CHAPTER TWELVE
Strength of Federal position. Three Days Battle. Retired to Hagerstown. Remained there eight days. Return to Virginia.
Lee, as plainly appears, was at great disadvantage in respect to position. He held the arc and his lines were about four miles long, while Meade held the chord of the arc and his lines were but little over one mile long. The difference in distances enabled Meade to reach with reinforcements any part of his lines in less than a third of the time necessary for Lee. Looking at conditions as then existing there would seem to be much in the claim that Meade should have been maneuvered out of this stronghold, and especially so after he had taken Little Round Top, the key to the field; the possession of which alone by the Confederates would have rendered the Federal position untenable.
This could have been captured without material opposition had the attack been made against the Federal left at dawn on the 2d, instead of at 2 p. m. One hour earlier than 2 would have sufficed for this important capture. At about 3 o'clock Hood, with Benning's and Anderson's brigades, flanked the Federal left and fought his way to it and ascended its rugged, western side; but Vincent's Federal Brigade had reached its summit just in time to meet the assault, and being rapidly reinforced held the position. Delay lost it. This gained would have won the battle for the Confederates.
During Longstreet's fight, in which he met relay after relay of fresh troops and accomplished many brilliant feats, driving back in the end the Federals to their final line on the ridge, the corps of Ewell and Hill, facing the Federal right, stood by without firing a gun. This left Meade free to hurl his fresh reserves against Longstreet and beat him to exhaustion. Then Ewell and Hill moved against the Federal right at Culps and Cemetery Hills, Meade again being left free to concentrate his reinforcements against them. The fight at Culps Hill continued until about noon of the 3d. After this Pickett's division, being the only fresh Confederates, made the famous charge already mentioned. Thus the great "Army of Northern Virginia" had been beaten in detail. The concentration of the Federals by reason of position gave them the advantage, while distance prevented Lee from reinforcing his wings in time. Then, too, there was lack of simultaneous advance and cooperation; time and distance prevented the necessary quick communication and movement of troops. It is difficult, if not impossible, for large, separate bodies of troops to move at the same time from the circumference to a central point, as was necessary here.
Looking back it is quite plausible that the best hope was in an attack at dawn against Meade's left, which at that time could have been easily turned and his position won, as it would have threatened his rear and communications with Washington, and would also have protected Lee's communications as well.
This battle and campaign was the crucial period of the Confederacy. It was an open secret, gained from rumor, that success would bring recognition of her independence by England, and later by France. Other nations would doubtless fall in line, and the blockade of her ports would soon have been raised. Credit and trade relations with other nations, the enlargement of her armies and munitions of war, would follow; and permanent independence would be established. The high tide of Confederate hopes and prospects were now passed, and on the night of the 4th Lee retired toward Hagerstown. His army was much weakened and in great need of rest. The Federals made one or two feeble attacks on our rear guard which were promptly repulsed.
On the afternoon of the fifth I was placed in command of a detail of men and wagons and directed to make a detour to the left of the column to gather food supplies. I was provided with Confederate currency with which to pay for such supplies. My route was over a mile out and parallel with the course of the column. The well supplied homes enabled me to soon load the wagons and get them under way on a country road that converged toward the column. I now discovered a battalion of Federal cavalry in the distance, bearing down upon us. I ordered the teamsters to move forward with all speed. We quickly reached the outer edge of the open lands and entered the thickly wooded course of the narrow road, so closely pursued that I was compelled to give battle.
I had time to place my men and deliver fire at close range with signal effect on men and horses. This sudden, and perhaps unexpected attack, threw them into great confusion, necessitating a reformation further back. They had, however, discovered the inadequacy of my force and were rapidly reforming. I saw the wagons some distance to my front, curving to the right, the road evidently entering the little valley to my right about three hundred yards to the front. The valley thus formed the chord of the circle, and hence was shorter than the road which formed the circle, but my advanced position gave advantage in distance. I now started with all possible speed with my little force toward this junction of road and valley, and almost immediately the charge up the valley began as anticipated. It was an exciting struggle. My men were strung out quite a distance along the way; and as we neared the junction the race was about even, with forces moving on parallel lines a short distance apart. My men now opened fire and luckily shot some of the foremost horses just as they were entering a narrow pass in their front. This blocked the way, impeded the charge and threw the cavalry into confusion which was increased by the continual firing of my command. Farther on we took an advantageous position, but were soon relieved by Confederate cavalry and rejoined the passing column.
The column reached the vicinity of Hagerstown on the evening of the 6th. The Potomac River by reason of recent rains was much swollen and intervened between Lee's army and Virginia from whence ammunition, now practically exhausted, had to be procured. The army was placed in position and entrenched itself against the approaching Federal army which did not appear in its front until the 12th, but failed to attack or to show an intention of so doing. Tired of waiting longer, Lee withdrew his army on the early morning of the 15th to Virginia. Ewell's Corps now remained in the valley for some time, then moved to the east side of the Blue Ridge. Nothing of importance transpired with this corps during the remaining season. On the approach of winter, camp was pitched in Orange County in rear of the Rapidan River. Thus ended the campaigns of 1863.