Sergeant Adams: The platoon would be marching in column of squads and I would be at the head. Two pairs of connecting files would keep me in touch with the point. ([Par. 1025].) I would now give this order: "Corporal Smith, take two men from your squad and patrol north along this road (pointing up the Tracy-Maxey road) for a mile and then rejoin the column on this road (Chester Pike), to the west of you." I would then say to Private Barker, "Take Carter and cut across to that railroad fill and go along the top of that (Sandy) ridge, rejoining the column beyond the ridge. Corporal Smith with a patrol is going up this road. Keep a lookout for him." When we reached the point where the road crosses the south nose of Sandy Ridge and I saw the valley in front of me with the long high ridge west of Sandy Creek, running parallel to the Chester Pike and about 800 yards west of it, I would give this order: "Corporal Davis, take the three remaining men in Corporal Smith's squad, cross the creek there (pointing in the direction of the Barton farm) go by that orchard, and move north along that high ridge, keeping the column in sight. Make an effort to keep abreast of the advance guard, which will continue along this road."
I gave Corporal Davis the remaining men out of Corporal Smith's squad because I did not want to break up another squad and as this is, in my opinion, a very important patrol, I wanted a noncommissioned officer in charge of it. Unless something else occurs this will be all the patrols I intend sending out until we pass the steel railroad trestle over Sandy Creek.
Captain: Your point about not breaking up a squad when you could avoid it by using the men remaining in an already broken squad, is a very important one. Take this particular case. You first sent out two pairs of connecting files between the advance party and your point—four men. This leaves a corporal and three men in that squad. If we assume that no patrols were out when we passed through Salem, this corporal and two of his men could have been sent up the Tracy-Maxey road, leaving one man to be temporarily attached to some squad. From the last mentioned squad you would pick your two men for the Sandy Ridge patrol and also the corporal and three men for the Barton farm, etc., patrol. This would leave three men in this squad and you would have under your immediate command two complete squads and three men. As the patrols return, organize new squads immediately and constantly endeavor to have every man attached to a squad. This is one of your most important duties, as it prevents disorder when some serious situation suddenly arises. Also it is one of the duties of the detachment commander that is generally overlooked until too late.
The direction you sent your three patrols was good and their orders clear, covering the essential points, but as you have in a very short space of time, detached nine men, almost a third of your advance party, don't you think you should have economized more on men?
Sergeant Adams: The Sandy Ridge patrol is as small as you can make it—two men. I thought the other two patrols were going to be detached so far from the column that they should be large enough to send a message or two and still remain out. I suppose it would be better to send but two men with Corporal Davis, but I think Corporal Smith should have two with him.
Captain: Yes, I agree with you, for you are entering a valley which is, in effect, a defile, and the Tracy-Maxey road is a very dangerous avenue of approach to your main body. But you must always bear in mind that it is a mistake to use one more man than is needed to accomplish the object in view. The more you send away from your advance party, the more scattered and weaker your command becomes, and this is dispersion, which constitutes one of the gravest, and at the same time, most frequent tactical errors.
To continue the problem, we will suppose you have reached the stone bridge over Sandy Creek; the point is at the cross roads by the Smith house; you can see the two men moving along Sandy Ridge; and Corporal Davis' patrol is just entering the orchard by the Barton farm. Firing suddenly commences well to the front and you hear your point reply to it.
Sergeant Adams: I halt to await information from the point.
Captain: That is absolutely wrong. You command the advance party of an advance guard; your mission requires you to secure the uninterrupted march of the main body; and at the first contact you halt, thus interrupting the march ([Par. 1021]). The sooner you reach the point, the better are your chances for driving off the enemy if he is not too strong, or the quicker you find out his strength and give your commander in the rear the much desired information.
Sergeant Adams: Then I push ahead with the advance party, sending back the following message—