Under this authority President Grant organized a Commission composed of Messrs. George William Curtis, Joseph H. Blackfan, and David C. Cox. But the Commissioners soon found that Congress was indisposed to clothe them with the requisite power, and that public opinion did not yet demand the reform. Their good intentions were therefore frustrated and the Commission was unable to move forward to practical results. When President Hayes came into power he sought to make reform in the Civil Service by directing competitive examinations for certain positions, and by forbidding the active participation of office-holders in political campaigns. The defect of this course was that it rested upon an Executive order, and did not have the permanency of law. The next President might or might not continue the reform, and all that was gained in the four years could at once be abandoned.
The settled judgment of discreet men in both political parties is adverse to the custom of changing non-political officers on merely political grounds. They believe that it impairs the efficiency of the public service, lowers the standard of political contests, and brings reproach upon the Government and the people. So decided is this opinion among the great majority of Republicans and among a very considerable number of Democrats, that the former method of appointment will always meet with protest and cannot be permanently re-established. The inauguration of a new system is hindered somewhat by an honest difference of opinion touching the best methods of selecting subordinate officers. Competitive examination is the methods most warmly advocated, and on its face appears the fairest; yet every observing man knows that it does not always secure the results most to be desired. Nothing is vouched for more frequently by chiefs of Government bureaus, than that certain clerks who upon competitive examination would stand at the head do in point of efficiency and usefulness stand at the foot.
Another point of difference is in regard to the power of instant removal, many of the most pronounced reformers of the civil service holding that power to be essential, and believing that it will not be abused so long as the removing power cannot arbitrarily appoint the successor. The matured opinion of others is that a tenure of office definitely fixed for a term of years, during which the incumbent cannot be disturbed except upon substantial written charges, will secure a better class of officials. They hold that a subordinate officer is stripped of his manhood by the consciousness that he may at any moment be removed at the whim or caprice of some one superior in station. It too often brings sycophants into the Government Departments, and excludes men of pride and character. On the question of a life tenure there is a similar division of opinion, which logically follows the two positions just stated. A life tenure cannot be adopted as a rule, unless pensions for a civil list shall follow.
There is also a belief with many who are most anxious to improve the civil service, that the political influence of Government patronage, as applied to the whole country, has been constantly misunderstood and therefore exaggerated. At certain places where the customs and postal services are large the appointing power can no doubt wield great influence. New-York City is the strongest illustration of this; and in less degree a similar influence is recognized at all the large cities of the country, especially the cities of the seaboard. But even at those points the political influence of the Federal patronage is far less than that of the municipal patronage. During the many years that the patronage, both of National and State governments, has been in the hands of the Republicans in New York, the municipal patronage, steadily wielded by the Democrats, has been far more potential in controlling elections. And throughout the United States to-day the patronage controlled by municipal governments largely outweighs in the aggregate that of the General and State Governments at all points where they come into conflict.
Towards the close of President Hayes' Administration the total number of men connected with the Postal service of the United States was about 64,000. Excluding mail contractors and mail messengers (whose service is allotted to the lowest bidder), the number subject to political influence was nearly 49,000. Of these, 5,400 had salaries under $10 per annum each; 19,400 others had salaries under $100 per annum each; 11,500 others had salaries under $500 per annum each; 8,100 others had salaries under $1,000 per annum each; 3,300 other had salaries under $1,600 per annum each; 700 other had salaries under $2,000 per annum each; 400 others had salaries under $3,000 per annum each; 84 had salaries under $4,000 per annum each. Only 14 had salaries of $4,000, and 2 (the Postmaster-General and the postmaster at New York) had $8,000 per annum each. In a majority of the Congressional districts of the United States there is scarcely any patronage known except that of postmasters; and when more than one-half of the total number of Postmasters have salaries under $100 per annum each, the political influence derived therefrom cannot be great.
The remaining officers of the United States were at the same period about 21,000 in number. The mass of these were in the Customs and Internal Revenue, and in the various Executive Departments at Washington. They had a larger average of salary than those engaged in the Postal Service. But one-half of the whole number had less than $1,000 per annum each, and less than one-third had salaries in excess of $2,000 per annum. Large salaries under the Federal Government are extremely few in number. Excluding the Federal Judiciary, whose members are appointed for life, and excluding senators and representatives, who are elected in their respective States, there are not more than one hundred and fifty officials under the National Government whose respective salaries equal or exceed $5,000 per annum. The emolument cannot be regarded as large in a country that opens so many avenues to fortune, and the places of this highest grade cannot be regarded as numerous when (in 1879-81) there were not more than three of them to every million inhabitants of the Republic.
While these figures demonstrate that the civil service of the United States is moderately paid, they also demonstrate that it can be more easily modified than if the emoluments were greater. A correct apprehension of an evil is the first step towards its remedy, and it is a serious mistake to apply to the interior States and the rural districts the imputations and accusations which justly lie against the service where of necessity a large number of officers are brought together. If lack of zeal is found in many sections of the country on this subject, it is because the people are never brought in contact with the evils, the abuses, and the corruptions which are well known to exist at points where the patronage is large, and where consequently many citizens are struggling for place.
No reform in the civil service will be valuable that does not release members of Congress from the care and the embarrassment of appointments; and no boon so great could be conferred upon senators and representatives as to relive them from the worry, the annoyance, and the responsibility which time and habit have fixed upon them in connection with the dispensing of patronage, all of which belong under the Constitution to the Executive. On the other hand the evil of which President Harrison spoke—the employment of the patronage by the Executive to influence legislation—is far the greatest abuse to which the civil service has ever been perverted. To separate the two great Departments of the Government, to keep each within its own sphere, will be an immeasurable advantage and will enhance the character and dignity of both. A non-political service will be secured when Congress shall be left to its legitimate functions, when the President shall not interfere therewith by the use of patronage, and when the responsibility of appointments shall rest solely with the Department to which the Organic Law of the Republic assigns it.
The rapid settlement of California, stimulated as it was by the discovery of gold, attracted a considerable immigration from China. Industrious and patient laborers, the Chinese were found useful to the pioneers; and they received for their work a degree of compensation many fold greater than they had ever realized in their native land, yet far below the average wages of an American laborer. The treaty relations between China and the United States, negotiated originally by Caleb Cushing in 1844 and afterwards by William B. Reed in 1858, did not contemplate the immigration into either country of citizens or subjects of the other. But in 1868 the treaty negotiated by Mr. Seward as Secretary of State and Mr. Burlingame, acting as Minister Plenipotentiary for China, recognized the right of the citizens of either country to visit or reside in the other, specially excluding in both, however, the right of naturalization.
Upon Mr. Seward's urgent request the following stipulation was inserted in the Fifth Article of the Treaty: "The high contracting parties join in reprobating any other than an entirely voluntary emigration. . . . They consequently agree to pass laws making it a penal offense for citizens of the United States or Chinese subjects to take Chinese subjects either to the United States or to any foreign country, or for a Chinese subject or citizen of the United States to take citizens of the United States to China or to any foreign country without their free and voluntary consent respectively."