The condition of affairs in Boston Harbor was most interesting. Here was a city with an estimated population of five hundred and fifty thousand; with an assessed valuation of $1,012,750,000; with business interests to be reckoned by daily bank-clearings of $20,000,000; with annual exports and imports of $189,879,839—in short, the second seaport of the country in commercial rank. Naturally it would be expected that the general Government, which hardly could be ignorant of the enormous interests just shown, would have made some pretence at giving them adequate protection. But what were the grim facts in the case?
In 1886, the so-called Endicott Board on Fortifications—whose scheme of defence, with some minor modifications, still remains the standard project for the erection of our coast works—recommended an expenditure of $10,910,250 for the defenses of Boston Harbor. This sum covered the cost of guns, mounts, emplacements, submarine mines, and a flotilla of eighteen torpedo-boats for local service. Large as it may seem, it yet represents a levy of but one and seven-hundredths per cent. on the assessed valuation of the property exposed at this port, and furthermore it was intended that its expenditure should be distributed through a period of ten years. How faithfully this programme was carried out by the authorities at Washington may be shown by the following table, in which the first column of figures indicates the number of breech-loading rifles and mortars required by the complete scheme of defence, while the second exhibits those actually mounted for service during the late war:
| Proposed | Mounted | |
|---|---|---|
| 16-inch B. L. R. | 8 | 0 |
| 12-inch B. L. R. | 10 | 0 |
| 10-inch B. L. R. | 15 | 8 |
| 8-inch B. L. R. | 10 | 0 |
| 12-inch B. L. M. | 132 | 16 |
| --- | -- | |
| Total of pieces | 175 | 24 |
In other words, of the projected scheme of defence—so far as concerned the main element, gun and mortar fire—there remained to be put into operation the trifling matter of eighty-six per cent.! In twelve years elapsing since the exhaustive report of the Endicott Board, the Congress of the United States had doled out appropriations barely sufficient to complete thirteen and seven-tenths per cent. of the required guns, mounts, and emplacements. The essential matter of the torpedo-boat flotilla had been put calmly aside without even the courtesy of consideration. Funds at the disposal of the Engineers had enabled them, as early as March 1st, to begin the work of submarine mining, but at no time during the war was the complete system of mines installed. And, last of all, when war actually had been declared, the garrisons of the three main defensive positions of the harbor—Fort Warren, Long Island Head, and the Mortar Battery at Winthrop—aggregated less than two hundred and fifty officers and men for duty.
MARCHING ORDERS
III.
Well aware of this condition of affairs, Governor Wolcott thought it prudent—even before the actual declaration of war—to have his foot batteries assembled in the vicinity of the guns at which it seemed more than likely that their services soon might be required, and by his direction permission was asked from Washington to send the First Heavy Artillery to Fort Warren, under State orders. This request met with the prompt approval of the Secretary of War, and on Sunday, April 24th, there came to regimental headquarters orders from General Dalton directing the command to "hold itself in readiness for immediate service in the defenses of Boston Harbor."
It hardly need be said that this order caused little surprise to the officers of the regiment. From the day when the naval court of inquiry reported the destruction of the Maine as due to external explosion, until the day that marching orders actually came, the command at any time could have reported for duty with full ranks, and on three hours' notice. It is a matter of official record that this regiment, for years, has been held in constant readiness for field service; the "Vigilantia" on the regimental badge has long stood for something more than an empty boast. As a strict matter of fact, though the officers had been convinced that war could not long be averted, there had been but little extra effort made on that account, for but little remained to be done; here and there battery rolls were judiciously weeded, all alarm-lists received final and careful revision—and that substantially was all. On the recommendation of the Military Advisory Board, to be sure, enough recruits had been enrolled to bring the regimental strength up to twelve hundred, and these new men had been faithfully drilled; but, as events proved, this labor was to result in small benefit to the regiment itself, though other commands ultimately profited by it.
Matters now were moving swiftly enough to suit the most impatient, and there were many impatient ones among the officers and men of the Old First. On the 23rd of April, President McKinley had issued his call for one hundred and twenty-five thousand volunteers; on the 24th, the regiment had been ordered to hold itself ready for instant response to marching orders; on the 25th, Congress resolved that a state of war then existed—and late in the afternoon of that day came the long-awaited summons to duty.
"Colonel Charles Pfaff, commanding First Regiment Heavy Artillery, First Brigade, M.V.M.," so ran the third paragraph of Special Orders, No. 42, from the office of the Adjutant-General, "will report with his command, fully armed and equipped, to the commanding officer at Fort Warren, for eight days' duty in the defenses of Boston Harbor." An eight days' tour? It was destined to be exactly two hundred and three days before the regiment should be released from the service on which it started under the order signed by General Dalton that afternoon.