After the picture by Ambrogio de’ Predis in the Biblioteca Ambrogiana, Milan
Charles and his army had abandoned themselves to the intoxication of their easy conquest, and to excess in those pleasures which in the Ausonian climate seem to enervate natives and strangers. From this careless security, news of the alliance roused him to the danger of being entrapped in his new kingdom. Leaving half his army there to maintain his authority, he on the 20th of May set out with the remainder on his return homeward. Hastily retracing the same route, he saw difficulties increasing around him, but avoided hostilities, until in descending the Apennines into Lombardy he found himself intercepted among the defiles of the Taro by the allied army, so superior in force as to render his destruction next to inevitable, even without taking into account the immense advantages of the position which they had selected. But the singular good fortune which had enabled the French monarch to overrun the whole Peninsula, conquer a kingdom, and retire in the face of opposing Europe, without once calling into exercise whatever talent, judgment, or bravery he might have possessed, did not forsake him in this his first difficulty. The confederates, by unpardonable want of good understanding among their leaders, and of steadiness among their troops, let slip the precious opportunity of exterminating their invaders. On the 6th of July they suffered on the Taro an overthrow which they vainly claimed as a victory, and after a brief hour's conflict retired in disorder, leaving above three thousand men on the field. Of this battle Guicciardini remarks that it was the first for a long period that had been really sanguinary in its character, compared with those tactic engagements of the condottieri, in which bloodshed was little sought on either side. As the earliest struggle between Italy and her invaders, the only occasion when her disunited interests were rallied beneath one banner, it holds a place in history which in a military view it by no means merited.[256] It was lost by the delays, distracted counsels, and deficient discipline among the allies, and brought little glory to the retreating army, which, without further opposition, reached Asti, where a strong garrison had been left, and in October re-entered France. The Aragonese party was strong in Naples, and within six weeks after Charles had quitted that capital, Ferdinand II. was welcomed back to it by a versatile people, whom the never-failing insolence of the French had quickly disgusted with their change of masters. The kingdom was gradually recovered from its invaders and their supporters, the Angevine barons, by aid of Spanish succours under Gonsalvo di Cordova, whose gallantry and skill during a harassing guerilla campaign established his reputation, and procured him the name of the Great Captain. Montpensier, when left as viceroy in command of the army of occupation, made feeble head against him for above a year, until most of his troops having dropped under the effects of climate and debauchery, he surrendered the remainder as prisoners of war. Lower Italy, again under Ferdinand's sway, was no more disturbed by Charles, who wasted the brief remainder of his life in dissolute indulgences, better becoming his despicable character than foreign conquests.
Thus terminated the first of those systematic and successful invasions from which Italy has suffered in later ages. Various circumstances combined to modify its serious results upon her prosperity, and though almost unopposed, the victors perhaps paid more dearly than the vanquished. But the seeds of mischief were sown, too surely to ripen into fatal evils. The nations of the north had learned important lessons; her temptations, her disunion, and her consequent powerlessness had been disclosed to them. This epoch may indeed be regarded as the turning point of European history. From it the liberties and prosperity of Italy declined, and the new combinations, alliances, and intermarriages then formed by ultra-montane governments gradually matured that political system which has since come to be regarded as the bulwark of national independence. We have introduced this rapid sketch of the French expedition, because, although it but slightly influenced Guidobaldo's position, subsequent events, to which it in some degree gave occasion, brought forward himself and his successor as prominent actors. He had been engaged by the Venetian republic to join the confederate army with four hundred and seventy horse, but had no share in the disgraceful conflict at the Taro; his squadrons, however, seem to have been there under his natural brother Antonio, who, while commanding the reserve, might have turned the fortune of the day, but for an oversight in the transmission of orders to him.
The Pisan war was the immediate fruit of the French invasion, as regarded the internal relations of the Peninsula. Charles, remembering the old proverb, "sow divisions and rule," or perhaps from a mere love of mischief-making, had instigated that city to throw off the yoke of Florence, and re-establish its ancient republican independence. But the support which he had pledged to it was forgotten, when personal considerations rendered a retreat advisable; and the Pisans were left to maintain themselves as best they could against their old rivals and recent masters, with the aid of a French brigade under Monsieur d'Entragues. The Florentines lost no time in engaging the Duke of Urbino to command their troops for three years, who, by active and well-judged movements, quickly possessed himself of Ponte Sacco, Palaia, and other small towns about the Era. Their resistance was punished with the usual barbarity of the time, by cold-blooded cruelties which Guidobaldo does not appear to have shared or approved. It seems questionable how far the blunders in an assault on Vicopisano were owing to him or to the Florentine commissaries, who, as was usual in the service of the great republics, were sent to control their general; but the consequence was a repulse, after which he retired into winter quarters. His subsequent operations in their service are of no interest; their jealousies paralysing both his spirit and their own.
The last year's experience was but short-lived in the Italian states. Instead of profiting by the absence of their common foe to strengthen themselves against a recurrence of danger, they resumed their innate rivalries, and fomented fresh discord. The Florentines, far from joining the league to expel Charles, continued to favour his cause, attributing, with justice, to his advent their liberation from the Medici and the re-establishment of a democratic government. What they, above all things, dreaded was the return of that banished race, so they kept aloof from any new combination that might lead to it. This contumacy was looked upon with little favour by those powers who were averse to popular institutions, or friendly to Pietro de' Medici; besides which they apprehended that such a state of matters, if allowed to continue, would facilitate a repetition of the late invasion. In accordance with the crooked policy of the age, they succoured Pisa, without any open declaration of the war which they were in fact carrying on against Florence. This circumstance, and the wonted bad faith of Ludovico il Moro, complicated a struggle which was conducted in the drawling spirit of half-fighting, half-negotiating, usual in such petty strifes. Ludovico finally tempted the Emperor to a fresh invasion of Italy, in order to force Florence into the general league, but he conducted the enterprise with equal feebleness and faithlessness, and after having occupied Pisa, retreated without leaving any material impression on the campaign, which declined into a series of unimportant skirmishes. Meanwhile the Pope, the Venetians, and Sforza united in exciting various neighbours of the Florentines, such as the Bentivoglii, the Riarii, and Siena, to molest their frontiers, whilst Virginio Orsini prepared to restore the Medici by arms. This plan, however, fell to the ground, and Guidobaldo was soon after summoned, as a vassal of the Church, to leave his incomplete term of unsatisfactory service under the lilies of Florence, and join the new combination formed by the Pontiff to replace Ferdinand upon the Neapolitan throne.
The fate of the French army at Naples, against the wreck of which this expedition was directed, has been already mentioned. The evolutions whereby Guidobaldo, as lieutenant-general of the ecclesiastical forces, in concert with the great Gonsalvo di Cordova, reduced some Angevine feudatories in the Abruzzi, who, supported by the Orsini, for a time resisted the restoration of the house of Aragon, need not occupy our attention. The particulars are involved in contradiction, and the results were unimportant to his fame. No sooner had Ferdinand triumphed over his difficulties than he was called to another sphere. He died in October, 1496, and was succeeded by his paternal uncle Federigo. Of the French, not above five hundred escaped from sword and pestilence to reach home.
Peace was once more restored to Italy, but not to the breast of that turbulent Pontiff who was her curse. The moment was propitious for resuming his favourite scheme of oppressing the Orsini, in whose extensive estates he saw ample endowments for his own disreputable progeny. The leaders of that family, Virginio, Gian-Giordano, Paolo, and its adopted scion Bartolomeo d'Alviano of Orvieto, had fought against Ferdinand's restoration, and all of them remained prisoners in his hands.[257] The Pope at once perceived the chance thus offered, and hastened to avail himself of it. After conciliating the Duke of Urbino by a pompous reception on the 14th of October, and by assigning him apartments in the Vatican, he held a secret consistory, which attainted the Orsini on general charges of lese-majesty and rebellion, and sanctioned the military occupation of their fiefs in name of the Church. He entrusted the command to his son the Duke of Gandia, associating with him the Duke of Urbino and Fabrizio Colonna (the latter but too willing to promote the downfall of a rival house), and, to inaugurate the expedition, he blessed the banners at St. Peter's, with an imposing military and religious spectacle.
The troops marched in October, and, having reduced Isola, a castle within ten miles of Rome, which stood a twelve days' siege, many other small strongholds speedily surrendered, their absent lords being unable to aid in their defence. The fortress of Bracciano was, however, strong by nature, and was held by Bartolomea, sister of Virginio Orsini, with energy, talent, and unquailing resolution, which saved her family in their urgent straits, and kept the assailants at bay until her husband, Bartolomeo d'Alviano, escaping from Naples, hastily raised a few old adherents of his adopted house, and hurried to her rescue. The impetuous Alexander, disgusted by this dilatory progress of affairs, had a lighter hastily built, and sent under a strong escort to the lake of Bracciano, in order to aid the besiegers' efforts, and to intercept the manœuvres of the enemy, whose petty force, passing by the water from one castle to another as occasion required, was enabled to garrison the three separate strongholds of Bracciano, Anguillara, and Trevignano. A well-timed ambuscade, laid by d'Alviano, routed the escort, and the boat was burnt. In another sally Bartolomeo, falling upon Cesare Borgia while hunting, chased him almost to the gates of Rome, and, but for the fleetness of his horse, would have obtained in his person the means of dictating terms to his father. Of these incidents a partizan warfare was naturally more productive than a more serious campaign.