"Fitzhugh Lee had come up from Auburn expecting to gain, unopposed, the rear of Kilpatrick's division, but he found Custer's brigade at Broad Run ready to oppose him. A fierce fight ensued."
Major McClellan also quotes Major P.P. Johnston, who commanded a section of Breathed's battery in the fight, as saying:
"My battery was hotly engaged. The battle was of the most obstinate character, Fitz. Lee exerting himself to the utmost to push the enemy, and Custer seeming to have no thought of retiring."
The battle was opened by Wickham's brigade of Virginians commanded by Colonel T.H. Owen of the Third Virginia cavalry. It was the First, Second and Third Virginia that led the advance. Pennington gave Breathed's battery much the worst of it.
The truth is that Fitz. Lee did not find Custer ready to oppose him, though it did not take him long to get ready, after he was attacked. Custer with most of his command was well on his way to follow Kilpatrick. Only one regiment was left behind, and that one regiment—the Sixth Michigan cavalry—was taken entirely by surprise when fired upon by the vidette, and was all that Colonel Owen had in front of him when he arrived and began the attack. It is possible that ignorance of what it was facing helped the Sixth Michigan to hold on till Custer could be notified and brought back. And again, it is possible that Custer was marching more slowly than the writer wots of; that he suspected the ruse which was being played by his old West Point instructor,[21] and sent the regiment out there for the express purpose of developing the enemy, if enemy there was, making a feint of moving away so as to deceive, but keeping an ear to windward to catch the first sound of danger. It has always seemed to the writer that General Custer must have had a motive which did not appear on the surface, in giving that order. His order was to go 500 yards. Five hundred yards would have brought us to the woods. If he suspected that there might be an enemy there, no surer way to find out whether his suspicions were well founded or not could have been chosen. One thing is certain. He was back in an incredibly short space of time. It may be that he heard the sound of firing and was on his way when the adjutant found him.
Fitzhugh Lee followed Custer half way to Gainesville and then withdrew. Near that place was found a line of federal infantry sent out to support the cavalry, but it did not advance far enough to get into the fight.
That night, Kilpatrick invited all the officers of the division to his headquarters and made a sorry attempt at merry-making over the events of the day. There were milk-punch and music, both of very good quality, but the punch, palatable as it undeniably was, did not serve to take away the bad taste left by the affair, especially among the officers of the First brigade. Custer's men did not feel so badly. They had saved their bacon and their battery, and the wariness, prudence and pluck of their young commander had prevented a much more serious disaster than had actually happened.
It may be of interest enough to mention that Fitz. Lee told the writer, in Yorktown, in 1881, that Stuart was at fault in stopping to fight at Buckland Mills; that, under the arrangement with him (Lee) Stuart should have fallen back very rapidly, without making any resistance whatever, until he had lured Kilpatrick with his entire division some distance beyond the bridge. In that event, General Lee would have found the opportunity he was seeking. But he did not know about Custer's action in insisting on stopping there. He was much surprised when informed of the true state of things, since he had felt that Stuart was blameworthy in the matter. He had supposed that it was Stuart's resistance to the federal advance which kept Custer's brigade back until his arrival, and foiled his well planned attempt.