The explanation given of the origin of power by both parties may be set forth in the following terms: In the opinion of some, God says, "Society, for thy preservation and well-being, thou requirest a government; choose, therefore, under what form this government shall be exercised, and appoint the persons who are to take charge of it; I, on my part, will confer upon them the faculties necessary for the fulfilment of their mission." In the opinion of others, God says, "Society, for thy preservation and well-being, thou requirest a government: I confer upon thee the faculties necessary for the fulfilment of this object; choose thyself the form under which this government shall be exercised, and, appointing the persons who are to take charge of it, transmit to them the faculties which I have communicated to thee."
In order to be convinced of the identity of the results of these two formulas, we must examine them in their relations: 1. to the sanctity of their origin; 2. to the rights and duties of power; 3. to the rights and duties of the subject. Whether God has communicated power to society, to be transmitted by it to the persons appointed to exercise it, or has merely conferred upon it the right of determining the form and appointing such persons, that, by means of this determination and appointment, the rights annexed to supreme power may be directly communicated to the persons intrusted with the exercise of it, it follows, in either case, that this supreme power, wherever it exists, emanates from God; and is not less sacred because it passes through an intermediate means appointed by Him. I will illustrate these ideas by a very simple and obvious example. Suppose there exists in a state some particular community, instituted by the sovereign, and having no rights but those granted by him; no duties but those which he imposes upon it; in fine, a community indebted to the sovereign for all that it is and has. This community, however small it may be, will require a government: this government may be formed in two ways; either the sovereign who has given it its laws has conferred upon it the right of governing itself, and of transmitting this right to the person or persons whom it may think proper to elect; or he has left to the community itself the determination of the form and the appointment of the persons, adding that such determination and appointment being once made, it shall be understood that, by this simple act, the sovereign grants to the persons appointed the right of exercising their functions within lawful bounds. It is evident that the parity is complete; and now I ask, Is it not true that, in this case, as in the other, the faculties of him who governs should be considered and respected as an emanation from the sovereign? Is it not true that it would be difficult to discover any difference between these two kinds of investiture? In both suppositions, the community would have the right of determining the form and appointing the person; in both cases, he who governs could only obtain his powers by virtue of the previous determination and appointment; in neither case would there need any new manifestation on the part of the sovereign, that the person nominated might be understood to be invested with faculties corresponding to the exercise of his functions. In practice, therefore, there would be no difference; further, I will assert that, in theory even, it would be difficult to trace the point of separation between the two cases.
Certainly, if we view the matter with the eye of an acute metaphysician, we may very easily discover this difference, by considering the moral entity which we call power; not as it is in itself, and in its effects, but as an abstract being, passing from one hand to another, in the manner of corporeal objects. But, instead of examining the question for the curiosity of knowing whether this moral entity, before arriving at one person, has not first passed through another, let us first seek to verify from whence it emanates, and what are the faculties it confers, the rights it imposes: we shall then find that, in saying, "I confer this faculty upon you, transmit it to whomsoever you think proper, and in whatever way you think proper," the sovereign expresses no more than if he should say: "Such or such a faculty shall be conferred by me upon the person you wish, and in the manner you wish, by the simple fact of the election you have made." It follows hence, that whether we adopt the opinion of direct communication, or the contrary one, the supreme rights of hereditary monarchies, of elective monarchies, and in general of all supreme powers, whatever be their forms of government, will not on this account be less sacred, less certainly sealed with divine authority. Difference in the forms of government does not in the least diminish the obligations of submitting to civil power, lawfully established; so that the refusing of obedience to the president of a republic, in a country in which republicanism is the legal form of government, is no less a criminal resistance to the ordinance of God, than the refusing of the same obedience to the most absolute monarch. Bossuet, so strongly attached to monarchy, and writing in a country and at a period in which the king might exclaim, "I am the state;" and in a work, in which he proposed nothing less than to offer a complete treatise on Politics, taken from the words of Holy Scripture; established, nevertheless, in a manner the most explicit and conclusive, the truth which I have just pointed out. "We ought to be subject," says he, "to the form of government established in our country." And he afterwards quotes these words of St. Paul in his Epistle to the Romans, chap. xiii.: "Let every soul be subject to higher powers; for there is no power but from God; and those that are, are ordained of God; therefore he that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God." "There is no form of government," continues Bossuet, "nor any human institution, without its inconveniences; so that it is necessary to remain in the state to which length of time has inured the people. For this reason, God takes under His protection all legitimate governments, in whatever form they may be established; whoever undertakes to overturn them, is not only an enemy to the public, but also to God." (Liv. ii. prop. 12.)
It is of little consequence whether power be communicated directly or indirectly; the respect and obedience due to it are not in the least changed, and consequently the sacredness of the origin of power remains the same, whichever opinion be adopted; neither do the rights and duties of government, and those of the subject, remain less sacred. These rights and duties suffer no change, whether there be or not an intermediate means for the communication of power; their nature and limits are founded upon the very object of the institution of society; but this object is totally independent of the mode in which God communicates power to man. Against what I have advanced upon the small amount of difference existing between these various opinions, the authority of the theologians, whose texts I have cited in the preceding chapter, will be objected. "These theologians," it will be said, "certainly understood these affairs; and as they placed so much importance upon the distinction here under discussion, they undoubtedly saw in it some great truth proper to be taken into account." This objection acquires the more force, when we consider that the distinction made upon this point by these theologians does not proceed from a spirit of subtilty, as it might be suspected in the case of those scholastic theologians, whose writings are replete with dialectic arguments, rather than with reasoning founded upon Scripture, upon the apostolical traditions and other theological resources, from which we ought principally to take our arguments in controversies of this nature; but the theologians whom I have quoted are certainly not of this class. We need only name Bellarmin, to recognise a grave and extremely solid author, who opposed the Protestants with Scripture, with traditions, with the authority of the holy Fathers, the decisions of the universal Church and of the Sovereign Pontiffs: Bellarmin was not one of those theologians who excited the lamentations of Melchior Cano, and of whom he said, that in the hour of combat against heresy, instead of wielding well-tempered weapons, they wielded only long reeds: arundines longas. Such was the importance given to this distinction, that James, King of England, complained loudly that Cardinal Bellarmin taught that the power of kings came from God only indirectly; and the Catholic schools were so far from looking upon this distinction as insignificant, that they defended it against the attacks of King James; and that one of their most illustrious doctors, Suarez, entered the lists to contend for the doctrines of Bellarmin.
It appears, then, at first sight, that I am wrong in what I have said upon the slight importance of the distinction here mentioned. I believe, nevertheless, that the difficulty may be easily removed, and that it will suffice for this purpose to distinguish the different aspects under which the question presents itself. First of all, I will observe, that the Catholic theologians proceeded upon this point with admirable prudence and foresight; and truly the question, such as it was then proposed, comprehended more than a subtilty; I am inclined to think that it included one of the most serious points of public right. In order to examine deeply these doctrines of Catholic theologians, and to lay hold of their true sense, we must fix our attention upon the tendencies which the religious reform of the sixteenth century communicated to European monarchy. Even before this reform, thrones had acquired a great deal of force and solidity, through the decline in the power of the feudal lords, and the development of the democratic element. That element, which in due time was destined to acquire the power of which it is now possessed, was not then in sufficiently favorable circumstances to exert its action on the vast scale which it embraces in our days. On this account, it was obliged to take refuge under the shadow of the throne—an emblem of order and justice elevated in the midst of society—a sort of universal regulator and leveller, destined gradually to destroy the extreme inequalities so harassing and obnoxious to the people. Thus, democracy itself, which, in after ages, was to overturn so many thrones, served them, at that time, as a firm support, sheltering them from the attacks of a turbulent and formidable aristocracy, unwilling to be transformed into mere courtiers. There was nothing in this state of things very mischievous, so long as matters remained within the limits prescribed by reason and justice; but, unfortunately, good principles were exaggerated, regal authority was gradually converted into an absorbent force, which would have concentrated in itself all other forces. European monarchy lost thus its true character, which consists in monarchy having just limits, even when these limits are not marked out and guarded by political institutions.
Protestantism exalts to an incredible degree the pretensions of kings, by attacking the spiritual power of the Pope, by painting in the darkest colors the dangers of his temporal power, and especially by establishing the fatal doctrine, that the supreme civil power has ecclesiastical affairs totally under its direction; and by accusing of abuse, of usurpation, of unbounded ambition, the independence which the Church claims by virtue of the sacred canons, of the guarantee afforded by the civil law, of the traditions of fifteen centuries, and above all, of the institution of her Divine Founder. He had no need of the permission, of any civil power to send His apostles to preach the Gospel, and to baptize in the name of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. A glance at the history of Europe at the epoch here mentioned will convince us of the evil consequences of such a doctrine, and show us how agreeable it must have been to the ears of power, which it invested with unbounded faculties, even in matters purely religious. This exaggeration of the rights of civil power, coinciding with the efforts made on the other hand to repress the pontifical authority, must have favored the doctrine which attempted to place the power of kings upon a level, in every respect, with that of Popes; and consequently, it was very natural that its authors should wish to establish, that sovereigns received their power from God, in the same manner as the Popes, without any difference whatever. The doctrine of direct communication, although very susceptible, as we have seen, of a reasonable explanation, might involve a more extensive meaning, which would have made the people oblivious of the special and characteristic manner in which the supreme power of the Church was instituted by God himself. What I have just advanced cannot be considered as merely conjectural; the whole is supported by facts which cannot have been forgotten. The reigns of Henry VIII. and of Elizabeth of England, and the usurpations and violence in which Protestant powers indulged against the Catholic Church, are a sufficient confirmation of these sad truths. But, unfortunately, even in countries where Catholicity remained triumphant, attempts were then, have since been, and still are witnessed, that show clearly enough how strong was the impulse given in this sense to the civil power; for even now it is but too prone to transgress its legitimate bounds.
The circumstances under which the two illustrious theologians above cited, Bellarmin and Suarez, wrote, are another reason in support of what I have just adduced. I have quoted remarkable passages from a work by Suarez, written in refutation of a publication of King James of England. This King could not bear the idea of Cardinal Bellarmin's having established that the power of kings does not emanate directly from God, but is communicated through the medium of society, which receives it in a direct manner. Possessed, as is well known, with the mania for theological debates and decisions, King James did not confine himself to simple theory; he reduced his theory to practice, and said to his Parliament: "that God had appointed him absolute master; and that all privileges which co-legislative bodies enjoyed were pure concessions proceeding from the bounty of kings." His courtiers, in their adulations, decreed him the title of the modern Solomon; he might well, therefore, feel displeased with the Italian and Spanish theologians for endeavoring to humble the pride of his presumptuous wisdom, and restrain his despotism. If we reflect upon the words of Bellarmin, and especially on those of Suarez, we shall find that the aim of these eminent theologians was to point out the difference between the civil and ecclesiastical powers, with respect to the mode of their origin. They admit that both powers come from God; that it is an indispensable duty to be subject to them; and that to resist them is to resist the ordinance of God; but not finding, either in the Scripture or in tradition, the least foundation for establishing that civil power, like that of the Sovereign Pontiffs, has been instituted in a special and extraordinary manner, they are anxious that this difference should remain obvious, and seek to avoid the introduction, in a point of such import, of a confusion of ideas, from which dangerous errors might arise. "This opinion," says Suarez, "is new, singular, and apparently invented to exalt the temporal over the spiritual power." (See above.) Hence, in discussing the question of the origin of civil power, they require you to bear in mind the influence of society. "By means of man's counsel and election," says Bellarmin; thus reminding the King, that how sacred soever his authority might be, it had been very differently instituted from that of the Sovereign Pontiff. The distinction between direct and indirect communication served, in a particular manner, to prove the difference in question; for this very distinction recalled to mind that civil power, although established by God, owed its existence to no extraordinary measure, and could not be considered as supernatural, but was to be looked upon as dependent upon human and natural right, sanctioned, nevertheless, in an express manner, by right divine.
These theologians would not, perhaps, have forcibly insisted upon this distinction, had it not been for the efforts made by others to efface it. It was a matter of consequence with them to humble the pride of power, to prevent it from assuming, whether in respect to its origin or its rights, titles not appertaining to it; to prevent its ascribing to itself an unlawful supremacy, even in religious affairs, and thus causing monarchy to degenerate into a sort of Oriental despotism, in which the governing power is every thing, the people and their affairs nothing. If we weigh their words attentively, we shall find that the predominating idea with them was that which I have just stated. At first sight, their language appears exceedingly democratical, from their frequent use of the words community, state, society, people; but on examining closely their system of doctrine, and paying attention to the expressions they use, we perceive that they had no subversive design, and that anarchical theories never once entered their minds. They advocated on the one hand the rights of authority, whilst they protected on the other those of the subject, thus endeavoring to resolve the problem which formed the continual occupation of all honest political writers; to limit power without destroying it, or placing it under too great restraint; to protect society against the disorder of despotism, without rendering it at the same time refractory or turbulent. From the above reasoning we see that the distinction between direct and indirect communication may be of great or of little importance, according to the view we take of it. It is of great importance when serving to remind the civil power that the establishment of governments and the regulation of their forms has in some way been dependent upon society itself, and that no individual, no family, can presume upon having received from God the government of the people without regard to the laws of the country, as if those laws, in whatever form, were a free offering made by them to the people. This same distinction serves, in short, to establish the origin of civil power as an emanation from the Deity, the Author of nature, but not as instituted in an extraordinary manner, as something supernatural, as in the case of the supreme ecclesiastical power. From this latter consideration two consequences follow, one of which is of more importance than the other to the legitimate liberties of mankind and the independence of the Church. To call in the intervention, express or tacit, of society for the establishment of governments and the regulation of their forms, is to prevent the concealment of their origin under any veil of mystery; it is simply and plainly to define their object, consequently to explain their duties, as well as to point out their faculties. By these means a restraint is put upon the disorders and abuses of authority, which it is thenceforth clearly seen are not to find support in enigmatical theories.
The independence of the Church is thus established upon a solid basis. Whenever the civil power attempts to offer it violence, the Church may say: "My authority is established directly and immediately by God in a special, extraordinary, and miraculous manner; yours likewise emanates from God, but through the intervention of man, through the intermediary of the laws, in the ordinary course pointed out by nature and determined by human prudence; but neither man nor the civil power has a right to destroy or change what God Himself, deviating from the course of nature and making use of ineffable prodigies, has thought proper to institute." So long as the ideas here set forth are respected, so long as direct communication is not received in too extensive a sense, and care taken not to confound things whose limits so gravely affect religion and society, the distinction here spoken of is of little importance. We have seen, even, that the two opinions may be reconciled with each other. At all events, this distinction will have served to illustrate with what exalted views Catholic theologians have discussed the grave questions of public right. Guided by sound philosophy, and without ever losing sight of the beacon of revelation, they have given equal satisfaction to the desires of both schools. They have not fallen into the errors of either; democratical without being anarchists, monarchical without being base adulators. In establishing the rights of the people, they were not, like modern demagogues, under the necessity of destroying religion, but made her the guardian of the rights of the people, as well as of those of kings. Liberty was not with them a synonyme for license and irreligion; in their opinion, men might be free without being rebellious or impious; liberty consisted in being subject to the law; and, as they could not conceive that law was possible without religion and without God; in like manner also they believed that liberty was not possible without God and religion. What reason, revelation, and history taught them has become evident to us by experience. Shall we be told of the dangers, grave or slight, in which theologians could involve governments? But people now-a-days are not led astray by affected and insidious declamations; and kings well know whether the schools of theologians have exiled royalty, and led it to the scaffold.[29]