In the autumn of this year, 1795, intelligence had been received that the war between France and Spain had terminated, and that the Spanish part of the island had been ceded to the French republic in perpetuity. It was stipulated, however, that so many of the inhabitants as should feel disposed to depart from the island to reside in the dominions of the King of Spain, should be permitted to remove or dispose of their property, and that the space of one year should be granted to them for that purpose.
About the end of this year the termination of the operations in Flanders having placed troops at the disposal of the British government, Brigadier-General Howe arrived with about seven thousand men at Cape Nicolas Mole. From the extent of this force a great deal might have been accomplished had they arrived at an earlier stage of the proceedings in the island, but the subjugation of the colony had now become extremely difficult, if not altogether impracticable. They attempted but little, and becoming languid and spiritless from sickness and disease, whilst the enemy were increasing in numbers, as well as in vigour and activity, the little that was undertaken proved unsuccessful.
It was not until the month of March, 1797, that any active operations were recommenced; when General Simcoe landed to take the command, an officer who had been selected by his government for the important trust, from his known talents and tried experience. He began his arduous undertaking by examining the whole line of defence, and lost no time in making every judicious arrangement for resuming offensive operations. It was also about the same time that the negro Toussaint L’Ouverture appeared invested by the republican government of France with the high rank of General-in-Chief of the Armies of St. Domingo. To this very extraordinary personage the British general was destined first to be opposed; and from the system of insurrectional warfare which had been pursued, the general found he had to combat with an antagonist of no ordinary capacity and courage. Wary and exceedingly cautious, well acquainted with the strength of the British force and the experience of their commanders, Toussaint made no effort beyond that of menacing the position of Mirebalais, before which he appeared with an almost overwhelming force. The British force at that point not being sufficient to oppose his progress, retired thence through the plains of Cul de Sac into Port au Prince, abandoning the whole of the country through which they retreated, and from which, from its fertility, the enemy were enabled to obtain abundance of provisions. By this movement also all communication with the Spanish part of the island was cut off.
To the southward, however, the operations were more favourable to the British. The negroes were driven from every post which they had occupied in the neighbourhood of Port au Prince, and Rigaud at the head of his mulatto force was defeated at Irois. Nearly at the same time Toussaint attacked St. Marc’s, but was obliged to retire with considerable loss, leaving a great many of his followers prisoners.
Notwithstanding these partial successes the British cause in the island seemed on the wane, and their force diminishing from a variety of concurrent circumstances, no attempt was afterwards made to advance against the enemy; but measures were adopted to guard against any surprise or any attack which their opponents contemplated upon those positions, in the line of defence, which were considered to be vulnerable. In the interim, and during the existence of this irregular warfare, General Simcoe, finding that in the present condition of his forces nothing could be undertaken with the least probability of success, and that to remain within his line of defence was imperative, left the island about the month of August, when the command devolved on Major-General Whyte. Finally, however, the Honourable Brigadier-General Maitland succeeded, to whom was left the important duty of making the most beneficial arrangements for evacuating the island, which his situation could command. And when it is considered that that gallant officer (who did not arrive until April, 1798,) took the command of the British forces under circumstances of extreme difficulty and discomfiture, at the moment of disasters and distress, the termination of the contest, the subsequent truce and negotiations with Toussaint, although making some concession, were called for by considerations of overwhelming expediency. These negotiations gave up the whole of the British possessions, and their colonial black troops (for whom a very large sum of money was paid to the very persons who afterwards took arms against them) to the black general, Toussaint, in the name of the French republic, and thus ended an enterprise from which no advantage resulted either to the ex-colonists or to the interests of Great Britain.
It is not my province to enter into a discussion of the merits of the enterprise into which Great Britain had been led, nor shall I venture to censure the undertaking on the one hand, or to applaud it on the other. It was commenced unquestionably at an unfavourable period, when the government of England had to contend, not only against the gigantic power of the French republic in Europe, but against the revolutionary spirit which had manifested itself at that time in England. Involved, therefore, as she was at the time of the emigration of the French agents from St. Domingo in disputes abroad and in domestic feuds at home, it is not surprising that those efforts were not made which the planters had anticipated, and which they were led to expect from the pledges which had been given to M. Charmilly, who had been the organ of those planters, and who, it is to be feared, was too sanguine in his representations of the unanimity which prevailed amongst them. I should be disposed to think favourably of the conduct of M. Charmilly had I not received the most unquestionable information, that his communications were much too highly coloured, and that his zeal for the cause of his colony somewhat exceeded that which ought to have been evinced by a discreet and prudent negotiator. The British general was without doubt deceived as to the strength of the revolters and as to the disposition of the planters; and the unanimity said to have existed amongst them, was most manifestly negatived by subsequent events, in which intrigue and treachery superseded fidelity and honour. M. Charmilly, however, in the opinions of many, may not have subjected himself to censure by his conduct; he may have been actuated by the best of motives, and have thought, at the time, that by exhibiting a favourable side of the picture the impression would be likely to succeed; but the best informed persons, with whom I have had opportunities of conversing on the subject, have given it as their unbiassed sentiment, that had not the disposition of the colony been too favourably represented, the British cabinet would either never have entered into the contest, or have undertaken it with their accustomed promptitude and known vigour; they would never have left any thing to chance, nor have depended so much upon extensive cooperation.
However much inclined Great Britain might have been to seize a favourable moment for dismembering republican France of her colonial possessions, yet I think she would have paused before she commenced any offensive operations against St. Domingo in its then insurrectional state, had she not been led by the most specious arguments to believe that the object was attainable without any great efforts; for although the slaves were in open rebellion, still they, as well as the mulattoes, were divided against themselves, and that an interposing power would inevitably turn the scale, and eventually succeed in restoring tranquillity, and finally the conquest of the whole colony. That the cabinet of England had been influenced by the accounts laid before it of the state of St. Domingo, needs no further argument than this, that the force sent was quite inadequate for the accomplishment of the object, which certainly would not have happened, had the descent upon that island received that deliberation which was usually given to similar operations in the time of war.
Before I proceed any further in my remarks, it may not be irrelevant to shew who were the parties engaged in this civil warfare and general havoc in the colony, for I find only one or two who have written before me who have been sufficiently clear and explicit on this point; and it is probable that I may not be quite so explanatory as the subject requires, but I shall, I trust, succeed in dissipating some of the cloud in which the whole seems to have been enveloped.
At the commencement of the revolution in the colony, the party that first appeared was composed of those white inhabitants who were tainted with republicanism, those of the mulattoes or gens de couleur of property who imbibed the same principles, and others of the people of colour, who had no stake in the country, but embraced similar opinions respecting liberty and equality. Their opponents consisted of the white inhabitants and persons of colour who adhered to the old form of government. To the former party, in the course of time, were added the revolted negroes, who had doubtless been instigated by them, and after the promulgation of the decree declaring a general emancipation, they were joined by the greater proportion, if not by the whole of that class. To the latter party a few only of the mulattoes, and a very small body of negroes, remained attached; added to which were the British forces which, from the end of the year 1793 to the evacuation in 1798, at different periods were landed.
To strengthen the former party, and to weaken the latter, the decrees of the national assembly of France materially contributed, whilst the proceedings of the general colonial and provincial assemblies, instead of giving to the latter any support, had a contrary effect, by inducing many of the people of colour, who had espoused it, to hoist the national cockade, and become active members of the republican party, thereby giving the cause of the royalists a fatal blow. It will be perceived that most of these proceedings of the two parties in the contest occurred before the British forces had been called in; and that the emancipation of the slaves was simultaneous with their arrival and an act of the French commissioners to strengthen the national cause against the royalists and the British. Now as the agents or emigrants of the royalist party who had gone to England, and as the negotiations of M. Charmilly took place at the very period when the hopes of his party rested upon so insecure a foundation, it seems to me something like deception was practised, and that the British government were not correctly informed of the actual state of the cause which they were engaging to support; and it is under this impression, an impression founded upon the authority of persons who were actually engaged in all the scenes of active operations which took place from the first arrival of the British to the termination of their proceedings under the Honourable Brigadier-General Maitland, that I venture to charge the French planters and their party with that want of unanimity which M. Charmilly, their accredited representative, assured the British commander displayed itself through most parts of the colony.