A British army, as it was,--is,--and ought to be

by James Campbell

"Although he cannot allow himself the liberty to regret leaving the 3rd division from a due obedience to orders; the Major-General wishes to be understood, that he will know how to value the corps that compose it, and to remember the personal notice he has acquired from the splendid conduct of those corps in the field, a notice to which, under other circumstances, he could have had no pretensions.

"No. 3. As good conduct commonly commands good fortune, General Pakenham expects to hear of the 3rd division's fair fame, each opportunity bringing new acknowledgments in additional thanks from England; and the increased dread of her inveterate enemy."

I believe that I should have, earlier in this work, protested against its being supposed, when I stated, that I considered our army to be deficient in good system in many points, that I have presumed to say, that there were not employed upon the staff of Lord Wellington's army, scientific and able officers; for it was well known, that many of them, as well as our generals, had become excellent; but it was in the school of experience, that most of them had received those lessons which made them so; and what they chiefly wanted was greater assistance, especially from a police force, in performing their duties, and a sufficiently comprehensive and well considered system for their guidance. I will also venture to say, that we were quite equal, and, in some points, even superior to the French in this branch of military service; and the extraordinary mistakes which they often committed, fully justify me in saying so.

Probably the severe check which Massena's army had received at Busaco, had rendered him and his état-major more cautious than Napoleon's officers were reported to be; but could any thing have possibly been more surprising, than after they had found out the strength of the lines of Torres Vedras to be so great as to deter them from venturing an attack, that they should have remained a single day, much less a whole winter in front of them, exposing their fine army to the ruinous Fabian system adopted by Lord Wellington, who by the steady and composed front he displayed, whilst the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo was going forward, and by the lesson he gave them at Busaco, must have told them plainly enough what they were to expect. Surely Massena, his generals, and état-major should have come to the conclusion, either to attack, at all hazards, these lines, or that they ought instantly to have made arrangements for falling back into Spain upon their resources, which they very likely might have been able to do undisturbed by us, from the melancholy state in which Portugal then was.

Had the two armies changed positions, and I think I am fully borne out in what I am going to assert by the line of proceeding adopted by Lord Wellington at the Nivelle and at Toulouse, I have no doubt but he would have attacked Massena, and carried the lines of Torres Vedras, strong as they were represented to be. Some points in such intrenched, or fortified positions, may always be carried by concentrated attacks of brave and ably directed troops, like the British and French, when generally the whole of the defences, constructed probably at great expense and labour, must be abandoned, and at all events an attack, if even unsuccessful, could not have been so disastrous to the French as the effects of want of cover, a short allowance of unwholesome food, naturally producing diseases and causing many deaths amongst them, all of which they experienced during the winter, miserably and uselessly spent by them before the lines of Torres Vedras, and in their ultimate retreat from Portugal, when the whole of the country, north of the Tagus, was completely, imprudently, but unavoidably laid waste; thereby proclaiming to the world, that the idea of attacking the Duke of Wellington there, at any future period, had been abandoned.

In the next place, and in farther illustration of the inefficiency of the French état-major, I beg to ask, was not the extension of the French left till it became weakened, and of which Lord Wellington so ably availed himself, a great error on the part of Marmont, or rather of his staff, at the battle of Salamanca? Could Marshal Soult and his état-major not have been aware of our situation before the battle Toulouse, when our pontoon bridge was unavoidably removed, or it would have been carried away by the floods in the Garonne, and by the masses of timber, &c. sent down, I conclude, by the Marshal's orders; and when part of our troops, having previously crossed, were left apparently at his mercy—and that of his whole army: and why was not advantage taken of such a favourable opportunity to attack us? For I cannot imagine, that Soult's prudence in reserving his army for the defence of the field works about Toulouse, ought to be looked upon as an excuse for his not having done so, and for what I am more inclined to attribute to his, or his staff's want of intelligence. Picton, his generals, and his division had certainly made up their minds to fight lustily on that occasion; and, having only a short time before, single handed, disposed handsomely of two French divisions at Vic Bigore, even when fighting in their own favourite manner—skirmishing on a large scale—certainly did not diminish their confidence in themselves, and in their chiefs, who I firmly believe, would have liked nothing better, had the light division been only within a reasonable distance of them, than to have contended with Soult and his whole army. Every precaution was, however, taken, and preparation made for the expected attack; for we were well aware of the situation in which circumstances, that could not have been foreseen, had placed us, and that we could only look for assistance from our splendid artillery, supporting effectually our right by firing across the Garonne. Soult, his generals, and état-major, however, allowed the opportunity to escape, but in a few days after, this very confidence in himself, and in his division, was the cause of Sir Thomas Picton receiving at Toulouse a severe check—the only one instance, as well as I remember, in which the 3rd division was ever repulsed, or rather obliged to be brought back from an assault during the whole war.

I had every reason to suppose Sir Thomas Picton was aware that the passage of the canal could not be forced, and that the very point he was induced to attack, was covered by a tête du pont, and another field work which the enemy had recently constructed. I believe he was told that the passage could be easily forced; but this, as the result, and a careful examination afterwards proved was impossible. But it was most mortifying, indeed, to the 3rd division, that its last feat in arms, and after so long and brilliant a career, should have terminated in a failure, and in the loss of many gallant officers and men killed and wounded, and amongst the latter Sir Thomas Brisbane, who had so often before led on his brigade to victory.

But I must give another conspicuous instance, out of many which might be adduced, in support of what I assert respecting French generals and staff; but I beg in the first place, to ask what could be more extraordinary than their evident want of knowledge of the country, and even of preparation for the battle of Vittoria? For I cannot suppose that the French Commander-in-Chief and his état-major could have been ignorant of our vicinity, or of the positions we occupied the evening before the action; or, in the second place, could they have calculated upon Lord Wellington not venturing to attack their fine army, when concentrated under so many renowned chiefs.

The Duke of Wellington had adopted an excellent plan, which ought to be followed by all commanders of armies, of never issuing his orders or instructions, for any movement or object of importance, until within a very few hours of the time at which they were to be executed, so that the enemy could not possibly know, either through spies, or by any other means, what he intended to do the following day; it was therefore towards the middle of the night of the 20th of June, 1813, that I received from an orderly dragoon, as senior staff officer in camp, for the 3rd division, the following concise and excellent instructions, or order of battle for the morrow.

"Arrangements for the movements of the Army, the 21st of June.