Whatever might have been the instructions given to the captain-general Le Clerc by his master, that officer seems to have acted with a degree of precipitancy that must be condemned. Had the French ruler been ever so confident in the success of an enterprise as the one in which he had engaged, as a soldier and as a general who had commanded in a series of campaigns, he must have left something to the discretion of the officer whom he had appointed to conduct it, and not have insisted on an implicit obedience to instructions that could only have been given from a vague knowledge of the scene on which such enterprise was to be carried into effect. The success of most offensive operations depends in a great measure on the local information which a commanding officer acquires on his arrival at the point at which such operations are to commence; and a great deal, therefore, must, I imagine, be left to his judgment and discretion, without fettering him with instructions from which he cannot deviate, however injudicious and inefficient they may become, from the local obstacles with which he has to contend. Bonaparte himself, I believe, never acted but as circumstances pointed out, paying but little attention to the directions which, from time to time, he received from the executive government of France. I think it, therefore, not unfair to draw from this the inference that, on sending out his brother-in-law, Le Clerc, to command the expedition to St. Domingo, he vested in him the power to act as circumstances might require, and as prudence and discretion might dictate.
After the outrage which he committed on the unfortunate Toussaint and his family, the captain-general began to deliberate on the organization of a new form of government, and about the end of June, 1802, he issued his regulations for that purpose; but he had forgotten that the treacherous conduct, of which he had so recently been guilty, remained unrevenged, and that the people would not submit to it with impunity, but resort to measures of retaliation until they had satiated themselves for the atrocious deed. These regulations had certainly nothing in them new; they were merely those of Toussaint, re-modelled as it were, but they were prematurely issued, for they only tended to inflame the more, and to hasten that crisis which began to threaten the French cause in the colony.
No sooner was the cruel seizure of Toussaint known, than Dessalines, Christophe, and Clerveaux flew to arms, collected their scattered forces, called the cultivators and others to join their standard, to revenge the outrage committed on their chief, and to defend themselves against the designs of the French general. In a few days, they found themselves at the head of a large body of troops, armed and well equipped, and determined on a most desperate struggle for liberty, and either to expel the French or perish in the attempt. The French troops, on the other hand, were hourly diminishing by various diseases incident to the climate. The officers were dying daily, and others sunk into an irrecoverable despondency; and a disaffected spirit had manifested itself amongst them, through which not only the privates and subaltern officers deserted their standards, but even generals followed the example. The scenes of carnage and destruction which took place are said to have shocked humanity, and the atrocities of the French exceeded so much the executions of their black opponents, that the latter seem to have entitled themselves to the character of being merciful when compared with the tortures inflicted by the former.
The circumstance of the introduction of bloodhounds I have heard spoken of by some who were engaged in the war, and they have all declared that many of the statements of the cruelties said to have been committed by them were unfounded. They were brought it is true, but the blacks were prepared for them; and although in some instances in which they were tried they tore some persons, and absolutely devoured a child or two, yet they were found to be ineffectual for the object for which they were intended, as they were shot in great numbers, so that at last they had but few to use, and those which were left were rendered useless, from the negroes having been always prepared to meet them. I do not mean by this that it at all lessened the enormity of such an act, on the part of the French, because it was not successful; on the contrary, the ferocity of it stands unmitigated, although it proved abortive.
In the plains of the Cape, and in the city, the massacres by the French were beyond the powers of description; and the least that can be said of the conduct of the agents of the French government is, that they must have been bereft of all feelings of humanity, that they were of the worst and most debased of the dregs of the French people, and unworthy to become the associates of even the untutored savage. The latter may plead nature for his savage propensities, but the former has nothing to offer to lessen the magnitude of his crimes, or to efface the recollection of his unheard-of cruelties.
Whilst these scenes of carnage and destruction were at their height, the French were daily losing their positions, and their force was constantly diminishing from the effects of the pestilence which raged through the whole army. The general-in-chief, who had for some time been in an impaired state of health, began visibly to sink under the ravages of disease, and on the 1st of November he breathed his last, leaving in the memory of his opponents a name blackened by the worst of crimes, unatoned for by one single virtue.
The command of the army now devolved on General Rochambeau, who, to say the least of him, was a worthy successor of Le Clerc, and possessed similar virtues. To him, therefore, was it left to pursue that barbarous policy which had been introduced by his predecessor, and which only tended to inflame the ardour of the black troops, without in any way promoting the good of the French cause. Rochambeau certainly took the command at a time when it must have appeared that the object of the expedition had failed, and that the prolongation of the contest would be attended with no favourable result. Opposed to an enemy, whose force was daily increasing, and whose ardour was unabated and resolution unshaken, he had but little hopes of accomplishing any thing beyond acting on the defensive, until such reinforcements should arrive as would enable him to act on the offensive with some degree of effect; but, even then, there seemed not the remotest possibility of his being able to retrieve the positions which had been lost, and place his forces in such security as might enable him to provide for a retreat, should subsequent disasters make such an alternative absolutely necessary.
In the early part of 1803, nothing decisive was done on either side. Rochambeau and Dessalines came in contact, and a battle ensued, in which the latter was successful; but the scene of carnage and massacres which followed is much too painful to admit of being detailed. The French general, who took about five hundred prisoners, put them all to death, forgetting or careless of the fate of his own soldiers who were in the power of his enemy. The latter retaliated; and the next morning at day break, on as many gibbets, there were exhibited five hundred French officers and men, sacrificed through the savage impetuosity of their general.
The war having broken out between England and France in July, a British squadron appeared off Cape François and blockaded the harbour, thereby rendering to the blacks a most important service, which in a great measure contributed to accelerate the expulsion of the French. This squadron precluded the possibility of the French receiving any supplies from the Spanish port, and the garrison and inhabitants of the city were therefore reduced to the most lamentable extremities. Every thing that could be found, horses, mules, asses, all had been consumed, and they were at last obliged to feed upon dogs. It is said “that the French were obliged for several weeks to subsist on those very bloodhounds, which they had procured for the purpose of hunting down the negroes.”
The city was at last reduced to the most melancholy state from the effects of famine and disease, the besiegers making great exertions to intercept any supplies that might be on their way for the relief of the besieged. All hopes of eluding the vigilance of his enemies having at length vanished, and extensive preparations having been made to take the city by storm, the French commander-in-chief began to see that there would be a necessity for offering to capitulate. Dessalines having received these proposals, agreed to them, and the articles were signed on the 19th of November. These articles were certainly highly favourable to the French, for they provided for the security of private property, and that all their sick and wounded should be carefully attended by the blacks, and afterwards conveyed to France in vessels bearing a neutral flag. For the evacuation ten days were allowed, and Rochambeau attempted a ruse de guerre, by which he hoped to evade the English squadron then blockading the city, but in this he totally failed. He thought that the strong and stormy winds which prevailed during the autumnal months, might blow off the English ships, and enable the French squadron to steal away unperceived; but the English commodore saw the design of the French general, and consequently increased his vigilance, and began to provide against the attempt meditated by the French commander.