A British army, as it was,--is,--and ought to be

by James Campbell

The officers of the board and secretary for performing what cannot be otherwise than troublesome duties, all the details of which they would have to regulate, and as they must have considerable responsibility attached to them, probably requiring security to be given, I conclude they would be allowed respectable fixed salaries. The clerks will also be of course well paid. I may be sanguine, but I confess I feel very confident, that the plan would be found, under the management of an able board, to work well. I have been more minute than I could have wished, but my object in being so, was to obviate many of the objections which are likely to be started. I regret much, however, that I cannot now see how to include the officers of the navy in it; for, unless it were so arranged, that they could contribute towards the fund, as retiring officers of the army are made to do, I fear that so desirable an object cannot, as they are now situated, be effected for them.

By establishing this military fund, Government would not only be able to do away with half-pay, but also to discontinue the practice of granting pensions, excepting in particular cases to officers of the army, their widows and children, as I conclude that they would all in future be provided for under the regulations to be made by the board of management; and what a relief to the minds of officers, and what a proud and proper feeling it would be for them to indulge in, that they could at such a trifling sacrifice, and on such easy terms, provide for themselves; and for those about whom they must naturally be so anxious, without becoming a burden to the country; and would not this plan give them a stake in it, which must perpetuate (though it cannot for a moment be supposed, that in such feelings and principles they can be wanting,) that attachment to their Sovereign, and to our free and admirable constitution, which they have ever so strongly evinced; and thus an additional and powerful barrier would be formed against the dangerous designs of men, who apparently wish to see our excellent institutions destroyed, and the country thrown, to suit their own selfish purposes, into such confusion, as could only end in a despotism of some kind or other.

I am not blind to the circumstance, that if what I am endeavouring to establish for the good of the service is accomplished, a severe blow must be given to the patronage of the army, but I trust that this will not be allowed to become a stumbling-block in the way of so much general benefit. I, however, willingly leave the cause of our gallant army, with which I am now, I may say, almost unconnected, to public opinion, which fortunately in this country is so powerful, as not to be easily or long withstood; and we may, I will venture to say, be certain, that if what I have presumed to propose, is practicable and desirable, the Commander-in-Chief will readily meet the wishes of the country and the army, with all that good will and zeal which he has on so many occasions evinced for the welfare of both.

CHAP. III.

What I have next to propose, will I think be allowed to be of importance; for I wish to free our army from much inconvenience, and at the same time to insure its efficiency. I have therefore to recommend, that the East India Company should have the power of raising, as usual by bounty, in the United Kingdom, such a number of regiments as they may require for their service; to be commanded by their own officers, in the same manner as has hitherto been the custom in their European corps; so as to enable them to maintain their ascendancy in the East, without the aid of Her Majesty's troops, except in cases of great emergency; for I am most anxious that any of our regular regiments sent there, as I have before observed, should be immediately ordered home, as soon as the cause for which they may have been sent out had been removed.

I am convinced that the Honourable Company's native armies would be greatly improved, and rendered fully competent to contend with any troops in the world, if several corps of Malays were formed for their service, and officered in the manner now practised in Ceylon, and when in the field made to act along with the Sepoys; and for very unhealthy parts of India, where the heat is almost unbearable, some corps of those always effective, and light-hearted beings—Caffres, would be found most admirably calculated for service, either in garrison or in the field. I am however aware that prejudices exist against both Malays and Caffres, but they should be got over.

From what I have seen of Malays, I believe them to be the bravest people of the East. The only resistance, worth talking of, which our troops met with in taking Ceylon from the Dutch, was from a battalion of Malays in their service; and I am convinced, that Sir Stamford Raffles did not speak too highly in their praise. It was however, a sad mistake, our having relinquished so much of their country, and I fear too without their consent, to the tender mercies of the Dutch; for they were always greatly attached to us, and it is well known that they make excellent faithful soldiers. They are also very healthy in almost any situation, and this alone should induce us to prefer them to every other description of troops, which could be employed in Indian warfare. Ought we not to look forward, and that too before long, to the Company's wars increasing in number and importance; for does not history and experience show us, that conquerors cannot easily stop in their conquests, and say, this river, or that range of mountains shall be our future boundary, and we shall go no farther; do we not almost invariably find, that before they had long endeavoured to halt, and when they had just began to expect, in rest and peace, to enjoy the fruits of their victories, that they were either again obliged to go forward, or else to retrace their steps. These historical facts are particularly applicable, even at the present moment, and ought to be considered as timely notice to beware of rendering our already vast Eastern Empire too extensive, unless we are prepared to support our high pretensions, by powerful and well organized fleets and armies; and that our chief object is to disseminate the blessings of pure and reformed Christianity throughout the East, for the long neglect of which we have, as a nation, so much to answer for.

I well remember looking upon it as a hopeless business to expect that the Portuguese could ever be brought to stand before French troops; and in making this remark, I more particularly allude to the period when Marshal Soult occupied Oporto. I could then have got, most advantageously, as many did, into the Portuguese army; but having, by chance, witnessed what took place on that occasion, and on some others, nothing could induce me to have any thing to do with them. I certainly came to a wrong conclusion, and I did not calculate, as I ought to have done, that British officers can make almost any men in the world fight; at all events, when they have an opportunity of seeing how British troops set about their work.

I should greatly fear, that it cannot now be safe to employ—at least in some of our West India Islands—corps composed of Blacks; I must therefore beg leave to recommend, that regiments should be raised by bounty in the United Kingdom, for service in that part of the world, and in some of our other foreign possessions; and none of our regular regiments should be required to serve there, but in cases of emergency; and they ought always to be immediately re-called from such countries, when the cause for which they were sent out had been removed. Such an arrangement would obviate many objections to the plan of the ballot, and would be found the means (so desirable an object in these times) of keeping our regiments in a very high state of discipline and efficiency; for they would be then very superior in these respects to any troops we can now, or even could avail ourselves of; and if what I suggest be adopted, a vast saving of expense to the country would be the consequence, which is incurred in constantly relieving the number of regiments we are obliged to have always stationed abroad.

In order to shew in the strongest manner, how serious a drawback such prolonged service in tropical climates is to the British army, I shall here take the liberty of stating, that in the year 1820, the regiment to which I then belonged arrived in the East, complete in officers and men. It lately returned to England, without having lost, I believe, any individual in action; but the climate alone had produced great changes in its ranks; and although volunteers from other corps were added to it, and many recruits had been sent out during the period of its absence from home, to keep up its strength, yet when it returned it could scarcely be called a regiment. Some of the officers had certainly exchanged into other corps at home, or had sold out; but only one or two reached England of all those who had embarked with it. This is most injurious to the discipline and efficiency of our army; for, according to present arrangements, and from unavoidable circumstances, a corps can only be at home for so short a period, that there is not sufficient time allowed to bring it into that state in which it ought to be for service; and when regiments arrive in foreign stations, they are too often so much detached in small bodies, that notwithstanding all the zeal and exertions of officers, a certain degree of relaxation in discipline necessarily takes place, and generally increases the longer a regiment, always hoping to be re-called—is kept abroad. This feeling, or anxiety about home, at least to any considerable extent, could not be supposed to exist in Colonial corps; for those who voluntarily entered them, would have, in a great measure, made up their minds to consider such foreign stations as their homes, at all events, for a certain number of years, which both officers and men can, in most instances, contrive to pass both profitably and agreeably.