With such diversity of opinion prevailing among commanders of nearly equal authority, it is not surprising that the advance upon Milan should have been most sluggish. After spending nine days in marching about twenty miles, the army, on the 6th of July, drew round that city, which the enemy, notwithstanding Bourbon's arrival the preceding night with the Spanish succours, are supposed by Sismondi to have been on the point of evacuating. The artillery having next morning begun to play upon the walls, a sally was made, and the allied troops, finding themselves under fire, behaved most scandalously, so that, had not Francesco Maria with the cavalry promptly supported the panic-stricken infantry of his own and the papal brigades, they must have suffered a total rout. Alarmed at these symptoms of unsteadiness, and unseconded by the expected insurrection within, the Venetian Proveditore and Guicciardini insisted upon a general retreat, as the only means by which their forces could escape destruction. In despair, they besought the Duke to take the retiring army under his command, a charge which he did not accept without taunting them on a result that so fully bore out his predictions, and proved their rashness in exposing an unorganised host of raw Italians to fight the veterans of Germany and Spain. But the moment was too critical for recrimination. Two hours before dawn the camp was silently raised, and the army withdrew in good order about twelve miles to Marignano. Their rear was effectually guarded by Giovanni de' Medici against any sally of the imperialists, but no less than four thousand of the foot were missing, having ignominiously deserted their colours.
Such is the account of Leoni and Baldi. Guicciardini, on the other hand, takes to himself credit for using every argument with the Duke against a retreat, which he designates as uncalled for and infamous. Upon his despatches were, no doubt, formed the opinions expressed in the following letter of the Bishop of Worcester to Cardinal Wolsey:—
"Most Illustrious and Reverend Lord," &c.
"I have hitherto daily informed you of what was going on, by longer or shorter letters, as time permitted. At present nothing new has transpired, except that, on the night of the 7th inst., the Duke of Urbino, captain-general of the ecclesiastical and Venetian forces, after most strenuous and gallant operations against the enemy, from which a successful issue was expected, suddenly changing his intention, notwithstanding numerous protests, drew off his army to Marignano, a town ten miles from Milan. Which, though the Duke, as usual, entangles it with numerous reasons, has exposed him to no slight disparagement from the public. I have only further humbly to commend myself to your most illustrious Lordship. From Rome, 11th July, 1526.
"Your most illustrious and reverend Lordship's
Humillimum manicipium,
"Hič. Epš. Wigornieñ."[304]
The prejudices of Guicciardini are admitted by the Venetian Paruta, who tells us that the Signory were satisfied with their general's explanations, but cautioned him for the future, to communicate his views more frankly to the papal commissioner. It is a passage of history hard to clear up, and in every view redounding little to the credit of its actors, whether we most blame the Duke's policy or the unsteadiness of his troops. Exposures so disgraceful well merited the sneer, that the swords in that army had no edge; and Sismondi admits that its spiritless conduct goes far to justify its leader's dispiriting tactics.[*305]
On the 22nd of July, the confederates, having been joined by five thousand Swiss levies, again approached the city, and were met by about three hundred women and children, whom Sforza had dismissed as embarrassing his defence. Shamed by their representations, the leaders, in a council of war, decided upon a new attempt to relieve the citadel, which, however, Giovanni de' Medici, after inspecting the works of the besiegers, opposed as too perilous. Whilst they lost time in these discussions, Sforza was fairly starved out, and surrendered the fortress on the 24th. Leoni and Baldi agree in charging these dilatory and unsatisfactory proceedings upon the other generals, and the total inefficiency of the army, rather than upon Francesco Maria's tactics. They may be considered as biased, but the following anecdotes will show how far the Florentine historian had reason to be impartial.
At one of the war councils held in the Certosa of Pavia, Guicciardini having cast some doubt upon an opinion expressed by the Duke, was thus answered: "Your business is to confer with pedants." These rude words were accompanied by a knock-down blow on the face, followed by an order to get up and begone! Leonardi, who preserves this incident, adds, "Such pugilistic sport was habitual to my Lord Duke; and it was well for those who could command their temper in reasoning with him, as he was ever ready to strike any one who argued against his views with disrespect." The historian's original prepossession against Francesco Maria, is ascribed by Baldi to a vain ambition of precedence. While lieutenant-general of the papal forces he displayed it towards Guido Rangone, his superior officer, and insisted on taking rank at the council-board of the Marquis of Saluzzo, when he arrived in command of the French contingents. These absurd pretensions were at first treated with indifference, but finally brought him into a wrangle with the Duke, over whom he also claimed a similar right, from the fact of being in the papal service, waiving it only out of consideration for his sovereign rank. In that instance, also, he is said to have been struck by the choleric prince; at all events he was expelled from the council-chamber, and a strong representation of his misconduct was made to the Pope, who consequently cancelled his anomalous commission, and appointed him governor of Modena.
Sismondi, embodying Guicciardini's one-sided narrative,[*306] has thrown upon Francesco Maria the entire odium of the ludicrously slow movements of the army, averaging about four miles on each alternate day, and of their double miscarriage before Milan. The fatal tendency of such measures, however they might have originated, admits of no question, and the responsibility of their failure must fall upon the most influential leader. It is always difficult in a heterogeneous confederacy to maintain that unity of purpose which may compensate for diversity of interests, and which can only be insured by prompt action and brilliant success. But the sentiment "that reputation was neither to be gained by risks nor lost by delays," which Bernardo Tasso puts into the Duke's mouth, in describing a council of war whereat he assisted,[307] not only advocates quite a different policy, but too well confirms the charge brought against him as one of those