ships of M. de Pointis' squadron, and should be furnished with six weeks provisions. A review was made, to prevent any but able men of the Colony being taken; negroes who served, if free, were to be allowed shares like other men; if slaves and they were killed, their masters were to be paid for them.
Two copies of the agreement respecting the sharing of booty were posted up in public places at Petit Goave, and a copy was delivered to M. du Casse, the Governor. M. de Pointis consulted with M. du Casse what enterprise they should undertake, but the determination wholly rested with M. de Pointis. 'There was added,' M. de Pointis says, 'without my knowledge, to the directions sent to Governor du Casse, that he was to give assistance to our undertaking, without damage to, or endangering, his Colony. This restriction did in some measure deprive me of the power of commanding his forces, seeing he had an opportunity of pretending to keep them for the preservation of the Colony.' M. du Casse made no pretences to withhold, but gave all the assistance in his power. He was an advocate for attacking the City of San Domingo. This was the wish of most of the colonists, and perhaps was what would have been of more advantage to France than any other expedition they could have undertaken. But the armament having been prepared principally at private expence, it was reasonable for the contributors to look to their own reimbursement. To attack the City of San Domingo was not approved; other plans were proposed, but Carthagena seems to have been the original object of the projectors of the expedition, and the attack of that city was determined upon. Before the Flibustiers and other colonists embarked, a disagreement happened which had nearly made them refuse altogether to join in the expedition. The officers of De Pointis' fleet had imbibed
the sentiments of their Commander respecting the Flibustiers or Buccaneers, and followed the example of his manners towards them. The fleet was lying at Petit Goave, and M. de Pointis, giving to himself the title of General of the Armies of France by Sea and by Land in America, had placed a guard in a Fort there. M. du Casse, as he had received no orders from Europe to acknowledge any superior within his government, might have considered such an exercise of power to be an encroachment on his authority which it became him to resist; but he acted in this, and in other instances, like a man overawed. The officer of M. de Pointis who commanded the guard on shore, arrested a Flibustier for disorderly behaviour, and held him prisoner in the fort. The Flibustiers surrounded the fort in a tumultuous manner to demand his release, and the officer commanded his men to fire upon them, by which three of the Flibustiers were killed. It required some address and civility on the part of M. de Pointis himself, as well as the assistance of M. du Casse, to appease the Flibustiers; and the officer who had committed the offence was sent on board under arrest.
The force furnished from M. du Casse's government, consisted of nearly 700 Flibustiers, 170 soldiers from the garrisons, and as many volunteer inhabitants and negroes as made up about 1200 men. The whole armament consisted of seven large ships, and eleven frigates, besides store ships and smaller vessels; and, reckoning persons of all classes, 6000 men.
April. Siege of Carthagena by the French. The Fleet arrived off Carthagena on April the 13th, and the landing was effected on the 15th. It is not necessary to relate all the particulars of this siege, in which the Buccaneers bore only a part. That part however was of essential importance.
M. de Pointis, in the commencement, appointed the whole of the Flibustiers, without any mixture of the King's troops, to a service of great danger, which raised a suspicion, of partiality
and of an intention to save the men he brought with him from Europe, as regarding them to be more peculiarly his own men. An eminence about a mile to the Eastward of the City of Carthagena, on which was a church named Nuestra Senora de la Poupa, commands all the avenues and approaches on the land side to the city. 'I had been assured,' says M. de Pointis, 'that if we did not seize the hill de la Poupa immediately on our arrival, all the treasure would be carried off. To get possession of this post, I resolved to land the Buccaneers in the night of the same day on which we came to anchor, they being proper for such an attempt, as being accustomed to marching and subsisting in the woods.' M. de Pointis takes this occasion to accuse the Buccaneers of behaving less heroically than M. du Casse had boasted they would, and that it was not without murmuring that they embarked in the boats in order to their landing. It is however due to them on the score of courage and exertion, to remark, though in some degree it is anticipation, that no part of the force under M. de Pointis shewed more readiness or performed better service in the siege than the Buccaneers.
There was uncertainty about the most proper place for landing, and M. de Pointis went himself in a boat to examine near the shore to the North of the city. The surf rolled in heavy, by which his boat was filled, and was with difficulty saved from being stranded on a rock. The proposed landing was given up as impracticable, and M. de Pointis became of opinion that Carthagena was approachable only by the lake which makes the harbour, the entrance to which, on account of its narrowness, was called the Bocca-chica, and was defended by a strong fort.
The Fleet sailed for the Bocca-chica, and on the 15th some of the ships began to cannonade the Fort. The first landing was effected at the same time by a corps of eighty negroes, without
any mixture of the King's troops. This was a second marked instance of the Commander's partial attention to the preservation of the men he brought from France. M. de Pointis despised the Flibustiers, and probably regarded negroes as next to nothing. He was glad however to receive them as his companions in arms, and it was an honour due from him to all under his command, as far as circumstances would admit without injury to service, to share the dangers equally, or at least without partiality.