“First, permission (for approbation he owes not to what is evil) and thus according to Matthew 13: 30, for public peace and quiet sake.
“Secondly, he owes protection to the persons of his subjects (though of a false worship) that no injury be offered either to the persons or goods of any. Rom. 13.”[[373]]
It follows, from this last position, that no man can be lawfully compelled to support a system of worship which he disapproves; for this is, in effect, to tax and punish him for his religious opinions.
The duty of the magistrate is thus very clear. With the religious opinions or practices of the citizens, he has no concern. They are not civil matters, which, alone, come within his cognizance. If a man’s religious views lead him to actions which injure society, those actions become civil offences, and are within the jurisdiction of the magistrate, who is appointed to guard the interests of the civil community. If a company of Hindoos should remove to Boston, and should erect a temple to Juggernaut, they ought to be protected in their worship, if they confined themselves to such acts, as made no disturbance, and violated no civil law. If, however, they should attempt to drag the idol through the streets, the magistrates ought to interfere. If they should sacrifice one of their children, the perpetrators ought to be tried and punished for murder. If a man violates the third commandment, in such a way as to disturb the community, he may be punished, though experience has proved, that it is not wise to enforce laws against blasphemy. If a man breaks the fourth commandment, by actions which interrupt or disturb the devotions of others, the law may restrain and punish him, not for the breach of the commandment, but for interfering with the religious privileges of other citizens. If a man chose to labor on the Sabbath, on his farm or in his shop, the law could not rightfully interfere; but if by his labor he disturbed the devotions of his neighbors, he might be restrained; though, here, too, experience proves, that the interference of the law is odious, and seldom beneficial.
Such cases as those specified present no difficulty. There is a broad, clear line, running between religious opinions and actions. The actions, and not the opinions, are the subjects of law. If it is alleged, that the opinions necessarily lead to illegal conduct, the reply is, wait till the actions are attempted or performed. They, then, come within the cognizance of civil law. If, indeed, a case could be supposed to happen, in which a religious sect avowed it as their creed, that they were required, or permitted, to murder their fellow-citizens, or burn their dwellings, the magistrates would be bound to take the necessary precautions to prevent such results. In such a case, the creed would involve a criminal design, against which the community would have a right to guard itself; but the mere design could not be punished; just as a purpose to commit murder cannot be punished, though it justifies the magistrate in taking measures to prevent its execution.
Liberty of conscience, however, has some limitations. It does not prohibit churches from excluding members whose opinions or conduct are inconsistent with the principles on which the church is founded. The Bible makes it the duty of churches to maintain suitable discipline. A church is a voluntary society, founded on certain fundamental rules, to which every member assents, when he enters it. If he adopts other principles, or in any way violates the rules, he makes himself liable to expulsion from the church, as from any other voluntary association.
Neither does liberty of conscience imply, that a man has a claim to our confidence, our patronage, our votes, whatever may be his religious opinions. I would not intrust my children to the care of an infidel, but I do not deprive him, by such refusal, of any right; yet a law forbidding infidels to be employed as instructors, would be unjust. I would not vote for a man holding certain principles, but I do not thereby invade his privileges, for he has no title to my vote; yet a law, making men ineligible to office, on account of certain opinions, would be an invasion of their civil rights.[[374]] Every man must bear the responsibility of his principles. Those principles cannot impair his positive rights; but they may, and will, affect the opinions and feelings of his fellow men. To their confidence, their patronage, or their votes, he has no natural right, and no civil injustice is done to him, if these are withheld.
We cannot prolong our remarks on this subject. It is expounded and illustrated, with much ability, learning and eloquence, in the “Bloody Tenet.” Roger Williams is entitled to the honor of being the first writer, in modern times, who clearly maintained the absolute right of every man, to a “full liberty in religious concernments.” Bishop Heber, in his Life of Jeremy Taylor, says, of the “Liberty of Prophesying,” “It is the first attempt on record, to conciliate the minds of Christians to the reception of a doctrine, which, though now the rule of action professed by all Christian sects, was then, by every sect alike, regarded as a perilous and portentous novelty.”[[375]]
Bishop Heber has here fallen into a mistake. The “Liberty of Prophesying” was published in 1647, three years after the “Bloody Tenet,” in which the principles of religious liberty are more clearly and consistently maintained, than in Taylor’s excellent work.[[376]] Bishop Heber admits (p. 222) that this essay “can by no means lay claim to the character which has been assigned to it, of a plea for universal toleration. The forbearance which he claims, he claims for those Christians only, who unite in the confession of the Apostles’ creed.” Bishop Taylor himself, at the end of the sixteenth section of the work referred to, says, that “opinions are to be dealt with,” if they tend to disturb the public peace, and lead to vice. “If either themselves or their doctrine do really and without color or feigned pretence, disturb the public peace, and just interests, they are not to be suffered.” But the magistrate must judge, in this case; and, of course, the door is left wide open, for persecution. Roger Williams, on the contrary, contended, that “a permission of the most Paganish, Jewish, Turkish or Antichristian consciences and worships, be granted to all men in all nations and countries;” and he left no discretion to the magistrate to judge of opinions, any further than they should exhibit their effects in action. His principles, too, claimed for men entire liberty of conscience, and not merely a right to toleration. To tolerate implies the power to interfere, and to regulate the conscience. If there is power to permit, there is power to forbid.
The great Mr. Locke advocated the principles of religious liberty with distinguished ability, in his Letters concerning Toleration, written about the year 1690; but he maintained, by implication, that Papists ought not to be tolerated, and expressly asserted that atheists must not receive toleration.[[377]]