The public collection of plunder by authority did not save the city from private pillage. In a short time all the plate disappeared from the churches. Houses were forcibly entered by the troops, and as much violence committed as if no capitulation had been granted. M. de Pointis, when complained to by the aggrieved inhabitants, gave orders for the prevention of outrage, but was at no pains to make them observed. It appears that the Flibustiers were most implicated in these disorders. Many of the inhabitants who had complied with the terms of the capitulation, seeing the violences every where committed, hired Flibustiers to be guards in their houses, hoping that by being well paid they would be satisfied and protect them against others. Some observed this compact and were faithful guardians; but the greater number robbed those they undertook to defend. For this among other reasons, De Pointis resolved to rid the city of them. On a report,
which it is said himself caused to be spread, that an army of 10,000 Indians were approaching Carthagena, he ordered the Flibustiers out to meet them. Without suspecting any deception, they went forth, and were some days absent seeking the reported enemy. As they were on the return, a message met them from the General, purporting, that he apprehended their presence in the city would occasion some disturbance, and he therefore desired them to stop without the gates. On receiving this message, they broke out into imprecations, and resolved not to delay their return to the city, nor to be kept longer in ignorance of what was passing there. When they arrived at the gates they found them shut and guarded by the King's troops. Whilst they deliberated on what they should next do, another message, more conciliating in language than the former, came to them from M. de Pointis, in which he said that it was by no means his intention to interdict them from entering Carthagena; that he only wished they would not enter so soon, nor all at one time, for fear of frightening the inhabitants, who greatly dreaded their presence. The Flibustiers knew not how to help themselves, and were necessitated to take up their quarters without the city walls, where they were kept fifteen days, by which time the collection of treasure from the inhabitants was completed, the money weighed, secured in chests, and great part embarked. De Pointis says, 'as fast as the money was brought in, it was immediately carried on board the King's ships.' The uneasiness and impatience of the Flibustiers for distribution of the booty may easily be imagined. On their re-admission to the city, the merchandise was put up to sale by auction, and the produce joined to the former collection; but no distribution took place, and the Flibustiers were loud in their importunities. M. de Pointis assigned as a reason for the delay, that the clerks employed in the business had not made
up the accounts. He says in his Narrative, 'I was not so ill served by my spies as not to be informed of the seditious discourses held by some wholly abandoned to their own interest, upon the money being carried on board the King's ships.' To allay the ferment, he ordered considerable gratifications to be paid to the Buccaneer captains, also compensations to the Buccaneers who had been maimed or wounded, and rewards to be given to some who had most distinguished themselves during the siege;—and he spoke with so much appearance of frankness of his intention, as soon as ever he should receive the account of the whole, to make a division which should be satisfactory to all parties, that the Buccaneers were persuaded to remain quiet.
Value of the Plunder. The value of the plunder is variously reported. Much of the riches of the city had been carried away on the first alarm of the approach of an enemy. De Pointis says 110 mules laden with gold went out in the course of four days. 'Nevertheless, the honour acquired to his Majesty's arms, besides near eight or nine millions that could not escape us, consoled us for the rest.' Whether these eight or nine millions were crowns or livres M. de Pointis' account does not specify. It is not improbable he meant it should be understood as livres. Many were of opinion that the value of the booty was not less than forty millions of livres; M. du Casse estimated it at above twenty millions, besides merchandise.
M. de Pointis now made known that on account of the unhealthiness of the situation, he had changed his intention of leaving a garrison and keeping Carthagena, for that already more Frenchmen had died there by sickness than he had lost in the siege. He ordered the cannon of the Bocca-chica Castle to be taken on board the ships, and the Castle to be demolished. On the 25th of May, orders were issued for the
troops to embark; and at the same time he embarked himself without having given any previous notice of his intention so to do to M. du Casse, from whom he had parted but a few minutes before. The ships of the King's fleet began to take up their anchors to move towards the entrance of the harbour, and M. de. Pointis sent an order to M. du Casse for the Buccaneers and the people of the Colony to embark on board their own vessels.
M. du Casse sent two of his principal officers to the General to demand that justice should be done to the Colonists. Still the accounts were said not to be ready; but on the 29th, the King's fleet being ready for sea, M. du Pointis sent to M. du Casse the Commissary's account, which stated the share of the booty due to the Colonists, including the Governor and the Buccaneers, to be 40,000 crowns.
What the customary manner of dividing prize money in the French navy was at that time, is not to be understood from the statement given by De Pointis, which says, 'that the King had been pleased to allow to the several ships companies, a tenth of the first million, and a thirtieth part of all the rest.' Here it is not specified whether the million of which the ships companies were to be allowed one-tenth, is to be understood a million of Louis, a million crowns, or a million livres. The difference of construction in a large capture would be nearly as three to one. It requires explanation likewise what persons are meant to be included in the term 'ships companies.' Sometimes it is used to signify the common seamen, without including the officers; and for them, the one-tenth is certainly not too large a share. That in any military service, public or private, one-tenth of captures or of plunder should be deemed adequate gratification for the services of all the captors, officers included, seems scarcely credible. In the Carthagena expedition it is
also to be observed, that the dues of the crown were in some measure compromised by the admission of private contributions towards defraying the expence. The Flibustiers had contributed by furnishing their own vessels to the service.
Du Casse when he saw the account, did not immediately communicate it to his Colonists, deterred at first probably by something like shame, and an apprehension that they would reproach him with weakness for having yielded so much as he had all along done to the insulting and imperious pretensions of De Pointis. Afterwards through discretion, he delayed making the matter public until the Colonists had all embarked and their vessels had sailed from the city. He then sent for the Captains, and acquainted them with the distribution intended by M. de Pointis, and they informed their crews.