The Southern Case for School Segregation

by James Jackson Kilpatrick

Their first handiwork, the Articles of Confederation, is too much denounced and too little read. “This despised government,” said Patrick Henry, defending the Confederation, “merits, in my opinion, the highest encomium: It carried us through a long and dangerous war; it rendered us victorious in that bloody conflict with a powerful nation; it has secured us a territory greater than any European monarch possesses; and shall a government which has been thus strong and vigorous be accused of imbecility and abandoned for want of energy?” It is popularly supposed that when the delegates assembled at Philadelphia in 1787, they tossed the whole of the Articles unceremoniously aside, and set out from scratch to compose a Constitution. They did nothing of the sort. The revisions they made were fundamental, of course, but the principles of political power under which the United States live today are in essence the principles embodied in the Articles of Confederation.

Here in the Articles are to be found many of the phrases, and indeed, many of the specific provisions, that endure in the Constitution. The genesis of the Tenth Amendment appears as the first substantive clause in the compact: “Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.”

Article III bound the States in a firm league of friendship “for their common defense, the security of their Liberties, and their mutual and general welfare”; the phrases were to reappear in the preamble to the Constitution of 1787. Article IV guaranteed to the inhabitants of each State “all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States,” a guarantee carried over to Article IV, Section 2. The extradition of fugitives from one State to another, the rule of “full faith and credit” among the States, the immunity of Congressmen, and the flat prohibition upon the granting of titles of nobility all stem from the Articles. It often is forgotten, but the States laid upon themselves in the Articles of Confederation many of the prohibitions they were to accept a few years later in the Constitution: No States were to enter into any compact without the consent of Congress; no States were to keep troops or ships of war in time of peace without the consent of Congress “unless such State be actually invaded by enemies, or ... the danger is so imminent as not to admit of delay,” a provision echoed to this day, almost exactly, in Article I, Section 10. The powers vested in the Congress under the Articles of Confederation also have a familiar ring—to coin money, fix standards of weights and measures, regulate trade, establish post offices, borrow money, build and equip a navy, and appropriate funds “for defraying the public expenses.”

But the Articles of Confederation, for all the thoughtful provisions they provided as progenitors of the Constitution, had serious and admitted defects as well. If there was to be something more than a “firm league of friendship” among sovereign States, a government had to be created capable of acting upon individuals as such. The most devoted friend of “States’ rights” willingly concedes that the “more perfect Union” provided for in the Constitution of 1787 created a nation, even if the Constitution described it only as a “Union,” or as “the land.” Obviously, the supremacy clause in Article VI was something new, not in degree, but in kind: “This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”

That clause alone, coupled with Article III and with John Marshall’s effective establishment of the principle of judicial review, created the “one out of many” that is the American Republic. Yet the objective student of public affairs who would understand the South’s classic and traditional position in advocacy of States’ rights should devote some thoughtful attention to certain aspects of the Constitution that have remained unchanged from the very beginning of the Union, surviving civil war and the growth of nearly two centuries—aspects that remain unchanged to this day.

At the risk of being tedious, it is necessary to examine the Constitution as it is, and not as centralizers might wish it to be. This is our organic law, the basis of our public institutions; the spirit that lives and breathes in it is the American spirit, and the great beams and foundation stones of this written compact support the whole structure of our government. The few paragraphs that follow may seem elementary. They are, in fact, essential to an appreciation of what was wrong with Brown v. Board of Education in 1954.

The preamble itself offers the first source of misunderstanding. It begins, of course, “We the people of the United States,” and for 175 years superficial students of the Constitution have been crying triumphantly that the opening three words prove the existence of some national democracy: “We, the people.” The demonstrable facts prove no such thing. On Monday, August 6, 1787, the Philadelphia convention received its first full draft of a Constitution. The preamble submitted by South Carolina’s John Rutledge on that day read as follows: “We the people of the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, do ordain, declare and establish the following Constitution for the Government of Ourselves and our Posterity.” The preamble in this form was adopted the following day without dissent, and indeed without debate. It was not until September 10, when the weary delegates were ready to have the final document whipped into form by a committee on style, that the presumptuousness of the draft preamble became apparent. James Wilson of Pennsylvania made the point that it would be “worse than folly to rely on the concurrence of Rhode Island.” The State of New York, he observed, “has not been represented for a long time past in the Convention.” North Carolina’s agreement was most uncertain. Many individuals from other States had spoken against the plan. And though Wilson was here addressing himself to a specific proposal that the draft Constitution be submitted first to the Congress, rather than directly to the States, his remarks made obvious good sense to members of the committee on style. They prudently recast the preamble to omit all mention of specific States—how could they know which nine would bind themselves by ratification?—and the preamble emerged as we know it. The point is that there was not the slightest doubt in the minds of the delegates at Philadelphia, or in the minds of the State conventions thereafter, that “We the people” meant, as Madison said, “We the people of the States as thirteen sovereignties.”

The first eight words of Article I are important: “All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested....” We are dealing, at the outset, as the careful choice of a noun makes clear, with powers, and with a specific kind of power: legislative power. These powers are “granted herein,” which is to say, granted by the ratifying States in the Constitution itself, and in no other place; and these powers are to be “vested” (a most judicious verb) in the Congress.

In Section 2 of Article I, the first of more than ninety references to “the States” appears: The House of Representatives is to be composed of members chosen every second year “by the people of the several States.” No congressional district ever may extend across a State line, for “the electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature.” Moreover, every Representative must be “an inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.” Then follows the enumeration of the States to whom the Constitution would be submitted, if they wished to enter the Union: The State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to choose three members of the House, Massachusetts eight, and so forth.

Section 3 deals with composition of the Senate. A preposition is important here: To become a Senator, a man must be an inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen. From the beginning, the concept has been that Representatives represent people, or groups of people, or districts of people; Senators speak for the larger, mystical entity of the States themselves.