On July 2d, we moved from our position at Malvern Hill to Harrison's Landing, to which point the Federals had retreated to the shelter of their gun boats; on the 3d some skirmishing occurred, as also on the following days. We remained in his front for four or five days. The storm and downpour of rain the day after Malvern Hill in its discomforts and injury to the army, ammunition and stores was distressing. Preceding and following this storm the beaming sun heated the humid atmosphere and made the army as miserable as well could be, but relief soon came in our removal to the Mechanicsville road near Richmond. Here we were free from mosquito ridden marshes and poison laden atmosphere, endured for half a month, in daily battle, the march and duties of soldiers in active war.
The seven days' battles were ended and had resulted in freeing the Capital City of immediate menace. McClellan at the head of his splendid army of over 110,000 well-equipped soldiers at its gates for many months perfecting plans for entrance over the opposition of 63,000 Confederates under Johnston, had been beaten, swept back and left in no condition to renew the effort. This relief of Richmond was contributed to by the battle of Seven Pines of May 23. Before that time—as stated in accounts and reports—"McClellan had advanced his left wing consisting of two of his five corps from his position on the north of the Chickahominy to the south of that stream, heavy spring rains had converted the streams into torrents, his military bridges across the Chickahominy into trembling and swaying structures, and the mud and mire made the movement and use of his heavy artillery practically impossible. The astute Johnston saw McClellan's faulty position, and availed himself of the opportunity to attack his left wing on May 23d. He drove it from the field and back more than a mile, capturing many prisoners, a number of pieces of artillery, small arms and a number of tents."
Unfortunately Johnston was struck by a fragment of shell late in the afternoon of the first day, knocked from his horse, and carried from the field in an insensible condition. Major-General G. W. Smith succeeded to command. McClellan had gotten Sumner's Corps to his left wing, and thus reinforced the Federals entrenched their position, and the battles of the succeeding days amounted to little more than skirmishes and were without material results. The treacherous Chickahominy now intervened between McClellan's two corps on the north and his three corps on the south of that stream. This position was so held June 26, at the time of the advance of Lee who had been assigned to the command of the army on the first day of that month.
There can be no question but that Johnston's attack was wise and successful, not only because he won the day, but because he drew a large part of McClellan's right wing from the north to the south of the Chickahominy, thus leaving much less than half of the Federal army on the north of the river, and contributing to Lee's success against this isolated right wing. At this time McClellan's entire army must have aggregated 110,000 to 115,000. In the early part of May his force was placed at 110,000. Lee's entire army, including Jackson, was 80,000 to 85,000. With this inferior force in numbers much was accomplished, yet with the attending advantages greater results might have been attained. There does not seem to have been any fault in Lee's plans or leadership; but fault, if such existed, must have been lack of cooperation by the separate commands.
Yet unforeseen conditions may have prevented this. Lee risked much when he withdrew his main army from Richmond to the north of the Chickahominy, leaving but 25,000 men under Magruder to defend the city against more than twice to three times their number of the best of McClellan's army; but this, of course, was considered by Lee, and results justified his course. The victories of the seven days were substantial, except Malvern Hill, which, except for the freeing of Richmond, nearly offset the previous six days. The attack on such a position so manned and garrisoned was a mistake.