It is necessary that I should make a few remarks on the subject of Haytian jurisprudence, and endeavour to shew my readers what description of personages preside over the civil and criminal departments of justice, as well as explain what sort of an individual a Haytian justice of the peace is.
I think that every person who has had an occasion to visit Hayti, and has been an observer of the way in which justice is generally dispensed, will accord with me in the opinion that there may be exhibited the symbol of justice, but that equity is never dealt out in spirit and in substance; and that whenever it becomes unavoidable that recourse should be had to the courts of law for a decision on a disputed question, it is ten to one in favour of that suitor who is the most liberal in his bribes to the judges. It is a fact which cannot be controverted, that justice in Hayti may be bought; and those who are appointed to administer it, cannot escape the imputation of making the chair of justice the vehicle of corruption. Justice never flows from a pure and unvitiated source. The civil and criminal codes of Hayti do certainly provide for its due administration, and for the protection of property and individuals against molestation; but there is a laxity in the courts which deserves the severest reprobation, and calls for a prompt remedy. There is so much procrastination, and such inconceivable dilatoriness in the officers of the courts, that cases of a civil nature, although of no importance and capable of being decided at the first glance, are oftentimes heard and reheard, considered and reconsidered, before any judgment is given; and those who may be committed for trial for an alleged offence, are alike subjected to the tardy proceedings of the law, and the innocent often suffers, by an unjust imprisonment before trial, equal in duration to that which is awarded to an offender after his conviction. The supineness and apathy of the judges are the subjects of general condemnation, and their want of discernment and discrimination renders it frequently necessary to reverse or suspend the execution of their judgments.
The law establishing a trial by jury in criminal cases passed the legislative body, I believe, in 1826, but I have not heard of any instance in which it has been acted upon, nor do I think, from the general incapacity of the people, that it will be acted upon. If it be, I cannot answer for the consequences that might ensue in all cases of crime, where a long investigation of the different allegations which constitute it took place. Amongst the people who would be thought eligible to be summoned on a jury by the court, few only, if any, would be found capable of determining upon the guilt or innocence of the party accused, and those probably would be led by their passions to convict or acquit, without the least reference to the charge or the evidence adduced. The trial by jury in Hayti may be a great blessing to the people when they are taught to estimate its importance, as the means of preserving their rights and liberties. But as they, at the present moment, know but little of liberty but the name, and have but a very superficial knowledge of what constitutes their rights, they are not fit to be trusted with the performance of so important a duty as to decide upon the innocence or guilt of their fellow men. Such being the state of knowledge, I feel confident that the trial by jury will not be adopted in practice until the people become more enlightened, and knowledge be more generally diffused throughout the country.
The court of cassation, which is the court of appeal from the courts civil and criminal, exceeds, in the tardiness of its proceedings, all the other legal institutions of the country. There is no such thing as an equitable decision emanating from the judges, for they are under the surveillance of the president, and before they give their judgment, have recourse to him to know whether their opinions meet his approbation. If he concur, they give judgment accordingly, but should he differ, and the question be one in which the state is a party, or any state officer, then they are obliged to reconsider the case, and to see if they have not taken a wrong view of the question at issue. After a short period,—for it is incumbent on them to preserve their characters as judges in equity,—they pronounce judgment with great solemnity, and with as much appearance of that conscious rectitude of proceeding as if their investigation of the subject had been the most unbiassed, and their decision founded on the purest principles of law and justice.
The proceedings in the lower courts are somewhat extraordinary in civil cases. If a creditor institute a suit against a debtor in one district, and obtain a verdict, the defendant is permitted to appeal from the sentence to the court of the adjoining district, and so on in succession throughout the whole series of district courts; and if the last confirm the judgment of the first, the defendant can then move it into the court of cassation, and in the event of that court confirming the judgment of the courts below, he may appeal from it to the president, and apply for a new trial in those courts, so that the contest proceeds ad infinitum, however clear may be the proof adduced of the debt being just. These unjust and inequitable acts of the judges and president are common; and foreigners who are obliged to resort to legal means for the recovery of their debts, find it attended with so much procrastination and expense, in addition to the uncertainty of the result, that they mostly wait the effect of time for the recovery of their debts, rather than have recourse to law.
Another most extraordinary, and I call it a most unexampled power over the courts, is vested in the hands of an officer denominated the grand judge. He can stay execution after the judgment is confirmed as long as he may deem it adviseable; and although at the time the party is in possession of means to liquidate the debt, he frequently gives him one, two, or three years to pay it. In the mean time, the debtor may dispose of his property in a clandestine manner, the creditor being left to lament not only the loss of his debt, but the heavy charges to which he had been put through the whole of the delays and chicanery of the law, and the weakness and unfairness of the judges.
The British merchants in Hayti have been subjected to the most intolerable impositions, through the unjust proceedings of the courts of justice; but it is probable that some check will now be put to these iniquitous and nefarious proceedings. The consul-general is too wary, and too sensible of the evil, not to be on the alert; and although he may not have the power to remedy the past, I am confident he will prevent a recurrence of it in future. His known perseverance and determination have shaken the courts already, and his presence there will, I think, insure to his countrymen that justice for which they have so long sought in vain.
The judges form perhaps the most extraordinary selection of personages that could ever have been found in any country; and their avocations previously to their elevation to the judicial seat, have never been professional. The grand judge, Mons. Freshnell, is an infirm man of colour, nearly eighty years of age. Until he arrived at middle age, he had been actively and successfully employed in the marauding career of a pirate. His legal knowledge is just what might have been expected from his previous avocations. He is a modest old man, it is true; for when his present appointment was offered to him he declined it, as he said himself, from his incompetency to fill it, and to perform the duties which it required. Boyer however insisted on his accepting it, and remarked “that it did not require talent or legal knowledge to execute the duties of it, that he had only to do as he was directed by such orders as he might receive from the bureau of government”; so that, in fact, the first law officer of the republic is a mere tool of the government, possessed neither of capacity nor power. He is a mere instrument of the president, to move and act as he may be directed.
The chief judge of the court of cassation is a black, and, like that race in general, exceedingly vain both of his talents and high station. He is a small shopkeeper, but generally called a merchant (negociant), and in that way he is more respectable than in his judicial capacity. The other judges of this court are all engaged in some mercantile or similar calling, and exhibit neither the dignity of expounders of the law, nor the grave nor placid exterior demeanour of men on whom devolves the important duty of distributing justice with an equal hand.
Monsieur Dieu Donney, chief judge of the lower courts, is a man of colour, and may be considered as possessing some little knowledge in the laws of the republic, and would, in all probability, do justice were he permitted to do so. He is said to be a great opponent to the practice of suspending judgments when ready for execution, and has declared it, in the presence of the president, to be unjust and unconstitutional, and that before long it would inevitably be the means of driving all foreigners from the country, for it gave countenance to the fraudulent designs of those who were in the habit of obtaining a large amount in goods on credit, disposing of them immediately for less than they actually cost, for the purpose of realizing the money and investing it in lands, when they knew that in the first place they could, by the delays of the court, prevent judgment being taken for two years, and after judgment, might obtain three years for its liquidation; and in fact, perhaps in the end, never pay at all, because in the interim they might dispose of, or make over their property to another, in trust, and laugh at their creditor with impunity.