| Great ships | 24 |
| Great galleasses | 8 |
| Quarracques | 11 |
| Galleras | 226 |
| Sailing galleys | 50 |
| Brigantines | 60 |
| Fustes | 80 |
| Boats innumerable. | |
| Total vessels | 459 |
Allowing to each man-at-arms and lance two followers, and to each gentleman one, the total force would amount to nearly 90,000 men, 1200 pieces of artillery, and 459 sail. To this there falls to be added, besides the usual attendance of servants and sutlers, an immense retinue attached to the luxurious court of Charles, of which no enumeration is attempted.
[APPENDIX IX]
THE BATTLE OF THE TARO, IN 1495
THE battle of Fornovo bears so little upon the proper subject of our narrative, that we have but rapidly noted its issue. It may be well, however, now to examine in greater detail the circumstances leading to a result so opposite from that which the ordinary chances of war would have inferred, and to consider how far the fortune of that field tried the comparative superiority of French and Italian prowess. We are in possession of contemporary statements which fairly represent each side of the argument; and the narratives of Corio, Sanuto, and Guicciardini, the historians of Milan, Venice, and Florence, may be accepted as exhausting those pleas by which the frank and graphic commentaries of Philippe de Comines and the more confused details of the Vergier d'Honneur ought to be tested.
The French march through Italy had been rather a pageant than an invasion: as they advanced, difficulties disappeared,—enemies fawned, crouched, or fled without hazarding a blow. A career of such success, trying to any judgment, intoxicated the young and giddy monarch, and, though startled by the northern confederacy, he was not fully roused to the danger of being caught and enclosed in an enemy's country. We accordingly find the pages of Comines full of lamentations at the careless ease with which he loitered on his retreat, and the infatuation of weakening his army by leaving small garrisons at Siena, Pisa, Lucca, and Pietra Santa, as well as by detaching a useless expedition against Genoa, whose resistance closed the coast road against him. At the two first of these places above a fortnight of valuable time was lost, whilst the allies were mustering to intercept his passage of the Apennines. As he approached the danger, blunders consequent upon divided councils were aggravated by imperfect discipline; and the wanton destruction by the Swiss of Pontremoli with its magazines exposed the army to famine in the mountain passes. A new obstacle now presented itself in the enormous artillery train, consisting of fourteen culverins from twelve to fifteen feet long. The Sieur d'Argenton, whose mission at Venice taught him to appreciate the urgency of a retreat ere the allies could concentrate their forces, and others who knew the difficulties of such a march, would gladly have seen these cumbrous impediments abandoned, but the Swiss, tackling themselves by hundreds to each piece, dragged them up defiles and lowered them down precipices, where beasts of draught could have been of no avail. This feat is described in the Vergier as "une execrable peine, merveilleux travail, et très penetrant ennuy, attendu la façon de proceder, le lieu estrange, et la chaleur grande et terrible que lors se faisoit." The army, after crossing the summit, slowly descended on Lombardy, by the left bank of the Taro, until its vanguard under Marechal de Gie, being thirty miles in advance, reached Fornovo on the 2nd of July, and halted for three days until the King should come up.[313] The allies were encamped at Ghiaruola, about three miles further in the open plain. Had they at once attacked the Marechal, his division might have been exterminated, whilst the army thus weakened, and unable from fatigue and exhaustion to fall back upon Tuscany, must have become an easy prey, or have surrendered at discretion. Opportunities so precious are rarely offered to men's exigencies, and once lost cannot be retrieved.
The estimate by Comines of the two armies is admitted to be a fair one. That to which he belonged was reduced to a tithe of the original armament, and numbered much under 9000 fighting men, who had to cut their way through at least four times that strength, with every disadvantage of ground. Both were now on the right of the Taro, a mountain torrent here subsiding into a shallow stream, which the French had to cross within half a mile of the enemy. So convinced was Comines of the risk, that on the 5th he availed himself of the anxious feeling which began to manifest itself among his countrymen, when in presence of so formidable a host, and opened negotiations. These appear to have been continued next day, even after the battle had commenced, but led to nothing. That they should have been entertained by the confederates might occasion surprise, but for Sanuto's ready admission that, even at such a moment, the hesitating and ruinous policy habitual to Venetian proveditori, sacrificed the advantages of the emergency. He tells us that they, "conducting themselves most wisely, wished to let the King pass, without perilling their cause, seeing that, as all know, a general action is essentially hazardous, and ought therefore to be avoided by a powerful state such as Venice."[314] The narrative of Guicciardini inculpates others in these craven counsels, which carried the day, and induced the scarcely credible resolution to wait for instructions from Milan and Venice: scarcely was it formed ere its fatuity became apparent.