A British army, as it was,--is,--and ought to be

by James Campbell

"No. 6. He entreats the attention of general officers, and commanding officers of regiments, to these orders, as they relate not only to the hay provided by the orders of the Commander of the Forces, but to the forage, and other resources of the country."

Much more might be given and said upon this most important subject; but being apprehensive that I have already exhausted the patience of many readers, I shall only farther observe, that in the French armies they act in a very summary manner with respect to carriages and animals kept contrary to the rules of the service. All such carriages and animals, and the persons along with them, are laid hold of by the police, and taken to head-quarters, to be delivered up to the provost, who reports the circumstances to the major-general, and who commonly orders the transgressors to be punished by the provost-corporals, and the carriages and animals to be sold for the benefit of the captors.

It now becomes necessary to consider other subjects connected with the higher branches of the military profession, and which require to be so well weighed, that I may, if possible, give offence to no one; at least it shall be my study to endeavour to avoid doing so.

CHAP. V.

There are many schools in which officers should study in order to gain a perfect knowledge of the military profession, but certainly none can be selected superior to that of experience, in which previously acquired science or theory can be usefully exemplified. But the best of all teachers is decidedly Cæsar, who still speaks to soldiers in a language which they can understand; and of this Napoleon was so well aware, that he always expected his officers to have carefully studied that great general's Commentaries, and which are so well translated into French by General Toulongeon. As an instance—selected out of many to be found in that finely written narrative—what can possibly be a more admirable piece of military policy, than when Cæsar, as he tells us, having found that his army had become alarmed at the accounts received of the warlike appearance, and desperate valour of the Germans under Ariovistus, he decides at once, to allow all who had no stomach for fighting to depart, if they thought fit to do so; and which instantly produced the effects he so wisely anticipated. And let me ask, if a British army were again to get into a scrape, like that in which the 3rd division, and part of our troops, found themselves on the Garonne, just before the battle of Toulouse, and had at least four to one pitted against them; and if our General announced, that those who did not like the appearance of matters might go home; how many would go?

Cæsar perfectly understood the feelings of a Roman army, and knew how to act upon them; but let us see what were those of even a commander of a British regiment.

Colonel Forbes was left by order of Sir Thomas Picton, after the 3rd division moved up the Garonne towards Toulouse, with the 45th regiment, to guard the pontoon bridge across it, where a considerable part of the army had passed. He had reason to think that a battle was about to be fought; and the idea of his remaining in the rear in command, even of such a regiment as the 45th, and though employed upon an important duty, was intolerable. Almost every hour I received a letter from him, urging me to represent to Sir Thomas Brisbane how unhappy he and his regiment felt, at being left in such a situation; and entreating that he might be allowed to give up his post to some troops more in the rear, or to detachments coming up to join the army. His impatience was for some time laughed at; but at last I had the pleasure of sending him orders to abandon his post, and to replace himself and his regiment at the head of the right brigade of the 3rd division. He came up just in time for the battle of Toulouse; and in it he fell, gallantly leading on his regiment in the unfortunate attempt made to force the passage of the canal.

To be able to take advantage of the proper moment for acting upon national feeling or character, is a strong proof of an officer being qualified to command. But a Commander-in-Chief cannot give the world a stronger proof of his fitness or unfitness for his high station than in the men by whom he surrounds himself or employs—if the choice is left to him—upon the staff of the army placed under his orders.

It is the opinion of many of our best soldiers, that no officer should ever be taken from his regiment to be employed upon the staff, unless his place in it be immediately and permanently supplied by another; for no corps ought thus to be deprived of those allowed for carrying on its duties; and such appointments have often been found to injure, in some degree, the individuals themselves ever after as regimental officers. What a corps might suffer in being thus deprived of its officers, seemed to be always overlooked; and interest or patronage alone too often guided those who had the power of recommending or selecting officers for such important appointments; their fitness to perform the duties attached to them was quite another matter, with which they did not appear to trouble themselves; and I have no doubt but I would be set down as a mere simpleton in the ways of the world, if I were to imagine that they would ever act otherwise.

It must be acknowledged, that our selections of officers for staff appointments were too often injudicious; but I do not allow that they were ever carried to the extent, shewn by an able French writer, that they were brought in France at the commencement of the year 1792, when the Etat Major of their armies were in so wretched a state, that it was found necessary to re-establish, quietly, but imperfectly, what had been destroyed by a decree of the 5th of October, 1790. The difficulties of the service augmented incessantly, from their ignorance even of the old forms gone through, and which some fancied they could remedy, by multiplying the numbers employed. The power of attaching assistants to the Etat Major consequently grew into a complete abuse; and at last, in the month of April, 1792, rose to such a pitch, that what with the numbers employed, and through the choice made, the Minister of War saw himself forced to try to put things to rights, by a circular letter addressed to Generals commanding military divisions, and which led to the dismissal from their employments of the whole of these assistants. It, however, soon after became necessary to employ the same, or others equally useless; and this letter did not by any means put a stop to the increasing evils of interest and patronage, for there were still appointed to the Etat Major the most improper and ignorant men, and even girls, who had mounted uniforms, and substituted the sword for the distaff. We are told that there is still to be seen a letter from General Dumourier to Pache, the Minister of War, reproaching him for having sent to his army an opera dancer as an adjutant-general. Men of abilities were, as may be well supposed, disgusted, whilst they were overwhelmed with business, to make up for the ignorance of others; and they were necessitated to use every expedient in order to get through, in any way, the tasks assigned them; and thus the service only presented one mass of confusion, the Minister of War not receiving connected reports or returns; and, as a matter of course, he could not give satisfactory information, when called upon to do so, to those really interested in knowing the state of the army. Another circular was, in consequence, issued by the Minister of War, dated Paris, the 20th of April, 1793; but it had no effect whatever, because it was not only unreasonable, but ridiculous, to require from men what they neither could do, nor knew how to do. The Committee of Public Safety, struck with this state of things, set about putting matters to rights; but two or three of its members, interested that the disorders should continue, found means to overturn all, and the state of the Etat Major was allowed to remain as hopeless as ever. It was not therefore until about the 4th year of the Republic, that they were able in some measure to put things into order, by turning out ignorant and incapable men, and the Etat Major then became composed of some good officers, who established plans to keep its machinery in movement; but France had then had time to see the danger, which there always is, in even slightly disorganizing useful establishments, under the pretence of reforming them. These remarks do not apply directly to us, farther than in the occasional appointment, through interest, of inefficient officers, for the returns of a British army, at least its regiments, were and are still well and regularly kept. Yet, I must say, that for the guidance of our staff in the field, we can scarcely show that we have a system, or what ought to be considered as such.