Twenty Years of Congress, Volume 2 / From Lincoln to Garfield, with a Review of the Events Which Led to the Political Revolution of 1860

by James Gillespie Blaine

During the civil war the negro had, so far as he was able, helped the Union cause—his race contributing nearly a quarter of a million troops to the National service. If the Government had been influenced by a spirit of inhumanity, it could have made him terribly effective by encouraging insurrection and resistance on his part against his master. But no such policy was ever entertained in counsels controlled in the Cabinet by Seward and Chase and Stanton, or in operations in the field directed by Grant and Sherman and Sheridan. The negro was left to raise the crops that supplied the Confederate armies with bread, when a policy of cruelty, no worse than that of Andersonville and Belle Isle, might have made him a terror to the Southern population. The humane policy thus pursued would have been scorned by European warriors who have become the heroes of the world, but there is not a Northern man who does not look back with profound satisfaction upon the philanthropic determination that forbade the encouragement of a single insurrection, or the destruction of a single Southern life, except under the recognized and restricted laws of war.

Peace had now come, and the question was, whether the power of these four and a half millions of men should be continually used against the Northern States, against the loyalty which had saved the Union. Only three-fifths of their number, in the day when the Southern States were true to the Union, were admitted in the basis of representation. Should the disloyalty of the South which had failed to destroy the Government only by lack of power, be now rewarded by admitting the whole number of negroes into the basis of representation, and at the same time giving them no voice in the selection of representatives? Surely, if this were conceded, it would offer such a premium upon rebellion as no government guided by reason should confer; and, therefore, the question came by the instinct of justice, and with the precision of logic, to this point—the negro shall not be admitted into the basis of representation until he is himself empowered to participate in the choice of the representative. The North had hoped that the South would cordially accept the justice of this principle, but whether the South accepted it or not, the North resolved that it should become part of the organic law of the Republic.

As matter of historical truth which has been ingeniously and continuously, whether ignorantly or malignantly, perverted, this point cannot be too fully elaborated nor too forcibly emphasized:—The Northern states or the Republican party which then wielded the aggregate political power of the North, did not force negro suffrage upon the South or exact it as a condition of re-admitting the Southern States to the right and privilege of representation in Congress until after other conditions had been rejected by the South. The privilege of representation in Congress had in effect been tendered to the Southern States, upon the single condition that they would ratify the Fourteenth Amendment, which provided among other safeguards for the future, that so long as the negro was denied suffrage, he should not be included in the basis of Federal enumeration,—in other words, that the white men of the South should not be allowed to elect thirty-five or forty representatives to Congress, based on the negro population, in addition to the representatives duly apportioned to their own numbers. When all the Southern States—with the exception of Tennessee —declined to accept this basis of reconstruction by their rejection of the Fourteenth Amendment, they ought to have measured the consequences. The imperative question thenceforward was whether the loyal or the disloyal—the victorious Union or the defeated Confederacy —should prescribe the terms of Reconstruction.

The Northern States were thus compelled to consider whether they would unconditionally surrender to the Rebel element of the South or devise some other plan of reconstruction. At that point, in the order of time and in the order of events, and not until then, the just resolve was made by the Republicans to reconstruct the South on the basis of Loyalty, regardless or race or color. By refusing to co-operate with the Republicans in the work of rehabilitating their States, the Southern rebels forced the Northern States to make impartial suffrage the corner-stone of the restored Union. The South had its choice, and it deliberately and after fair warning decided to reject the magnanimous offer of the North and to insist upon an advantage in representation against which a common sense of justice revolted. The North, foiled in its original design of reconstruction by the perverse course of the South, was compelled, under the providence of the Ruler of Nations, to deal honestly and justly with the colored people. It was the insane folly of the South, in drawing the sword against the life of the Nation, that led irresistibly to the abolition of slavery. In a minor degree the folly was now repeated, in resisting the mode of Reconstruction first tendered, and thus forcing Congress to confer civil rights and suffrage upon the emancipated slave. A higher than human power controlled these great events. The wrath of man was made to praise the righteous works of God. Whatever were the deficiencies of the negro race in education, for the duties and responsibilities of citizenship, they had exhibited the one vital qualification of an instinctive loyalty, and as far as lay in their power a steadfast helpfulness to the cause of the National Union.

As the strife between the Executive and Legislative Departments had grown in intensity, President Johnson naturally sought to increase his own prestige by the use of the patronage of the Government. To this end he had already removed certain conspicuous Republicans from office, especially those who had been recommended and were now sustained by senators and representatives prominently engaged in frustrating his plan of reconstruction. The wonder in the political world was, that the President had not resorted to this form of attack more promptly, and pursued it more determinedly. His delay could be explained only by what was termed his talent for procrastination, and to a certain indecision which was fatal to him as an executive officer. But as the breach between himself and Congress widened, as the bitterness between the partisans of the Executive and of the Legislative Departments grew more intense, the belief became general, that, as soon as Congress should adjourn, there would be a removal of all Federal officers throughout the Union who were not faithful to the principles, and did not respond to the exactions, of the Administration. Outside of his Cabinet, the President was surrounded by the class of men who had great faith in the persuasive power of patronage, and the pressure upon him to resort to its use was constant and growing. Inside of his Cabinet, there were men of the same belief, but their power was somewhat neutralized by the attitude of Mr. Seward, whose faith always lay in the strength of ideas, and not in the use of force, or in the temptation of personal advantage. Mr. Seward's influence had constantly tended to hold the President back from a ruthless removal of the whole body of officers who declined to take part against the policy of Congress.

According to long-accepted construction of the Constitution, the President's power of removal was absolute and unqualified. Appointment to office could not be made unless the consent of the Senate was given in each and every case—but the consent of the Senate had not been held as requisite to the removal of an officer. The Constitution was silent upon the subject, and the existence or non-existence of power in the Senate to prevent a removal from office had been matter of dispute from the foundation of the Government. Those who contended for the right of the President to remove without consulting the Senate were fortified by the early legislation of Congress and the early practice of the Executive. The First Congress of the Union had provided for officers whose appointment depended upon confirmation by the Senate as required by the Constitution, but whose removal was left in explicit terms to the President alone. The decision to that effect was made after debate in which Madison had strenuously contended for that construction, and his high authority gave to the conclusion great weight with subsequent administrations of the Government. But there was undoubtedly a divided opinion in the Congress that conceded it, and that division has continued among Constitutional lawyers and statesmen to this day. In 1835 Mr. Webster, "after considering the question again and again," made this declaration in the Senate: "I am willing to say that, in my deliberate judgment, the original decision was wrong. I cannot but think that those who denied the power in 1789 had the best of the argument. It appears to me, after thorough and repeated and conscientious examination, that an erroneous interpretation was given to the Constitution in this respect by the decision of the First Congress. . . . I have the clearest conviction that the Convention which formed the Constitution looked to no other mode of displacing an officer than by impeachment or the regular appointment of another to the same place. . . . I believe it to be within the just power of Congress to reverse the decision of 1789, and I mean to hold myself at liberty to act hereafter on that question as the safety of the Government and of the Constitution may require."

Mr. Webster's words would have exerted a far wider influence upon public opinion if his argument had not been made under the pressure of a partisan excitement caused by General Jackson's removal of officers who were not in sympathy with the measures of his Administration. He was effectively though not directly answered by the venerable ex-President Madison. In October, 1834, in a letter to Edward Coles, Mr. Madison said, "The claim of the Senate on Constitutional ground to a share in removal as well as appointment of officers is in direct opposition to the uniform practice of the Government from its commencement. It is clear that the innovation would not only vary essentially the existing balance of power, but expose the Executive occasionally to a total inaction, and at all times to delays fatal to the due execution of the laws." A year later, and only a few months before his death, Mr. Madison in a letter to Charles Francis Adams thus repeated his views: "The claims for the Senate of a share in the removal from office, and for the Legislature an authority to regulate its tenure, have had powerful advocates. I must still think, however, that the text of the Constitution is best interpreted by reference to the tripartite theory of Government, to which practice had conformed, and which so long and uniform a practice would seem to have established. The face of the Constitution and the journalized proceedings of the Convention strongly indicate a partiality to that theory then at the zenith of favor among the most distinguished commentators on the organization of political power." Chief Justice Marshall fortified the position of Mr. Madison, by declaring that the action of the First Congress on this question "has ever been considered as a full expression of the sense of the Legislature on this important part of the American Constitution."

Of the thirty-nine members of the Convention of 1787 who signed the Constitution, thirteen, including Mr. Madison, were members of the first Congress; Alexander Hamilton was Secretary of the Treasury under the new Government; and above all, General Washington, who had presided over the deliberations of the Convention, had attentively listened to every discussion, and had carefully studied every provision, was President of the United States. More than one-third of the members of the Constitutional Convention were therefore engaged in the Executive and Legislative Departments of the new Government in applying the organic instrument which they had taken so large a part in creating. The cotemporaneous interpretation was by those facts rendered valuable if not authoritative. Cotemporaneous interpretations of organic law are not always, it is true, to be regarded as conclusive, but they are entitled to the most careful and respectful consideration, and cannot be reversed with safety unless the argument therefor is unanswerable and the motive which suggests the argument altogether patriotic and unselfish. The familiar rule laid down by Lord Coke is as pertinent to-day as when first announced: "Great regard ought, in construing a law, to be paid to the construction which the sages, who lived about the time soon after it was made, put upon it, because they were best able to judge of the intention of the makers at the time when the law was made. Contemporania exposito est fortissima in legem."

Against the early decision of the founders of the Government, against the ancient and safe rule of interpretation prescribed by Lord Coke, against the repeatedly expressed judgment of ex-President Madison, against the equally emphatic judgment of Chief Justice Marshall, and above all, against the unbroken practice of the Government for seventy-eight years, the Republican leaders now determined to deprive the President of the power of removing Federal officers. Many were induced to join in the movement under the belief that it was important to test the true meaning of the Constitution in the premises, and that this could be most effectively done by directly restraining by law the power which had been so long conceded to the Executive Department. To that end Mr. Williams of Oregon on the first Monday of December, 1866, introduced a bill "to regulate the tenure of civil offices." It was referred to the Committee on Retrenchment, and reported back with amendment by Mr. Edmunds of Vermont, who thenceforward assumed parliamentary control of the subject.

The bill came up for discussion on the 10th day of January. Its first section provided that every person except members of the Cabinet, "holding any civil office to which he has been appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and every person who shall hereafter be appointed to such office, shall be entitled to hold such office until a successor shall have been, in like manner, appointed and duly qualified, except as herein otherwise provided." The second section declared that "when any officer shall, during the recess of the Senate, be shown by evidence satisfactory to the President, to be guilty of misconduct in office, or crime, or for any reason shall become legally disqualified or incapable of performing the duties of his office; in such case, and in no other, the President may suspend such officer and designate some suitable person to perform temporarily the duties of such office, until the next meeting of the Senate, and until the case shall be acted upon by the Senate: and in such case it shall be the duty of the President, within twenty days after the first day of such meeting of the Senate, to report to the Senate such suspension, with the evidence and reasons for the same, and if the Senate shall concur in such suspension, and advise and consent to the removal of such officer, they shall so certify to the President, who shall thereupon remove such officer, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate appoint another person to such office; but if the Senate shall refuse to concur in such suspension, such officer so suspended shall forthwith resume the functions of his office, and the powers of the person so performing its duties in his stead shall cease."