Blue Shirt and Khaki: A Comparison

by James F. J. Archibald

The battle of Pretoria, June 4, 1900; Boer guns in action; British advance along the first range of hills.

The tactics of Lord Roberts at the capture of Pretoria were badly at fault. The taking of that city was attended by a glaring military blunder unexpected from that great leader. It seemed to be the commander’s only idea to get into the town and to occupy it, rather than to cut off the enemy’s retreat and capture him. The advance was made along the road from Johannesburg, the main force being composed almost entirely of infantry and artillery. The customary flanking movements were commenced. Hutton’s division of mounted infantry swung around one flank for a short distance. French’s cavalry division started around the other flank, but did not get very far before the fighting ceased. It happened that General Botha had not defended Pretoria, and the action that lasted during the entire day of June 4th was merely a rear-guard action, to cover the retirement of the main force. Consequently, no matter what course Lord Roberts might have pursued, he could not have captured more than 1,500 prisoners. But the British commander did not know the state of affairs in Pretoria, and was led to believe that he would be opposed by the concentrated commandoes of General Botha and General de la Rey. Had such been the case his tactics would have allowed the escape of the entire force, as they did allow the slipping away of the rear guard. Had the field marshal delayed the attack of the main body for another day, or even two days, and allowed his mounted troops to get well into the rear, he could have cut off the retreat of the burghers. Instead, his premature frontal attack in force compelled them to retire under the cover of darkness long before their flanks were even threatened.

The miscarriage seemed like another case of British superciliousness towards their foe, which has repeatedly cost them so dear. After Bloemfontein the Boers had been kept so on the run that, to some minds, the employment of costly strategy on the part of the British might seem needless. They were in such tremendous force compared to the number of Boers opposing them that they rolled down over the veldt, a flood of khaki, irresistible in power. If they were opposed at one point of the advance, they merely kept on marching either side of the threatened position, until the flanking movement compelled the Boers to withdraw. The British did not seem to attempt actually surrounding and cutting off the retreat of the Boers, but were content with merely driving them back. The inadequacy of this plan was clearly manifest after Pretoria had been reached, for the force of their enemy was not in the least broken. On the contrary, the burghers showed conclusively that they were the strategic masters of the situation. Nothing but their masterly movements saved them from defeat and capture early in the war; and after Pretoria, when the London press began to call the Boers guerrillas, wandering brigands, and outlaws, there was just as clever strategy shown in the manner in which the Transvaal and Orange Free State leaders handled their men as though a mighty army had been at their command.

I asked General Botha why he did not concentrate all the forces in the field, so that he could make some decided stands. He answered: “We have talked the matter well over, and have made a definite form of campaign for the remaining portion of the war. Should we gather all our fighting men together into one force we could undoubtedly make some very pretty fights; but there would be only a few of them, for with the overwhelming force against us they could soon surround any position we could take, and there would be an end to our cause. As it is, we will split up into four or five commands, continue operations independently of each other, but keep absolutely in touch, and confer on the general plan of campaign at all times. It took your colonial troops seven years of that sort of work to gain independence against the same country, and we can do the same thing. We can fight seven years without being crushed, and should we gain our independence at the end of that time we would consider the time well spent.”

General Botha pointed to the facts that his troops were in better condition and had greater resources than Washington’s ever had; that there was more accord among his burghers than there was among the American colonial troops; and that, more important still, the entire population of the country was in absolute sympathy with the cause. This shows why a campaign can develop into what the British call guerrilla warfare and still be a part of a splendid strategical plan. In my mind, the operations in South Africa cannot be called guerrilla warfare so long as the Boer commands of 3,000 or 4,000 men move on regular marches, with heavy and light artillery, baggage-trains, and assisted by signal corps. From these commands small detachments are sent out for the various duties of blowing up a bridge or a culvert, attacking a force sufficiently small in number, or capturing a supply train. All of these operations are done under a system of regular order, and are not, as the British reports would lead us to believe, the work of mere bands of robbers or outlaws.

The strategy shown in these movements, and, in the main, the tactics and their execution, have been of a superlative order, although not developed from military text-books, but rather from the natural brain of a lion-hunter. It is to be regretted that more of the movements have not been chronicled, so that the military world might have been benefited by a study of these operations.

The facts that at last the British overwhelmed the Boers with their inexhaustible supplies of troops, and that the general strategy of the campaign proved successful, do not justify their careless tactics in the routine of the campaign. If matched against a larger and more aggressive army than that of the Boers, this characteristic carelessness might have been very fatal.

Here is a curious instance of this inexplicable heedlessness. The first important engagement after the occupation of Pretoria was the battle of Diamond Hill, about sixteen miles north of the capital, and it was fought by Lieutenant-General French, who commanded the cavalry division. His command had been very much weakened by drafts upon it for duty about army headquarters in Pretoria, so that he did not have more than 3,000 men at his call. This cavalry command, with a few guns, went out to ascertain the position taken by the retreating burghers. They found them strongly entrenched on a range of hills commanding the valley through which the British were to advance. The battle lasted three days, the fighting going on all that time. General French told me, on the third night, when we were at dinner, that it had been the hardest fight he had had during the campaign, and that he doubted whether he could hold the position until noon the next day, when Lord Roberts had promised him reënforcements.

General French was surrounded on three sides with what he said was an overwhelming force of the enemy, and yet he did not station any pickets or outposts even on his headquarters camp. Captain Beech brought a wagon-train into the center of the camp, through the lines, without so much as a challenge. The bitter cold of the high veldt kept me awake that night, and about three o’clock in the morning I heard horsemen riding through the lines. They took no especial care to keep their movements secret, so I imagined them to be friends, but lay waiting for the expected challenge. None came, and the party of horse rode nearer and nearer until it came quite up to General French’s headquarters, near a little farmhouse. Dawn was just breaking, and in the gray light I recognized Captain Beech as he rode up to headquarters. Captain Beech is an old campaigner in experience if not in years, and such negligence of the most ordinary and primary needs of campaigning seemed to him outrageous. He expressed himself with highly-colored vehemence.