In their country of crags and ravines it was impossible either to rear powerful horses, or to manœuvre with heavy cavalry; the accoutrements of gens d'armerie were also too costly for a population of scanty and much divided means. They therefore adopted, what proved more effective even in the plain, an infantry so armed and drilled as to withstand the shock of men-at-arms. In lines four deep, or in cross-shaped columns, they received the charge upon their bristling pikes, and with two-handed swords dealt fell blows on the broken squadrons. Their defensive armour was of the least cumbrous description, consisting generally but of breastplates; and with the axe-headed halberts, which some of them carried, they unseated their enemies, or cut their reins in the mêlée. By these means they were enabled so well to apply the activity and endurance bestowed upon them by nature, as to meet on equal terms with armies apparently much their superiors. Louis XI. was the first sovereign to avail himself of a new element, whose qualities he had learned by bloody experience at the passage of the Birsa, in 1444.[243] But after the Swiss mercenaries had tasted the gratification of regular pay, and the plunder of lands more golden than their own, an appetite for adventure superseded the pristine simplicity of their habits. The cantons, finding it difficult to keep their youth at home, became parties to contracts which hired out their services to the best bidder; and we shall henceforth find them in the champagne lands of Lombardy, following with equal goodwill the lilies of France, the lion of St. Mark, or the Papal gonfalone. Thus in a few years, the military aspect of Southern Europe became changed, not only by the employment of Swiss infantry in all important enterprises, but from an adoption of their system by the troops of Italy, France, and Germany.
The Emperor Maximilian was the first to organise in Germany a militia of foot, under the name of lanznechts, against whom the Swiss, recollecting their ancient struggles for liberty, nourished a rancour, which only their common stipendiary interests could for the moment suspend. Lightly armed with lance and dagger, but encumbered by a preposterous camp-following; reckless of danger, yet indifferent to glory; they were fractious, disobedient, debauched, impatient of suffering, greedy of pay, devoted to plunder. But our notice of the ultra-montane infantry would be incomplete without the Spaniards. They were brought into Italy to maintain Ferdinand's pretensions upon Naples, and to support the aspirations of his successor to extended dominion in the Peninsula. Levied by tuck of drum, with scanty promise of pay, but unlimited licence to pillage, they campaigned in the spirit of pirates; and though the energy of Gonsalvo di Cordova ultimately brought the Hispano-Neapolitan army into a very efficient state, this stain was never effaced. The character for ferocity which attached to their birth is stamped upon their military exploits, and has left its traces to this day upon the inhabitants of Lower Italy. The cavalry of Germany and Spain was decidedly inferior to the Italian light horse and men-at-arms, and played but an unimportant part in the wars which we are now to consider.
Our review of the military art in the Peninsula must needs include the recent introduction of fire-arms. The researches of Gaye have discovered that projectiles were used in Italy considerably earlier than the date usually assigned to their invention, a due provision of "cannons and metal balls," both for field-service and fortification, being ordered by the Florentine government in February, 1326.[244] Whatever may have been its origin, the invention was slowly followed up; for, after nearly a century and three quarters, the Italian artillery was still so cumbrous and defective as to be of little practical utility, and it was rarely employed except in sieges. Indeed, according to Guicciardini, the very name of cannons had passed out of use, and the light and rapidly-served field-pieces of the French army were regarded with as much surprise as apprehension.
The development of the new power was extremely gradual; and although we have seen it in operation at the battle of Molinella, in 1467, no other instance occurred during that century of its being used with effect in the field.[245] Nor is this surprising, when we consider the unmanageable nature of the service, and the gradual steps whereby science superseded rude contrivance. Heavy cannon were then from ten to twelve feet long, requiring at times fifty yoke of oxen. They carried balls of stone or metal of ten or twelve hundred pounds; and after each discharge, some hours were needed to clean out, reload, and point the piece. Even the flying artillery (passa volanti) were in length sixty diameters, and the basilisks, reckoned as light guns, were two-hundred pounders. We cannot now pursue the subject, but any one who visits a complete armoury of 1480-1500, or examines the works upon military engineering of that age, will probably conclude that few modern discoveries in the destructive art had not even then been approximated. For attack and defence of fortified places these machines were certainly better adapted; yet, with all the talent and princely encouragement then expended upon fortification, it must be considered as in its infancy. But when the chivalry of the north poured upon fated Italy, under Charles VIII., no part of their array appeared so formidable as their field-train, powerful yet compact, heavy but easily moved; and the unimportant service required from it in that brief campaign, was performed in a manner which showed how much even the Italians had to learn in this department. At the Taro, the nature of the ground prevented it from contributing much to the success of that bloody day, and it was reserved for the sanguinary conflict of Ravenna to develop the capabilities of a service which gradually became the right arm of European warfare.
[CHAPTER XV]
Italy ill prepared for the French Invasion—Duke Guidobaldo sent against the Orsini—Lucrezia Borgia’s second marriage—Descent of Charles VIII.—He reaches Naples and retreats—Battle of the Taro—The Duke engaged in the Pisan war—Is taken prisoner by the Orsini and ransomed.
THE preceding rapid sketch may show the materials of which the invading hosts were composed, and the nature of the approaching danger. Its imminence appalled even those powers who, like Sforza, thought more of their own ends than of the general weal; and Alfonso II., who had succeeded to the crown of Naples on the death of his father Ferdinand, in January, 1494, was indefatigable in uniting them on the defensive. With Pietro de' Medici, we have already seen that the latter was in close relations. Among the princes of Romagna, Gallic influence had obtained no footing. The Venetians, occupied in the defence of their eastern dependencies from the Turks, and trusting, perhaps, to see Charles redeem his promise of a crusade against the Crescent, were inclined to neutrality. Genoa was in the hands of a faction entirely under the influence of Ludovico il Moro,[*246] who, though bound by treaty to Charles, was already alienated at heart from the connection, and ready on the first opportunity to discard it. The Pontiffs position, like his usual policy, was somewhat complicated. We have formerly found his predecessors generally hostile to the dynasty of Aragon, as well as to that of Hohenstaufen, and tolerably consistent in support of the Angevine races, whose original title the Neapolitan crown was a papal grant. Further, claims of the popes as lords paramount of that kingdom, and the annual payments which in that capacity they demanded, were fertile grounds for rancour, which but a few years before had broken out into hostilities. We have also seen Ferdinand assisting Virginio Orsini in purchasing those estates from which Alexander was bent upon expelling him. But a deeper cause for mortification and personal enmity arose out of the resistance by that King and his son to the matrimonial alliance of a princess of their house with one of the Pope's spurious sons.[*247] For a time, therefore, his Holiness balanced between the parties, and appears even to have allowed his name to be used by Ludovico Sforza in proposing to Charles the conquest of Naples.[*248] But his object was merely to annoy and alarm Ferdinand; and when he found this idea seriously adopted by the young monarch of France, he hastily backed out, and employed his spiritual and temporal influence to dissuade him from the enterprise.[249] Alfonso warmly supported his Holiness in this new policy, and, in order to clench him in it, betrothed his natural daughter, Sancia, with a dowry of lands worth 10,000 ducats of rent, and jewels to the value of 200,000 ducats, to Giuffredo Borgia, the Pope's youngest child, whom he created Prince of Squillace. This son-in-law not being yet marriageable, the King had an excuse for taking him to be brought up near his bride, with the intention of securing a hostage for his unstable parent's good faith. As a further bait, the principality of Tricarico, with estates of 12,000 ducats a year, and one of the seven great offices under the crown of Naples, were given to the eldest Borgia, now Duke of Gandia; whilst on Cesare, already raised to the purple as Cardinal Valentino (or of Valencia), his best ecclesiastical benefices were showered by the hard-pressed Alfonso.
But the transaction of Virginio Orsini gave rise to a preliminary episode in the great drama, which, as bringing the Duke of Urbino upon the stage, requires some notice in this place. Besides the uneasiness with which Alexander viewed the further aggrandisement of that already too formidable subject, it is more than probable that, in claiming the Cibò estates, as lapsed to the Camera Apostolica, his ultimate intention was, to bestow them upon one of his own children; for his selfish policy seldom embraced any aim more noble than nepotism or revenge. Being doubtful of his own ability to drive the Orsini from their new purchase, he, in April, 1493, leagued himself with Ludovico Sforza and the Venetian republic. Through the former, he carried into effect a scheme which at once tended to facilitate that object, and promoted his favourite aim of providing his offspring with eligible marriages. His daughter Lucrezia,—she whose name has, perhaps, done more to render her infamous than her guilt, but whose beauty, accomplishments, and eventual penitence, had been forgotten in the heinous crimes which history laid to her charge unquestioned, until Roscoe's ingenious defence,—Lucrezia Borgia was then betrothed wife of a Spanish, or, rather, a Neapolitan, gentleman, named Procida. To nullify a union so valueless cost no qualm to the Pontiff, and, probably, as little to the lady. To match her with the widowed Lord of Pesaro scarcely required the persuasions of his relation Ludovico il Moro, and his brother-in-law, Duke Guidobaldo, whose good offices the Pope put in requisition to arrange preliminaries with the bridegroom, paying at the same time 3000 ducats as a solace to her first husband. The betrothal, in May, was celebrated by a ball in the palace of Pesaro, from which the assembled guests issued forth in couples, dancing through the streets a sort of polonaise, which was led by the papal ambassador! The nuptial ceremony was postponed until Lucrezia's arrival from Spain in the following spring, and it was not until June that the bridal party reached their capital.[*250]