Luck, then, decided the tenure of the tribes in Canaan—a title dictated by Divinity.
Joshua determined, by lot, that it was Achan, of the tribe of Judah, who had taken “the accursed thing” and thus brought upon Israel the disaster at Ai. (Josh. 7:14.) During the great battle of Michmash-Aijalon, Saul said unto the Israelites: “Cursed be the man that eateth any food until evening, that I may be avenged on my enemies.”
Unmindful of this oath, wild honey was eaten by his son, in a moment of extreme hunger. No one would divulge that the king’s adjuration had been disregarded by the beloved Jonathan. “Therefore, Saul said unto the Lord God of Israel, give a perfect lot. And Saul and Jonathan were taken: but the people escaped. And Saul said, Cast lots between me and Jonathan, my son. And Jonathan was taken.” (1 Sam. 14:40, 42.)
By lot, likewise, the question of “ministry and apostleship” was decided against Justus and in favor of Matthias. (Acts 1:26.)
Briefly, if the Bible is a divine production, how can appeals to chance be stigmatized as vicious or irreligious? Also, it is not to be denied that chance, or casualty, enters very largely into every department of human action. Men are compelled to take ventures every day; the engineer faces them; so does the sea captain; the same may be said of the doctor, the surgeon, the lawyer and the banker. A merchant encounters all the risks of trade; the hostility of the elements and the bankruptcy of others. The rains may rot or the drouths destroy the crops of the farmer. And almost, in the words of Ben Jonson, throughout the world,
“All human business, fortune doth command,
Without all order, and with her blind hand,
She, blind, bestows blind gifts, that still have nurst,
They see not who nor how.”
The politician, too, might say with Macbeth: “If chance will have me king, why, chance may crown me.” War is a mighty game between giants. In truth, of Napoleon the poet has said:
“Whose game was empires, and whose stakes were thrones,
Whose table, earth; whose dice, were human bones.”
Beyond this, even our laws and institutions appeal to chance. In the United States Senate, whom, respectively, of two members—elected at the same time—shall serve for the long and short term, is decided by lot. The law recognizes that even property may be thus divided. “When an estate is apportioned into three parts, and one part is given to each of three persons; the proper way is to ascertain each one’s part by drawing lots.” Thus is the rule stated by Bouvier and Wolff. The Illinois Statutes, for the regulation of elections, enact that “when two or more persons receive an equal and the highest number of votes for an office to be filled by the county alone, that county clerk shall issue a notice to such persons of such tie vote, and require them to appear at his office, on a day named in the notice, within ten days from the day of election, and determine by lot which of them is to be declared elected. On the day appointed the clerk and other canvassers shall attend, and the parties interested shall appear and determine by lot which of them is to be declared elected.” Similar laws exist in other states.
Some moralists admit the validity of a transaction, notwithstanding it may depend upon chance. They will concede there is no intrinsic wrong in any species of game, unless there exists an inequality of chance or skill. Not so, thought Paley, the Christian philosopher, whose name is a household word for purity, zeal and power. He said: “What some say of this kind of contract, that one side ought not to have any advantage over the other, is neither practical nor true. This would require perfect equality of skill and judgment, which is seldom to be met with. I might not have it in my power to play with fairness a game of cards once in a twelvemonth, if I must wait till I meet with a person whose art, skill and judgment are neither greater nor less than my own. Nor is this equality requisite to the justice of the contract. One man may give to another the whole of the stake if he chooses, and the other may justly accept it if it be given him; much more, therefore, may one give another an advantage in the chance of winning the whole. The only proper restriction is, that neither side have an advantage by means of which the other is not aware. The same distinction holds of all transactions and proceedings into which chance enters; such as insurance, and speculations in trade or in stocks.”