In regard, again, to the supposed "transmutation of species," we are equally warranted in affirming that it is destitute of all experimental evidence, and unsupported even by any natural analogy. As the doctrine of spontaneous generation stands opposed to the maxim that organic life can be produced only by organic life, so the doctrine of a transmutation of species stands opposed to the equally certain maxim that like produces like, both in the vegetable and animal kingdoms. Cuvier has demonstrated, with reference to the birds and reptiles preserved in Egypt, an entire fixity and uniformity of species, in every, even the least, particular, for at least three thousand years.[48] In the actual course of Nature we see no tendency to change; nay, a barrier seems to have been erected in the constitution of Nature itself to prevent the possible confusion of races by promiscuous intercourse, through that provision which renders the mule incapable of reproduction. No plant has ever been found in a state of transition from a lower to a higher form; no instance has ever been produced of one of the algæ being transmuted into the lowest form of terrestrial vegetation; nor of a small gelatinous body developing itself into a fish, a bird, or a beast; nor of an ourang-outang rising into a man.[49] It is true, indeed, that "there is a capacity in all species to accommodate themselves, to a certain extent, to a change of external circumstances, this extent varying greatly according to the species. There may thus arise changes of appearance or structure, and some of these changes are transmissible to the offspring; but the mutations thus superinduced are governed by constant laws and confined within certain limits. Indefinite divergence from the original type is not possible, and the extreme limit of possible variation may usually be reached in a short period of time; in short, species have a real existence in Nature, and a transformation from one to another does not exist."[50]
The whole science of Natural History is based on the existence of distinct species, capable of being discriminated from each other by certain characteristic marks; and the whole art of the agriculturist and the stockbreeder proceeds on the assumption of a law, invariable in its operation, whereby "like produces like in the vegetable and animal worlds." The instances to which the author of "The Vestiges" refers in support of his theory are utterly frivolous when opposed to the copious inductions to which they are opposed; and they may all be explained consistently with the law of variation within definite limits, as stated by Dr. Whewell, or by our ignorance of all the conditions involved in each particular case. Nor is his argument founded on the limited range of our observation, even with its singular illustration derived from Mr. Babbage's calculating engine, fitted to diminish, in the slightest degree, our confidence in the general results of these inductions; for, not to mention that it amounts to nothing more than an appeal from what we do know to what we do not know, from knowledge to ignorance, from the certainties of science to the mere possibilities of conjecture, it has been well shown by Mr. Miller, that our range of observation is not so limited as the author of "The Vestiges" would have us to believe, since "extent of space is, in a matter of this kind, equivalent to duration of time. For, although no man has lived five hundred years, so as to observe the gradual development of the oak from the acorn in its various stages of progress, yet every man who can survey five hundred yards of an English forest, can see the oak in every stage of its growth, and need have no doubt as to the law of its progressive development. And so, had there really been such a transmutation of species as is contended for, we might expect to find, somewhere on the vastly extended sea coasts of our islands and continents, some specimens of plants or animals in a state of transition from the lower to the higher forms."
We are told, indeed, in answer to this argument, that Mr. Babbage's engine produces numbers according to a certain law up to a particular point, and then, most unexpectedly, perhaps even unaccountably, the law of the series is changed, and the next term exhibits a striking departure from the order previously followed; and so, it is argued, it may be in nature. Each organism may propagate after its kind for immense periods, so as to give the impression of this being an invariable law; but at a certain stage the order may change, and the next term in the series may differ from all that went before it. The argument—if it can be called an argument—amounts to this: Mr. Babbage's machine produces a series of numbers, and of numbers only, but according to different laws of succession; ergo, Nature may produce in the same way, and with similar variations, different races of plants and animals. The argument would have been perfect if the engine had produced something else than numbers; if, as Professor Dod supposes, "while watching Mr. Babbage's machine, presenting to us successive numbers by the revolution of its plates, we should suddenly see one of those plates resolving itself into types, and these types arranging themselves in the order of a page of 'Paradise Lost,' or even of 'The Vestiges of Creation;'—in such a case, there might have been something in the argument; but even then, the withering question remains, Is there any man in his senses who would not immediately conclude that some new cause was now at work?"
In short, in so far as the facts of the case are concerned, there is not only no known instance either of "spontaneous generation" or of "transmutation of species," but there is not even any natural analogy that can give the theory the slightest aspect of verisimilitude. The author of "The Vestiges" thinks that a presumption in its favor may be derived from "the analogy of the inorganic world,"—in other words, from the supposed conversion of nebulæ into planets and astral systems by the operation of natural causes; but this analogy has been conclusively set aside by disproving the hypothesis on which it depends. He further thinks that a favorable presumption may be derived from "the analogy of the organic world,"—in other words, from the process of propagation by which the races of plants and animals are perpetuated; but the presumption thence derived, so far from being favorable, is directly opposed to his theory, since all the facts which come under our cognizance in every department of Nature serve only to establish the two great maxims of Natural History,—that organic life can spring only from organic life, and that like produces like, both in the vegetable and animal world.
If we have succeeded in disposing of the facts of the case, we shall have little difficulty in exposing the fallacy of the principles which are involved in the author's speculations on this subject. It is of fundamental importance, in this inquiry, to form a clear and correct conception of the precise point at issue, and of the two alternatives between which we are called to make our choice. It has been well said that "the great antagonist points in the array of the opposite lines are simply the Law of Development versus the Miracle of Creation."[51] And the author of "The Vestiges" virtually acknowledges this to be the real state of the question, when he says that "if we can see no natural origin for species, a miraculous one must be admitted."[52] Now, the grand alternative being Creation by Miracle or Creation by Law, that is, Creation by a Natural or by a Supernatural cause, we affirm that it is utterly presumptuous and unphilosophical to represent the one as less worthy of God, or more derogatory to His infinite perfections, than the other. Yet the author does not hesitate to say that the natural ought to be preferred to the miraculous method of accounting for the origin both of planets and of their inhabitants, for this among other reasons, that the latter would be derogatory to the wisdom and power of the Most High. His words are remarkable: "The Eternal Sovereign arranges a solar or an astral system by dispositions imparted primordially to matter; He causes, by the same majestic means, vast oceans to form and continents to rise, and all the grand meteoric agencies to proceed in ceaseless alternation, so as to fit the earth for a residence of organic beings. But when, in the course of these operations, fuci and corals are to be for the first time placed in those oceans, a particular interference of the Divine power is required; and this special attention is needed whenever a new family of organisms is to be introduced,—a new fiat for fishes, another for reptiles, a third for birds; nay, taking up the present views of Geologists as to species, such an event as the commencement of a certain cephalopod, one with a few new nodulosites and corrugations upon its shell, would, on this theory, require the particular care of that same Almighty who willed at once the whole means by which infinity was replenished with its worlds?" ... "Is it conceivable, as a fitting mode of exercise for Creative Intelligence, that it should be constantly paying a special attention to the creation of species, as they may be required in each situation throughout those worlds at particular times? Is such an idea accordant with our general conception of the dignity, not to speak of the power, of the Great Author?" ... "It would be distressing to be compelled to picture the power of God as put forth in any other manner than in those slow, mysterious, universal laws which have so plainly an eternity to work in."[53]
Such is the author's presumptuous decision on a matter which is far "too high for him." We offer the following remarks upon it:
First of all, let it be observed that, unless on the principle of absolute Atheism, which he professes to repudiate, he cannot but acknowledge that once, at least, the power of God must have been put forth in another manner than "in those slow, mysterious, universal laws" of which he speaks; and that, even if he could succeed in disproving "repeated interferences of creative power," he could in nowise dispense with a primitive act of direct, immediate, supernatural creation, since he does not profess to believe in the eternal existence of matter and its laws. We find, indeed, that even in the subsequent acts of a continuous, but mediate creation, he is compelled to acknowledge a supernatural power as acting, in each individual case, according to established natural laws; for he says expressly, "There cannot be an inherent intelligence in these laws; the intelligence appears external to the laws, something of which the laws are but as the expression of the will and power. If this be admitted, the laws cannot be regarded as primary or independent causes of the phenomena of the physical world. We come, in short, to a being beyond Nature,—its Author, its God." ... "When we speak of Natural Law, we only speak of the mode in which the Divine power is exercised; it is but another phrase for the action of the ever-present and sustaining God."[54] It is admitted, then, first, that there must have been a primary act of creation, in the highest and strictest sense, by a direct and immediate interposition of Divine power, at the commencement of created existence; and, secondly, that, even in the continuous work of creation, which is supposed to have been subsequently carried on after the method of development by established natural laws, Divine agency is still equally real, although it is differently manifested, and is indispensably necessary to account for the resulting products. Now, can it be reasonably asserted that the direct and immediate creation of such a being as Man would be more derogatory to the wisdom and power of God than the primordial production of "a universal Fire-Mist," or even of "electricity and albumen?" or, will it be pretended that immediate creation of molluscs as molluscs, of fishes as fishes, of reptiles as reptiles, would be less worthy of the great Author of Nature than the establishment of a system which must in due time give them birth, and that, too, not without the concurrence and coöperation of the Divine will; for "natural law is but another phrase for the action of the ever-present and sustaining God?"
But, while we hold that there is no good ground for an affirmative answer to these questions, we would carefully guard against rushing to the opposite extreme, and affirming, either that the production of new races by the method of natural law was, on a priori grounds, impossible, or that God might not have adopted that method, had He so pleased, in perfect consistency with the manifestation of His wisdom and power. We see that He has done so, under the actual constitution of Nature, so far as the production of individuals is concerned; we see not why a similar provision might not have been made for the production of genera and species. In either way His power and His wisdom might have been displayed. But, when we are told that the one is derogatory to the Divine Majesty, and the other alone consistent with the loftiest views of His perfections, we denounce the whole speculation as one that is alike presumptuous and unphilosophical, on the simple but conclusive ground that we are in no degree competent judges of the best method either of creating or of governing the world. Had we been asked to say whether it was likely that, under the rule of infinite wisdom and almighty power, certain insects, reptiles, and fishes, that are unattractive to the eye, and loathsome to the fastidious taste of many, could find a place at all among the works of God, we might have thought it improbable that they should be created; but they exist notwithstanding, and the fact of their existence is enough to silence all our presumptive reasonings. And surely it is not less—it is much more—presumptuous to affirm that, existing as they do, they could not have been brought into being, without disparagement to Divine wisdom, otherwise than by the action of established laws, or by a process of natural development; as if it were unworthy of God to produce that for whose production He confessedly did make provision.
But, further, we see here very strikingly exemplified the tendency of such speculations to exclude God from all real, active, and direct connection with His works. The dominion of Natural Law, which, as we shall afterwards see, is held by M. Comte and Mr. Combe to exclude the doctrine of a special Providence and the efficacy of prayer, is here extended, by the author of "The Vestiges," so as to be exclusive also of any direct Divine interposition in the work of Creation itself, other than what may have been implied in the aboriginal production of matter and its laws, or in the subsequent concurrence of His will with the action of these laws in the established order of Nature.
We have said that the Theory of Development, as expounded in "The Vestiges," is not necessarily atheistic, partly because the author professedly disclaims Atheism, and partly also because, in strict logic, it might still be possible, even on the basis of that theory, considered simply in itself and apart from the speculations with which it has been associated, to construct, from the actual phenomena of Nature, a valid proof for the being and attributes of God. And yet we have thought it necessary to advert to it as one of the recent speculations of science, because, whatever may be its professed aim, its practical tendency is unquestionably hostile to the influence of religious truth. It will be found, in the great majority of cases, and especially in the case of ardent youthful minds, that this theory, when it is embraced as an article of their philosophic creed, is, to all practical purposes, tantamount to Atheism. For not to insist on the consideration, so forcibly stated by others,[55] that the natural argument for the Immortality of Man, or for the doctrine of a Future Life, as implying distinct individuality and continued self-consciousness, must be materially weakened, if not entirely neutralized, by a theory of development which traces the human lineage up through the monkeys and fishes to albumen impregnated by electricity, or, further still, to a diffused Nebula or universal Fire-Mist,—we think that the Sensational and Materialistic speculations with which the work abounds have a tendency to weaken the evidence for a living, personal, spiritual God, as the Creator and Moral Governor of the world, and to diminish that reverence, confidence, and love, which these aspects of His character alone can inspire. The system of Epicurus, although it contained a formal recognition of a First Cause, has always been held to be practically atheistic, simply because it removed God from the active superintendence of the affairs of the world, and excluded the doctrine of a special providence and of a moral government. It was held, in the words of Cicero, "Epicurum verbis reliquisse Deos,—re sustulisse."[56] And so, in "The Vestiges," Natural Law is substituted for Supernatural Interposition, not only in the common course of Providence, but in the stupendous work of Creation itself.