2. Another objection to the present form of the Trinity is, that it is not only scholastic, or purely intellectual, but that it is also negative. It is not even a positive doctrine. It is often charged against Unitarianism, that it is a mere negation; and, in one sense, the charge is well founded. Unitarianism is a negation, so far as it is a mere piece of reasoning against Orthodoxy; but, as asserting the divine Unity, it is very positive, But the doctrine of the Trinity is a mere negation, as it is usually held; because it is an empty form of denial. It only can be defined or expressed negatively. The three Persons are not substances, on the one hand; nor qualities, on the other hand. It is not Sabellianism, nor is it Arianism. Every term connected with the Trinity has been selected, not to express a truth, but to avoid an error. The term “one essence” was chosen in order to exclude Arianism; the term “three Persons,” or subsistences, was chosen in order to avoid Sabellianism.

Because the doctrine is thus a negation, it has failed of its chief use. It has become exclusive; whereas, when stated truly, as a positive truth, it would become inclusive. Rightly [pg 430] stated, it would bind together all true religion in one harmonious whole, comprehending in its universal sweep everything true in natural religion, everything true in reason, and uniting them in vital union, without discord and without confusion. Every manifestation which God has made of himself in nature, in Christ, and in the human soul, would be accepted and vitally recognized by Christianity, which comes, not to destroy, but to fulfil. The doctrine of the Trinity would be the highest form of reconciliation or atonement,—reconciling all varieties in one great harmony; reconciling the natural and supernatural, law and grace, time and eternity, fate and freedom.

But, before illustrating this, we must consider further some of the objections to the common form of the doctrine.

3. It is also charged against the doctrine of the Trinity, “that it is a contradiction in terms, and therefore essentially incredible.” To this it is replied, that it would be a contradiction if God were called Three in the same sense in which he is called One; but not otherwise. The answer is perfectly satisfactory; and we therefore proceed to ask, In what sense is he called Three, and in what sense is he called One? The answer is, The Unity is of essence, or substance: the Trinity is of persons. This answer, again, is satisfactory, provided we know what is meant by these two terms. But the difficulty is to know what is meant by the word “person.” We are expressly informed, that this term is not used in its usual sense; for, if it were, it would divide the essence, and three Persons would be the same as three Gods. On the other hand, we are told that it means more than the three characters or manifestations. Here lies the difficulty, and the whole of the rational difficulty, in the doctrine of the Trinity. It is all on the side of the Triad. When we ask, What do you mean by “the three”? there can be given but three answers,—two of them distinct, and one indistinct. These answers are, (1.) We mean three [pg 431] somethings, which we cannot define; (2.) We mean three Persons, like Peter, James, and John; (3.) We mean three manifestations, characters, or modes of being. Let us consider these three answers.

(a.) “The three Persons are three somethings, which cannot be defined. It is a mystery. It is above reason. There is mystery in everything, and there must be mystery in the Deity.” So Augustine said, long ago, “We say three Persons, not because we have anything to say, but because we want to say something.”[85] But if one uses the phrase “three Persons,” and refuses to define it positively, merely defining it negatively, saying, “It does not mean this, and it does not mean that, and I don't know what it does mean,” he avoids, it is true, the difficulties, and escapes the objections; but he does it by giving up the article of faith. No one can deny that there may be three unknown distinctions in the divine nature; but no one can be asked to believe in them, till he is told what they are. To say, therefore, that the Trinity is a mystery, is to abandon it as an article of faith, and make of it only a subject of speculation. We avoid the contradiction; but we do it by relinquishing the doctrine.

This fact is not sufficiently considered by Trinitarians. They first demand of us to believe the doctrine of the Trinity, and, when pressed to state distinctly the doctrine, retire into the protection of mystery, and decline giving any distinct account of it. Now, no human being ever denied the existence of mysteries connected with God, and nature, and all life. To assure us, therefore, that such mysteries exist, is slightly superfluous. But, on the other hand, no human being ever believed, or could believe, a mystery, any more than he could see anything invisible or hear anything inaudible. To believe a doctrine, the first condition is, that all its terms shall be distinct and intelligible.

(b.) The second answer to the question is, “We mean, by Persons, three Persons, like Peter, James, and John.” According to this answer, the Trinity remains, but the Unity disappears. This answer leaves the Persons distinct, but the Unity indistinct. The Persons are not confounded; but the essence is divided. The Tri-personality is maintained, but at the expense of the Unity. In fact, this answer gives us Tritheism, or three Gods, whose unity is only an entire agreement of feeling and action. But this answer we may set aside as unorthodox, no less than unscriptural.

(c.) Having thus disposed of each other possible answer, there remains only that which makes of the three Persons three revelations or manifestations of God, or representations of God. This answer avoids all the difficulties. It avoids that of contradiction; as we do not say that God is one in the same sense in which he is three, but in a different sense. It avoids the objection of obscurity; for it is a distinct statement. It avoids the objection of Tritheism; for it leaves the Unity untouched. Moreover, it is a real Trinity, and not merely nominal. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are not merely three different names for the same thing, but they indicate three different revelations, three different views which God has given of his character, which, taken together, constitute the total divine representation. It remains, therefore, simply to ask, Is this view a true one? Is there any foundation for it in Scripture, in reason, and in Christian consciousness, the three sources of our knowledge of the truth?

§ 4. The Trinity of Manifestations founded in the Truth of Things.