"MY DEAR SIR,
"Commodore Fischer having, in a public letter, given an account to the world of the battle of the 2d, called upon his royal highness as a witness to the truth of it. I, therefore, think it right to address myself to you, for the information of his royal highness; as, I assure you, had this officer confined himself to his own veracity, I should have treated his official letter with the contempt it deserved, and allowed the world to appreciate the merits of the two contending officers. I shall make a few, and very few, observations on this letter. He asserts the superiority of numbers on the part of the British; it will turn out, if that is of any consequence, that the Danish line of defence, to the southward of the Crown Islands, was much stronger, and more numerous, than the British. We had only five sail of seventy-fours, two sixty-fours, two fifties, and one frigate, engaged; a bomb vessel, towards the latter end, threw some shells into the arsenal. Two seventy-fours, and one sixty-four, by an accident, grounded; or the Crown Islands, and the Elephanten and Mars, would have had full employment: and, by the assistance of the frigates—who went to try, alone, what I had directed the three sail of the line who grounded to assist them in—I have reason to hope, they would have been equally successful as that part of the British line engaged. I am ready to admit, that many of the Danish officers and men behaved as well as men could do, and deserved not to be abandoned by their commander. I am justified in saying this, from Commodore Fischer's own declaration. In his own letter, he states that, after he quitted the Dannebrog, she long contested the battle. If so, more shame for him to quit so many brave fellows! Here was no manoeuvering, it was downright fighting; and it was his duty to have shewn an example of firmness becoming the high trust reposed in him. He went in such a hurry, if he went before she struck—which, but for his own declaration, I can hardly believe—that he forgot to take his broad pendant with him, for both pendant and ensign were struck together; and it is from this circumstance, that I claimed the commodore as a prisoner of war. He then went, as he says, on board the Holstein—the brave captain of which did not want him—where he did not hoist his pendant. From this ship, he went on shore, either before or after she struck, or he would have been again a prisoner. As to his nonsense about victory, his royal highness will not much credit him. I sunk, burnt, captured, or drove into the harbour, the whole line of defence to the southward of the Crown Islands. He says, he is told that two British ships struck. Why did he not take possession of them? I took possession of his as fast as they struck. The reason is clear, that he did not believe it. He must have known the falsity of the report, and that no fresh British ships did come near the ships engaged. He states, that the ship in which I had the honour to hoist my flag fired, latterly, only single guns. It is true; for steady and cool were my brave fellows, and did not wish to throw away a single shot. He seems to exult, that I sent on shore a flag of truce. Men of his description, if they ever are victorious, know not the feel of humanity. You know, and his royal highness knows, that the guns fired from the shore could only fire through the Danish ships which had surrendered; and that, if I fired at the shore, it could only be in the same manner. God forbid, that I should destroy an unresisting Dane! When they became my prisoners, I became their protector. Humanity alone, could have been my object; but Mr. Fischer's carcase was safe, and he regarded not the sacred call of humanity. His royal highness thought as I did. It has brought about an armistice; which, I pray the Almighty, may bring about a happy reconciliation between the two kingdoms. As I have not the names of all the ships correct—only of the thirteen, including the seven sail of the line which struck, remained at anchor, and fell into my possession after the battle—I shall, therefore, be very much obliged to you, for a correct list of their names; and the number of men, if possible to be obtained, on board each, and the numbers sent from the shore during the action. My earnest wish is, to be correct; and believe me, dear Sir, with great esteem, your most obedient servant,
"Nelson and Bronte."
"General-Adjutant Lindholm."
Whatever severity may appear in this retort, it's, justice would be with difficulty refuted. The answer of General-Adjutant Lindholm apologizes, with very considerable address, for the commander in chief; but that honourable officer's reasoning is also tinctured with as much national partiality as is consistent with a due regard to truth. This is no uncommon effect of patriotic zeal in the best minds, and may be traced even in that of our hero.
"Copenhagen, 2d May 1801.
"MY LORD!
"Your lordship has imposed upon me a very painful task, by desiring me to communicate to his Royal Highness the Crown Prince the contents of that letter with which your lordship has favoured me the 22d of April; and in which you have treated Commodore Fischer with a severity which, as a brother officer, I cannot but think too great, indeed, I conceive, that your lordship has felt a certain degree of displeasure at that incorrectness which you have thought to find in Commodore Fischer's official report; but your lordship did not fully consider, at that moment, that he himself might have received incorrect reports: a fatality to which every commander in chief is exposed. I flatter myself, from your lordship's well-known candour and indulgence, that you will not think it presuming in me, or contrary to the respect I feel for your lordship, if I take the liberty of offering you some few observations in vindication of the conduct of Commodore Fischer. But, first, let me have the honour to assure your lordship, that I have not communicated to that officer your letter of the 22d of April; and that, what I take the liberty of offering your lordship, is absolutely my private and individual opinion.
"Your lordship thinks, that Commodore Fischer has over-rated the forces by which he was attacked, and under-rated his own; or, that he wrongly asserts the superiority of numbers on the part of the British. I must confess, that I am now, as I have always been, of opinion, that the squadron with which your lordship attacked our southern line of defence, say all those ships and vessels lying to the southward of the Crown Battery, was stronger then than that line. I will say nothing about our not having time sufficient to man our ships in the manner it was intended: they being badly manned, both as to number and as to quality of their crews, the greatest part of which were landmen; people that had been pressed, and who never before had been on board a ship or used to the exercise of guns. I will not mention our ships being old and rotten, and not having one-third of our usual complement of officers; I will confine myself to the number of guns, and from the ships named in your lordship's official report: and there I find, that your squadron carried one thousand and fifty-eight guns, of much greater calibre than our's; exclusive of carronnades, which did our ships so much injury; also, exclusive of your gun-brigs and bomb-vessels.
"Now, I can assure your lordship, upon my honour, that to my certain knowledge the number of guns on board of those eighteen ships and vessels of our's which were engaged (including the small ship the Elbe, which came into the harbour towards the end of the action) amount to six hundred and thirty-four, I have not included our eleven gun-boats, carrying each two guns, as a couple of them only had an opportunity of firing a few shot. Nor need I to mention the Crown Battery, on which sixty-six guns were mounted, as that battery did not fairly get into action, and only fired a few random shot.