A British army, as it was,--is,--and ought to be

by James Campbell

It may, perhaps, be considered out of place, but, before closing this chapter, I must beg leave to observe that I read—as I think every one else must have done—with great interest what the Marquis of Londonderry has told us in the account he has given of his visit to Russia, of the enormous establishments of the Czar for the instruction of those intended for the staff and other branches of his military and naval services. The country ought always to feel indebted to officers who can, like his Lordship, give useful information upon such subjects; for we certainly, by some means or other, should be made acquainted with what is going on in the military and naval world. And although the grand reviews, or showing off of troops and establishments were evidently got up in order to produce strong impressions, I feel confident it must, hereafter, be found that the expense of keeping up the latter will be much greater than the advantages to be derived from them. But our army does not require such an extended and overgrown system, which is neither suited to the feelings, ideas, or the genius of the free people of the British Empire.—An absolute government, which may one day have cause to tremble at the effects of what it has produced, could alone be supposed capable of creating and carrying out a plan of such magnitude, and which must, I should fear, prove hazardous to the safety of the country in which it is adopted, and also to its institutions.—I certainly would require that all gentlemen intended for commissions in our service should have had a certain military or naval education, but I would not ask where it had been acquired, provided they could pass the examinations I have already alluded to.

From our staff, at their own cost, well and probably expensively educated, we might naturally expect that officers would be selected, to be employed as consuls or otherwise, in ascertaining what might be going forward in countries likely to be, or which have already become the scenes of warfare, and about which, or the parties engaged, Great Britain might be deeply interested, yet not altogether justified in taking an active part in the contest, such as Circassia, Persia, South America, and perhaps Spain; and, above all, we might constantly have an eye upon our North American democratic neighbours, who can only be properly dealt with by a military governor-general of the whole of our North American territories, and who should be entrusted with much authority, both civil and military, so that he could act at all times with decision and promptitude.

Accomplished staff officers, such as I have in view, could give such information as might be relied upon, and would enable those, who direct the affairs of this great empire, to act judiciously and advantageously; and when these officers wished to do so, they ought to be allowed to go wherever war of any kind was carrying on, if it were only with the view of acquiring greater knowledge of their profession; for no matter what might be the nature of the warfare, some things may always be learnt. But these officers should, at the same time, be strictly prohibited from meddling with, or in any way aiding, or advising either party, without permission to do so from our Government. Civilians, in general, ought to be looked upon as not calculated for employment such as that I speak of, and we had once a lesson given us in this respect, if we will only profit by it, when Sir John Moore's army was so nearly lost through the foolish presumption of our agent or minister, sent out to the Spanish government of that day.

Many think that France could not be better governed than it is at present by Louis Philip, who is universally allowed to be an able sovereign; but I have often heard the question asked, how it was, that Paris, and all France in its train, fell so easily and unaccountably into the hands of the men of July, 1830. Although I know Paris tolerably well, and a good deal of France and Frenchmen, yet the only answer, I believe, that can be given is, that it did not suit the views, prejudices, or feelings of the military, that the existing order of things should be maintained; many of them, very probably, at the time belonging to the political coteries, with which Paris in particular always abounds, and in which are broached and discussed the strangest possible doctrines and dogmas. British officers can never belong to such dangerous associations, if they even did exist in the United Kingdom.

Any tumultuous assemblage of men, if even partially armed, can at first, as was the case the other day at Newport, be easily dispersed or put down, by rightly disposed and well officered regular troops. As for the barricades, of which we heard so much, they could only have led, had the troops done their duty, to the greater destruction of the city and the rioters; but as they were put up, why did an able and enlightened officer like Marshal Marmont, who commanded, send his soldiers in the manner he did into the streets of Paris, for this was quite as useless as our going headlong into those of Buenos Ayres, where some streets, and almost every house, were strongly barricaded, and yet I believe we forced them all; but probably, if he had ever heard of our exploits there, he had forgotten them. It appears strange to many, that Mont-Martre and other commanding points in and about Paris were not occupied by the Marshal in force with cannon and mortars, his communications with the country secured by his cavalry, and that he did not, without delay, bring up to the capital a sufficient number of troops to restore order. But even before their arrival, it is likely, that the peaceable and well-disposed part of the inhabitants, and especially the householders, would have found it to be their interest to declare openly against a lawless mob and their political leaders; and to have taken part with the troops opposed to them; but should this not have been the case, and it then clearly appearing, that all were leagued to resist the established government, which it is the duty of armies in all countries to uphold, the Marshal, however painful it might have been to his feelings, could have had no alternative but to announce to the riotous people, that if tranquillity and obedience to the laws, and to the constituted civil authorities, were not instantly restored, Paris, with the view of punishing its lawless inhabitants, would be laid in ruins. It will no doubt be asked, if such reasoners would have consented to destroy that large, beautiful, and populous city, the seat of the arts, and where every thing magnificent is to be found? Blucher would have done this for them sometime before, for he had a great fancy to treat Paris as General Steinbock did Altona years ago, had it not been for Lord Wellington; and for this, I fear, the French people were not afterwards even grateful to him. But this question is very like one I had put to me some time ago, when I ventured to hint, that a certain determined mode of acting, would, in the end, but in another country, prove to be the most humane, viz. "Would you shoot the people—the poor misguided people of Ireland?" I answered, that as an officer, I should be obliged to do so, however reluctant I might be to adopt such a measure; but I would begin with their selfish agitators, if they would not discontinue their wicked practices, and cease holding out expectations to the people of a dismemberment of the empire, and allow the laws, whatever they may be, to be obeyed. If the laws are bad, or fancied to be bad, and if they do not please all men, without regard to difference of religion, and in other respects, upon an equality, let the Government, whose business it is, endeavour to have them altered; but as long as they stand the laws of the realm, it is the duty of officers and soldiers to uphold them, and the civil authorities in the execution of them, and they have nothing more to say to the matter. Had the French acted thus, and upon such principles—for I cannot suppose that their officers had lost all influence and command over their men—and as I am convinced, British officers, if necessary, would act, we should not now have before our eyes the awful example, of an established government overturned, as was the case in 1830, and which, with what has occurred in that country for many years past, ought to be held up for ever as a lesson to the United Kingdom. I hope, however, that Great Britain will never become so humbled, as to require salvation from naval and military patriotism; but I boldly assert, and without fear of contradiction, that no where on earth, amongst men, is this virtue to be found so pure as in the hearts of the officers of our navy and army.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] N.B. Many of the absentees did not, as was supposed, fall into the hands of the enemy, but had gone off in search of liquor or plunder.

CHAP. VIII.

There is no country with which Great Britain is likely so soon to come into hostile contact as the United States of America, and for such a war we must certainly want an army such as I have in view.

It has long been the fashion, and I believe it is the object of many interested and designing men, to endeavour to have the United States of America considered as much more powerful and dangerous to Great Britain then they really are. No nation, nor body of men, be they who they may, composed of such heterogeneous materials, scattered over so vast an extent of territory, in which the laws, enacted by an often unruly legislature, are so powerless, and in many places so weakly administered, as not to be able to prevent aggressions upon an unoffending neighbour, or to afford sufficient protection to the peaceably inclined against the hand of violence, can possibly be considered powerful. I am aware that parts of the United States ought, to a certain extent, to be looked upon as exceptions, but, generally speaking, this is by no means an over-drawn picture of what is the state of society in that part of the world.