The order given to Grogniet was not put in execution, and when Davis had arrived with his ship within cannon-shot of the Spaniards, Swan shortened sail and lowered his ensign, to signify he was of opinion that it would be best to postpone fighting till the next day. Davis wanting the support of two of the most able ships of his fleet, was obliged to forego his
intention, and no act of hostility passed during the afternoon and evening except the exchange of some shot between his own ship and that of the Spanish Vice-Admiral.
When it was dark, the Spanish fleet anchored, and at the same time, the Spanish Admiral took in his light, and ordered a light to be shewn from one of his small vessels, which he sent to leeward. The Buccaneers were deceived by this artifice, believing the light they saw to be that of the Spanish Admiral, and they continued under sail, thinking themselves secure of the weather-gage. 29th. At daylight the next morning the Spaniards were seen well collected, whilst the buccaneer vessels were much dispersed. Grogniet and Townley were to windward of the Spaniards; but all the rest, contrary to what they had expected, were to leeward. At sunrise, the Spanish fleet got under sail and bore down towards the leeward buccaneer ships. The Buccaneers thought it not prudent to fight under such disadvantages, and did not wait to receive them. They were near the small Island Pacheca, on the South side of which are some Islands yet smaller. Among these Islands, Dampier says, is a narrow channel in one part not forty feet wide. Townley, being pressed by the Spaniards and in danger of being intercepted, pushed for this passage without any previous examination of the depth of water, and got safe through. Davis and Swan, whose ships were the fastest sailing in either fleet, had the credit of affording protection to their flying companions, by waiting to repulse the most advanced of the Spaniards. Dampier, who was in Davis's ship, says, she was pressed upon by the whole Spanish force. 'The Spanish Admiral and the rest of his squadron began to play at us and we at them as fast as we could: yet they kept at distant cannonading. They might have laid us aboard if they would, but they came not within small-arms shot, intending to maul
us in pieces with their great guns.' After a circuitous chace and running fight, which lasted till the evening, the Buccaneers, Harris's ship excepted, which had been forced to make off in a different direction, anchored by the Island Pacheca, nearly in the same spot whence they had set out in the morning.
30th. On the 30th, at daylight, the Spanish fleet was seen at anchor three leagues to leeward. The breeze was faint, and both fleets lay quiet till ten o'clock in the forenoon. The wind then freshened a little from the South, and the Spaniards took up their anchors; but instead of making towards the Buccaneers, they sailed away in a disgraceful manner for Panama. Whether they sustained any loss in this skirmishing does not appear. The Buccaneer's had only one man killed outright. In Davis's ship, six men were wounded, and half of her rudder was shot away.
The two Fleets separate. It might seem to those little acquainted with the management of ships that it could make no material difference whether the Spaniards bore down to engage the Buccaneers, or the Buccaneers bore down to engage the Spaniards; for that in either case when the fleets were closed, the Buccaneers might have tried the event of boarding. But the difference here was, that if the Buccaneers had the weather-gage, it enabled them to close with the enemy in the most speedy manner, which was of much consequence where the disparity in the number of cannon was so great. When the Spaniards had the weather-gage, they would press the approach only near enough to give effect to their cannon, and not near enough for musketry to do them mischief. With this view, they could choose their distance when to stop and bring their broadsides to bear, and leave to the Buccaneers the trouble of making nearer approach, against the wind and a heavy cannonade. Dampier, who has related the transactions of the 28th and 29th very briefly, speaks of the weather-gage here as a decisive advantage. He says,
"In the morning (of the 29th) therefore, when we found the enemy had got the weather-gage of us, and were coming upon us with full sail, we ran for it."
On this occasion there is no room for commendation on the valour of either party. The Buccaneers, however, knew, by the Spanish fleet coming to them from Panama, that the treasure must have been landed, and therefore they could have had little motive for enterprise. The meeting was faintly sought by both sides, and no battle was fought, except a little cannonading during the retreat of the Buccaneers, which on their side was almost wholly confined to the ship of their Commander. Both Dampier and Lussan acknowledge that Edward Davis brought the whole of the buccaneer fleet off safe from the Spaniards by his courage and good management.
June. On June the 1st, the Buccaneers sailed out of the Bay of Panama for the Island Quibo. They had to beat up against SW winds, and had much wet weather. In the middle of June, they anchored on the East side of Quibo, where they were joined by Harris.
Keys of Quibo. The Island Quibo. Quibo and the smaller Islands near it, Dampier calls collectively, the Keys of Quibo. They are all woody. Good fresh water was found on the great Island, which would naturally be the case with the wet weather; and here were deer, guanoes, and large black monkeys, whose flesh was esteemed by the Buccaneers to be sweet and wholesome food.