CHAP. VII.
The escalade of the castle of Badajoz, ought to be held up as an example to future commanders of such enterprises. Good maps, and plans of fortifications can almost always be purchased, or procured by some means or other, of any country about to become the scene of warfare. If they cannot be purchased in Great Britain, it ought to be the business of some department of the state to endeavour, if possible, to procure them; and the generals and staff of the army about to leave our shores should be furnished with correct copies of such maps; and when necessary, they should be referred to as official documents. All those therefore intended to be used, whether by the General commanding-in-chief, or by any general or staff officer, should be strictly alike; and how easy it would then be to direct the movements of bodies of troops, though even stationed at a distance, upon particular points by certain lines of march, and thereby to insure punctuality and correct performance of all the parts of a combined operation. And what a quantity of writing and explanation would thus be rendered unnecessary. I however repeat, that to the plan of the castle of Badajoz—which had been much strengthened during the time the French held it—and which was, I believe, obtained through the means of a deserter, I attribute our success in that very difficult enterprise; for by it the officers were shown where to go, what they might expect to encounter, how they were to overcome the obstacles which would present themselves; and they were even encouraged to ask questions, and for explanations upon points which they might not clearly understand. How different was this to the display of consummate wisdom, by some of our chiefs at the attack upon Buenos Ayres in South America; who seemed, I must say, generally to have been selected because they possessed, to say the least of it, most overbearing manners, and truly Prussian ideas of discipline. A field-officer who was to command one of the wings of a regiment in that very injudiciously arranged undertaking, ventured to ask, how he was to act after reaching a certain point, which was a conspicuous building shown him—a general present on the occasion deigned to reply yet in any thing but an encouraging manner, and at the same time turning from the unlucky querist, to the Commander of the Forces—"General Whitelock, the city of Buenos Ayres will never be taken, if our time is to be occupied in answering silly questions." Now all the wings of regiments accomplished what was required of them, and it was entirely owing to such silly questions not having been answered, and to those bodies of gallant troops becoming isolated, and no communications being kept up, or orders sent for their farther proceedings, that the total failure of that ill-fated, and badly managed enterprise was chiefly to be attributed.
I hope I shall be forgiven if I presume to observe, that if the manner of carrying on war since the time of Julius Cæsar has been necessarily changed, the spirit which a soldier should possess, and the attainments requisite for rendering an officer fit to command-in-chief, or even to be an able subordinate, are still the same.
The art of commanding, and of inspiring that confidence, which Cæsar possessed so transcendently, and which can make men fight, who are not much inclined to do so, are also still the same.
A General should not only have studied attentively the sciences which qualify him for his profession, but he ought also to be an experienced soldier. He should know, with due discrimination, how to appreciate men, and to employ them, so as to reap the greatest advantages from their various talents and acquirements, especially those which fit them for staff appointments. He should know how to act, so as to make the most of both the fear and love of those he leads. He should, like the Duke of Wellington, command the respect of mankind by the uprightness of his public dealings with them; even to the exclusion of his own family or intimates, from appointments, which he could have, even with apparent justice, bestowed upon them. He should possess that rapid coup d'œil, which would enable him in war to take advantage of any error in tactics, which his adversary might commit, and to avail himself of events to the utmost; and whilst he inspired all with confidence in his military skill, in his actions, and in the example he set others, he should not only teach, but also create in them ambition to resemble him.
The great Emperor Napoleon, possessed, as a soldier, many of these essential qualities; and carried along with him, not only the hearts and feelings of Frenchmen, but also those of the people of many other countries, even in his most ambitious aspirations; and, perhaps, no period of the world produced two men of greater or more opposite characters, views, and abilities, not only for the welfare of mankind, but also for their bane, than Wellington and Napoleon. In short, I look for talents, acquirements, and many perfections in a soldier, who aims at the distinction of commanding-in-chief, or even of holding a high staff appointment; and amongst others, that confidence in himself, not the fruits of presumption, but of matured experience, which a perfect knowledge of the art of war naturally produces.
How often in his intercourse with his troops did we find the Emperor Napoleon imitating Cæsar. At the battle of Jena, the infantry of the Imperial Guard could not, as he tells us, conceal their annoyance, when they saw all around them engaged, and they themselves kept only as spectators of the battle. He at last heard from many voices the words, "en avant." "What is that I hear?" said the Emperor, "Ce ne peut étre qu'un jeune homme qui n'a pas de barbe, qui peut vouloir préjuger ce que je dois faire; qu'il attende qu'il ait commandé dans treute batailles rangées avant de prétendre me donner des avis!"
As it may serve as a lesson to many a gallant soldier, and show him how to act, if ever it should be his fortune to be similarly situated, I must now relate, and in as few words as I can, what I saw Sir Edward Pakenham achieve at the battle of Salamanca, in which, during the absence of Sir Thomas Picton, he commanded the 3rd division; and I am anxious also to give the reader some idea of its style of fighting. I shall not indulge myself in giving a description of the splendid movements of the two armies, useful as they might be to the young soldier, which took place previous to that battle—this has already been done by able military writers; and I shall only say, that the 3rd division crossed the Tormes in the forenoon of the 22nd July, and took up a position in the rear, and towards the right of our army. Here the troops commenced cooking, but from what I saw going forward in both armies, I did not expect that the soldiers would be allowed to eat their dinners in tranquillity. The ground we occupied was well selected, and offered many advantages to the part of the army intended to form a rear-guard; in case, as appeared very likely, that we were to fall back on Ciudad Rodrigo; and the manner in which Marshal Marmont manœuvred at the moment, evidently showed that his object was to force us to do so, under certain disadvantages. I, therefore, looking upon the 3rd division as intended for that rear-guard, fully expected hot work before long.
Thus situated, we were able to enjoy a delightful view of what was going on in both armies. We were not, however, destined to remain long mere idle spectators; but, on the contrary, to take a most active and conspicuous part in the approaching action.
It might have been near two o'clock, when Lord Wellington, followed by some of his staff, galloped up to where the 3rd division was posted; and calling for Sir Edward Pakenham, he gave him certain orders in a very few impressive words, and Sir Edward's reply was quite in character.