[338]. Distance between firing line and support. The distance between the firing line and the supporting group or groups will vary between wide limits; it should be as short as the necessity for protection from heavy losses will permit. When cover is available, the support should be as close as 50 to 100 yards; when such cover is not available, it should not be closer than 300 yards. It may be as far as 500 yards in rear if good cover is there obtainable and is not obtainable at a lesser distance. (301)
[339]. Placing entire battalion or regiment in firing line at beginning. In exceptional cases, as in a meeting engagement, it may be necessary to place an entire battalion or regiment in the firing line at the initial deployment, the support being furnished by other troops. Such deployment causes the early mingling of the larger units, thus rendering leadership and control extremely difficult. The necessity for such deployment will increase with the inefficiency of the commander and of the service of information. (302)
Fire
[340]. Major apportions target. Fire direction and fire control are functions of company and platoon commanders, as laid down in [pars. 285]–290. The major makes the primary apportionment of the target—in defense, by assigning sectors of fire, in attack, by assigning the objective. In the latter case each company in the firing line takes as its target that part of the general objective which lies in its front. (303)
[341]. Major indicates where or when fire fight begins. The major should indicate the point or time at which the fire fight is to open. He may do this in his order for deployment or he may follow the firing line close enough to do so at the proper time. If it be impracticable for him to do either, the senior officer with the firing line, in each battalion, selects the time for opening fire. (304)
Attack
(See [pars. 456]–502.)
[342]. Battalion the attack unit. The battalion is the attack unit, whether operating alone or as part of a larger unit. (305)
[343]. Advance of battalion acting as one of several in firing line. If his battalion be one of several in the firing line, the major, in executing his part of the attack, pushes his battalion forward as vigorously as possible within the front, or section, assigned to it. The great degree of independence allowed to him as to details demands, in turn, the exercise of good judgment on his part. Better leadership, better troops, and more favorable terrain enable one battalion to advance more rapidly in attack than another less fortunate, and such a battalion will insure the further advance of the others. The leading battalion should not, however, become isolated; isolation may lead to its destruction. (306)
[344]. Close in on enemy as much as possible before opening fire. The deployment having been made, the firing line advances without firing. The predominant idea must be to close with the enemy as soon as possible without ruinous losses. The limited supply of ammunition and the uncertainty of resupply, the necessity for securing fire superiority in order to advance within the shorter ranges, and the impossibility of accomplishing this at ineffective ranges, make it imperative that fire be not opened as long as the advance can be continued without demoralizing losses. The attack which halts to open fire at extreme range (over 1,200 yards) is not likely ever to reach its destination. Every effort should be made, by using cover or inconspicuous formations, or by advancing the firing line as a whole, to arrive within 800 yards of the enemy before opening fire. (For expenditure of ammunition see [pars. 432]–433; for advancing the attack see [par. 467].) (307)