philosophers.

Man, they say, was not created to live alone; his existence supposes a family; his inclinations urge him to form an alliance, without which the human race could not be perpetuated. Families are connected with each other by intimate and indestructible ties; they have common wants; none can insure happiness, or even preservation, without the aid of others. Therefore they are bound to enter into society. Society cannot exist without order, or order without justice; and both require a guardian, an interpreter, an executor. This is the civil power. God, who created man, and willed also his preservation, consequently willed the existence of society, and the power which it requires. Now the existence of the civil power is as conformable to the will of God as the existence of the paternal; if families have need of the paternal, society has no less need of the civil power. Our Lord has condescended to secure us from mistakes on this important point by telling us in the Scriptures, that all power emanates from Him, that we are obliged to obey it, that whoever resists it resists the Divine command. I seek in vain for an objection to this way of explaining the origin of society, and of the power which governs it. This doctrine preserves natural, human, and divine right; all these rights are connected, and support each other. The sublimity of the theory rivals its simplicity; revelation sanctions what was shown by the light of reason, and grace fortifies nature. Such, then, is the famous divine right, presented as a bugbear to the ignorant and unsuspecting, in order to make them believe that the Catholic Church, when she teaches the obligation of obeying the legitimate power, and founds this obligation on the law of God, proposes a dogma injurious to true human liberty.

To hear some men ridicule the divine right of kings, one would say that we Catholics believed that certain individuals and families have received bulls of institution from Heaven, and that we are grossly ignorant of the history of the changes of the civil power. If they had examined the matter more deeply, they would have found that, far from being liable to the reproach of such folly, we have only established a principle the necessity of which was acknowledged by all the legislators of antiquity, and that our belief is quite reconcilable with true philosophical doctrines and the events recorded by history. In support of what I have said, see with what admirable clearness St. Chrysostom explains this point in his 23d homily on the Epistle to the Romans: "There is no power that does not come from God." What do you say? Is every prince, then, appointed by God? I do not say that; for I do not speak of any prince in particular, but of the thing itself, that is, of the power itself: I affirm that the existence of principalities is the work of the divine wisdom, and that to it it is owing that all things are not given up to blind chance. Therefore it is that the Apostle does not say, "That there is no prince who does not come from God;" but he says, speaking of the thing in itself, "There is no power which does not come from God." "Non est potestas, nisi a Deo. Quid dicis? Ergo omnis princeps a Deo constitutus? Istud non dico. Non enim de quovis principe mihi sermo est, sed de re ipsa, id est de ipsa potestate. Quod enim principatus sint, quodque non simpliciter et temere cuncta ferantur, divinæ sapientiæ opus esse dico. Propterea non dicit: non enim princeps est nisi a Deo. Sed de re ipsa disserit dicens: non est potestas nisi a Deo." (Hom. 23, in Epist. ad Rom.) It appears, from the words of St. John Chrysostom, that the meaning of divine right, according to Catholics, is, that there exists a power for the government of society, and that it is not abandoned to the mercy of passion and imagination. This doctrine, which insures public order, by establishing the obligation of obedience on motives of conscience, does not descend to the inferior questions, which do not affect the fundamental principle.